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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the use of tax incentives to promote foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Thailand and the issues arising out of the way in which the Thai revenue 
system has chosen to implement these incentives. Thailand experiences sporadic 
political unrest, and has been affected by regional and global economic crises. Since 
FDI appears to increase economic growth and help the host country to achieve 
sustainable development, the Thai government has a clear policy to encourage FDI. Tax 
incentives have become a significant weapon in the Thai government’s arsenal for 
encouraging this aim. This thesis presents a detailed analysis of the tax incentives and 
the mechanisms used for their implantation. Analysis reveals that, unfortunately, the 
Thai government has also chosen to deliver the administration of tax incentives in to the 
hands of two separate bodies ─ the Revenue Department and the Board of Investment 
(BOI). This strategy is problematic because it creates unnecessary difficulties and 
uncertainty in the administration of incentives and promotes confusion among foreign 
investors. The jurisdictional problems inherent in the system of the dual allocation of 
tax incentive powers are highlighted in the landmark Minebea case, which involved 
conflicting interpretations by the Revenue Department and the BOI.  
In addressing these jurisdictional problems, this thesis examines norm conflict 
resolution principles in general and the lex specialis in particular, and argues that the 
Investment Promotion Act of 2001 (IPA 2001), being a special law, and so overrides the 
more general provisions of the Revenue Code. Two solutions are suggested in order to 
tackle the current problem: 1) to amend the IPA 2001 to specify methods of tax 
calculation and clearly define problematic terms and 2) to incorporate the tax incentive 
provisions provided for BOI-promoted companies into the Revenue Code. This is based 
on the premise that all tax matters, including tax incentives provisions, should be 
administered only by the revenue authority, i.e. the Revenue Department. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
Thailand’s economic growth has been driven significantly by investment, and foreign 
investment is a particularly important factor for economic development. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) contributes sources of capital to the host country and can have a long-
term impact on Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Additionally, FDI has brought into 
Thailand a large amount of technology and knowledge transfer, creating the right 
conditions to achieve sustainable development.
1
 Thailand has been affected by the 
current global economic crisis
2
, and since 2006 its economic and investment situations 
have been worsened following domestic political unrest. On 19 September 2006, Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup, as announced by General 
Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the leader of the Council for Democratic Reform
3
, and went into 
self-imposed exile after being indicted on corruption charges.
4
 His supporters went on 
to stage major protests against the new government, led by Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva.
5
 The crisis has brought to the fore issues of media freedom, the role of the 
constitution in breaking political deadlock
6
, the problem of significant disparity between 
rich and poor and governmental abuses of power. 
                                                          
1
 Heike Baumüller, ‘Sustainable Development Impacts of Investment Incentives in Southeast Asia’ 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development 2009) 13-23 
<www.iisd.org/tkn/pdf/competing_business_southeast_asia.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
 
2
 Krist Decharuk, Pornnapa Leelapornchai and Manop Udomkerdmongkol, ‘Thailand Investment in the 
Post-Crisis Era: Issues and Challenges’ (Bank of Thailand Discussion Paper April 2009) 24 
<www.bot.or.th/English/EconomicConditions/.../dp042009_eng.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
3
 Michael Nelson, Thaksin Overthrown: The ‘Well-intentioned’ Coup of September 19, 2006, eastasia.at 
Vol. 6, No. 1, 1 June 2007 <http://www.eastasia.at/vol6_1/article01.htm> accessed 10
 
November 2011. 
4
 Anis Chowdhury, Handbook on the Northeast and Southeast Asian economies (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2007) 130-131. 
5
 For an overview of Thailand‘s political map, see Oxford Business Group, The Report Thailand 2011. 
6
 See Peter Leyland, ‘The emergence of administrative justice in Thailand under the 1997 Constitution’ in 
Tom Ginsburg and Hongyi Chen, Administrative law and governance in Asia: comparative perspectives, 
(Taylor & Francis 2008) 232. 
2 
 
Thailand’s political unrest has greatly affected the local economy and weakened foreign 
investors’ confidence in doing business in the country.7 A survey of American 
multinational companies showed that political risk is the single most significant 
negative factor influencing potential investors.
8
 In addition, a survey conducted in 2009 
indicated that political risk is ranked the highest factor among major constraints on 
foreign investment in emerging markets.
9
 A perceived risk of war, terrorism or civil 
unrest will obviously have a hugely detrimental impact on FDI.
10
  
As well as domestic political unrest and worldwide economic instability, the following 
specific factors, which will be described in more detail in Chapter 4, have also given 
foreign investors reasons to doubt Thailand as a suitable location. First, the Bank of 
Thailand decided to implement an unremunerated 30% reserve requirement on short-
term capital inflows; second, the government plans to amend the Foreign Business Act 
1999 (FBA) to prevent foreign investors from using nominee shareholders or 
preferential voting rights to take control of Thai companies in restricted sectors; third, 
the Map Ta Put legal entanglement over environmental issues has been criticised for 
lacking clarity where investment regulations are concerned and lastly, the damage 
caused to manufacturing production and plants by severe flooding in late 2011 has been 
huge. 
The Thai government has initiated a number of policies to boost the confidence of 
foreign investors and to aid economic recovery. The Board of Investment (BOI) is a 
government agency responsible for granting and administering fiscal and non-fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
For a critique of the most significant changes introduced as part of the 2007 Thai Constitution, see Peter 
Leyland, ‘Constitutional Design and the Quest for Good Governance in Thailand’ in Tania Groppi, 
Valeria Piergigli and Angelo Rinella (eds), Asian constitutionalism in transition. A comparative 
perspective (Giuffre Editore 2008) 69-104. 
7Euromonitor International, ‘Political instability in Thailand affects ASEAN countries’ 6 July 2010  
<http://blog.euromonitor.com/2010/07/political-instability-in-thailand-affects-asean-countries.html>   
accessed 10 November 2011, Jon Fernquest, ‘Long political crisis hurts investment’ (Bangkok Post, 6 
July 2011) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/245778/long-political-conflict-
hurts-investment> accessed 10 November 2011. 
8
 Alex Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, (Kluwer Law International 2004) 29. 
9
 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, ‘World Investment and Political Risk 09’, World Bank 
Group 29 <www.miga.org/documents/flagship09ebook_chap2.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
10
 For opinions regarding Thai domestic political unrest and its effect on investment, see Newley Purnell, 
‘Thailand: Bangkok Dangerous’ Newly.com, 3 May 2010 
<http://newley.com/archive_thailand_bangkok_dangerous/> accessed 10 November 2011. 
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incentives to encourage both domestic and foreign private sector investment in priority 
activities and areas. The main focus of this thesis is the case of tax incentives, which 
constitute one of the means through which the BOI engages in investment promotion. 
Guidelines and criteria pertaining to businesses that are entitled to tax incentives are 
specified in the Investment Promotion Act of 2001 (IPA 2001). The responsibilities of 
the BOI and the problems raised by its involvement in tax administration are examined 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
Tax incentives are allocated by the BOI according to the IPA 2001 but are implemented 
and administrated, and the revenue collected, by the Revenue Department. The 
overlapping jurisdiction of these two authorities creates problems when BOI-promoted 
companies
11
 claim tax incentives from the BOI, but the Revenue Department seeks to 
collect tax as if no (or lesser) tax incentives exist. The provisions of the IPA 2001 
regarding tax incentives do not specify methods of tax calculation nor clearly define 
important terms. Under the current system, investors are able to seek clarification on the 
matter from both the BOI and the Revenue Department who invariably offer conflicting 
opinions. Where the situation becomes too complex, or there are accusations of 
illegality, investors can proceed through litigation. The most remarkable incidence, 
however, is the Minebea case, which concerns the calculation of the net profit and loss 
of BOI-promoted businesses. The case demonstrated that legislation and legal 
administration regarding tax incentives are problematic and need to be reformed. The 
Minebea case features prominently throughout this thesis, since it is, to date, the only 
case of its kind that has been heard by the Thai Supreme Court.   
This thesis argues that the current situation under which jurisdiction over tax incentives 
is split between the BOI and the Revenue Department creates unhelpful conflict that is 
both problematic and unsustainable and drastically increases compliance costs for both 
investors and the Thai authorities. As a consequence, these factors could lead to 
Thailand becoming an undesirable investment destination, to the detriment of its 
developing economy. This thesis argues that reform of the legislation is needed in order 
to remedy the defects in the current system. In essence, the contention is that the current 
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tax incentive system for FDI, which is regulated by non-tax legislation but implemented 
by the revenue body, does not exemplify good tax administration. This system is broken 
and needs fixing.  
1.2 Thesis Summary 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters beginning with a description of the issue’s 
background and contexts. It is then followed by a summary of the thesis and a 
description of its methodology and limitations.  
Chapter 2 examines the mechanism of the Thai legal system by outlining its specific 
characteristics, since it is as a civil law system with elements of a common law system. 
The chapter goes on to explain that Thailand adopted codified legislation following the 
pattern of continental European legal systems (civil law), before revealing the fact that 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy whereby the constitution recognises the king as 
the head of state. The organs of state, consisting of the executive, legislative and judicial 
bodies, are also discussed. This chapter also examines the Thai judicial system. Unlike 
broad judicial power under the common law system, the Thai court cannot itself 
develop a body of law, and so judgments are not categorised as a source of law. In 
practice, however, the judgments and rulings of the Supreme Court have persuasive 
authority over both itself and lower courts when relevant issues are raised. The 
precedents set by Supreme Court rulings are used only as considerations and sources of 
information, and are not legally binding. This stands in contrast to common law 
systems, which are bound by the precedents of earlier judgments and are subject to a 
greater degree of interpretation by judges. Chapter 2 also examines the structure of 
laws, including the supreme law (the Constitution), primary legislation and secondary 
legislation. The chapter ends with important information regarding the legal opinion of 
the Council of State, which will be discussed further in Chapters 6 and 8. 
 
The third chapter of this thesis deals with the Thai revenue system. It starts with a 
discussion of general purpose of taxation in Thailand, and then moves on to examine the 
sources of Thai tax law, which will be mentioned throughout the thesis. The chapter 
then discusses the principal taxes in Thailand, providing background information for the 
analysis of tax incentives in Chapter 5. The chapter’s emphasis is given to Thailand’s 
tax authorities, especially the Revenue Department and its roles. The Revenue 
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Department is one of the two main characters in the conflict of tax jurisdiction. The 
Thai tax court, its history and functions are also explained here to inform the reader of 
how tax matters are treated differently from normal cases. This chapter also examines 
the issue of statutory interpretation in Thailand and argues that where there is ambiguity 
in tax legislation, it should be interpreted in the taxpayer’s favour.  
 
Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of Thailand’s economic and investment situation. 
This chapter lays out the data concerning FDI inflows in the country and emphasises the 
significance of FDI to the economy. The Thai government’s policies on investment 
promotion, as well as major factors, which had or have affected investors’ confidence in 
doing business in Thailand, are examined. This is followed by an investigation of the 
investment promotion authority, the Board of Investment (BOI) which is in charge of 
granting investment promotion and incentives. This chapter introduces the history, roles 
and responsibilities of the BOI, which is the other character playing a crucial role in the 
conflict examined in this thesis. Chapter 4 also demonstrates the history of the 
Investment Promotion Act, and the scope of this law, which is discussed further in the 
analysis part in Chapter 6. 
In Chapter 5, the thesis moves on to an examination of the overall characteristics of tax 
incentives, both in general and in Thailand in particular. It also specifically examines 
the respective advantages and disadvantages of major tax incentive schemes. The main 
focus of this chapter is on the characteristics of those tax incentives available to foreign 
investors, but it also emphasises the discussion on the accounting rule that allows loss 
carry forward for tax purposes, which will be analysed in Chapter 6. Chapter 5 analyses 
the reasons for Thailand granting tax incentives and further discusses the links between 
tax incentives and FDI. Finally, an analytical account of tax incentives is presented in 
order to set the stage for future reform of the system. 
Chapter 6 highlights existing potential ambiguity in the interpretation of tax incentive 
provisions under the IPA 2001. This chapter focuses on the Minebea case, which 
concerns the problem of overlapping tax jurisdictions, especially for the interpretation 
of net profit and loss calculations. Under the current system, the BOI, under Section 31 
Paragraph 4 of the IPA 2001, allows BOI-promoted companies to deduct annual losses 
incurred during the period of corporate income tax exemption. The fundamental issue is 
the term ‘annual losses’ used in this provision. It could be construed to mean the annual 
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loss of each individual BOI-promoted project or the annual loss should be offset against 
the net profit of all other BOI-promoted projects within the same accounting period. 
The chapter demonstrates that the consequences of this problem can affect current BOI-
promoted operations, as well as companies considering investing in Thailand. An 
analysis of this issue highlights the problems caused by unclear legislation and the 
overlapping jurisdictions dealing with tax incentives. In addition, the chapter thoroughly 
analyses the views of the BOI, BOI- promoted companies, the Revenue Department, the 
Council of State, and the Thai tax court, finding that the current situation entails the 
inclusion of tax incentive provisions in non-tax legislation; in this case, the IPA 2001 is 
unclear enough to create problems where it conflicts with the Revenue Code. The 
inclusion of tax provisions in non-tax legislation, especially in the IPA 2001, is argued 
to have adverse effects on Thailand’s investment climate. 
Chapter 7 raises two related questions. First, which laws should apply in the situations 
of conflict examined? Secondly, what the consequences are of applying the laws to the 
current problem? It examines norm conflict resolution principles, both generally and in 
Thailand’s legal system in particular. The focus is on the principles of lex superior, lex 
posterior and lex specialis. This chapter evaluates how norm conflict resolution 
principles can be applied to the particular problem raised in Chapter 6. It also argues 
that the problem of conflict between the Revenue Code and the IPA 2001 should be 
solved according to the lex specialis rule, i.e. the IPA 2001 should override the Revenue 
Code in this case because the IPA 2001 is a specific law. This chapter suggests that the 
current overlapping of tax jurisdictions creates uncertainty among government officials 
and investors, and then goes on to posit a solution to this issue and the need to amend 
the IPA 2001’s provisions on tax incentives.  
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises this thesis’ findings, suggesting that where unclear tax 
legislation is concerned, an interpreter of the law is required to exercise caution 
regarding statutory interpretation and to pay close attention to the drafting process. The 
chapter concludes the thesis with an examination of the proposal to amend tax incentive 
provisions under the IPA 2001, and the implications of the amendment. The 
recommendations of this thesis go beyond amendments to the IPA 2001 as they propose 
reform by incorporating tax incentive provisions in the Revenue Code. A number of 
potential difficulties are taken into account, and solutions are suggested in order to 
achieve the best possible benefits for Thailand and foreign investors. 
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The research methodology is based on textual analysis, adopted a doctrinal approach 
and examines primary and secondary sources from substantive laws, judgments and 
documents held by libraries in the United Kingdom and Thailand, relevant government 
authorities, and online sources. Secondary sources regarding investment, FDI and 
economic aspects are obtained from the Bank of Thailand, the Thailand Board of 
Investment, OECD, UNCTAD, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Asian Development 
Bank.  
This thesis does not attempt to offer an in-depth analysis of the propriety of tax 
incentives in general or to discuss the possibility of their abolition, whether in Thailand 
or elsewhere. Instead, it merely engages with the policy as declared by the Thai 
government, and examines critically the policy as implemented. Details of customs and 
excise laws are excluded from this thesis, as it focuses only on income tax laws.  
8 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
2 The Thai Legal System 
 
Introduction 
The Thai legal system is a civil law system, but is also incorporates aspects of common 
law systems. This chapter will present the development of Thai law as a combination of 
the two systems. It provides an essential background for the analysis that follows, since 
it discusses the sources of laws, and the infrastructure of the court, illuminating the 
issues of conflict resolution that will be discussed in Chapter 7. This chapter also 
explains the structures of Thai government and law-making, and the historical 
influences on the development of the Thai legal system as a constitutional monarchy. 
The legal procedures described in this chapter will also be revisited when considering 
the possibilities of reform in Chapter 8.  
2.1 Thailand as a Civil Law Country with Common Law influences 
Following the legal reforms of the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), the Thai 
legal system was modernised along the same lines as some European countries, most 
notably France and Germany, whose jurists and legal consultants had an influence on 
Thailand’s legal system.12 This influence led to the drafting of various written codes of 
law based on a civil law system with fixed, codified laws, originating in Roman law (or 
civil codes). Simultaneously, however, many Thai legal specialists studied law in 
England, where the common law, based on a body of precedents, was used.
13
 Therefore, 
Thai lawyers and lawmakers could compare the advantages and disadvantages of the 
two legal systems and choose, from each one, the practices which they considered best 
for Thailand’s situation. Although Thailand may be classified as a civil law country 
whereby a continental style of codification is the dominant system, the English common 
law system has also had much influence on its development, particularly in the fields of 
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Douglas M. Johnston  and Gerry A. Ferguson, Asia-Pacific Legal Development (UBC Press 1998) 299. 
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 IAWE conference, (John Benjamins Publishing Company 2007) 169. 
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commercial law, procedural law and the law of evidence.
14
 Some of the common law 
influences are the notion of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases, proof on 
the balance of probabilities in civil cases, and the adversarial system of procedure, 
whereby the judge acts as an umpire.
15
 Thailand, therefore, can be considered a mixed 
legal system
16
 in which the law in force is derived from more than one legal tradition.
17
 
Thailand deliberated whether a common law or civil law system should be adopted as 
their model of law. There had been discussions about adopting a common law system, 
due to the fact that many Thai legal specialists, graduating in law from England, were 
familiar with the common law system. After considering the nature of the common law 
system, the specialists concluded that this system was not organised enough to be 
suitable for Thailand.
18
  By contrast, the civil law system was considered to be well 
organised into sections according to a code and this was deemed suitable to be a model 
for Thai law.
19
 Since the Thai legal system was influenced by continental European 
countries, this pattern of civil law continues to dominate.
20
 Accordingly, following the 
civil law tradition, all laws are codified in statutes.
21
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 Ibid. 
15
 See David Lyman, ‘An Insight into the Functioning of the Thai Legal System’ (1975) Jan-Feb, Thai-
American Business Magazine. 
16
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a mixed legal system, derived in part from the civil law tradition and in part from the common law 
tradition’’. William Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified)’ 
(1999) Unif.L. Rev. (N.S.) 591-691 (Part I) <http://www.mcgill.ca/files/maritimelaw/mixedjur.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011.  
17
Wen-Shing Tseng, Daryl B. Matthews and Todd S. Elwyn, Cultural competence in forensic mental 
health: a guide for psychiatrists, psychologists, and attorneys (Psychology Press 2004) 7. 
18
 The Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court and the Institution of Developing 
Economies ‘The Judicial System in Thailand: An Outlook for a New Century’ (Japan External Trade 
Organisation, 2001) 64 referred to as ‘The Judicial System in Thailand’. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
Dennis Campbell (ed), International Agency and Distribution Law (Yorkhill Law Publishing 2007) 385. 
21
 International Legal Counsellors Thailand Limited (Russin & Vecchi,), Thailand Business Legal 
Handbook Prepared for the Board of Investment Royal Thai Government (Millennium Edition 2000) 1 
referred to as ‘Thailand Business Legal Handbook’.  
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2.2 Thailand as a Constitutional Monarchy 
The Thai constitution recognises the King as the head of state
22
, the head of the Thai 
armed forces
23
 and the upholder of all religions.
24
 He enjoys the highest status, which 
no one may hold in contempt. According to the Constitution of Thailand 2007, no 
person shall expose the King to any sort of accusation or action.
25
 His symbolic power 
comes from the people of Thailand and is exercised through the three branches of 
government: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.
26
 It is specified in the 
constitution that the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the courts and state 
agencies shall perform duties of office under the rule of law.
27
 Thus, everyone within 
the jurisdiction, citizens and foreigners alike, can have confidence that their activities 
will be judged in accordance with established rules and principles of law. Their personal 
liberty and the liberty to conduct business affairs is subject to restraint only by virtue of 
legal powers clearly vested in persons acting, with the authority of the state, under the 
constitution or under legislation as interpreted by the judges in courts of justice.
28
 
2.3 Organs of State and Balance of Power 
The Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches constitute the main vehicles in driving 
economic, social, political, security, budget and legal development in Thailand. Each of 
the three branches of government has a degree of control over the actions of the other 
branches of government, as follows:  
1) The Legislative Branch can approve, amend or reject proposed bills, thoroughly 
review the budget submitted to it, and can make changes to the budget within the 
limitations specified in the constitution.  
                                                          
22
Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 2.   
23
 Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 10. 
24
 Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 9. 
25
 Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 8. 
26
 Constitution of Thailand, 2007, art 3. 
27
 Constitution of Thailand, 2007, art 3. 
28
 Scott Veitch, Emilios Christodoulidis and Lindsay Farmer, Jurisprudence Themes and Concepts 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 7. 
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2) The courts have a degree of control over legislation approved by the Parliament, 
in interpreting the law (as does the Constitutional Court), and in determining 
whether the law is consistent with the constitution.  
3) Any law found by the Constitutional Court to be inconsistent with the constitution 
is ineffective, and cannot be followed. The courts also review governmental 
actions, and can require changes or reconsideration in appropriate cases.  
4) The Executive Branch, through the power of preparing the budget, has a degree of 
control over issues such as the functions of the courts, how many employees the 
courts may have, and any other matters related to the infrastructure of the courts.  
5) The Executive Branch also has control over legislation passed by the Parliament, 
in that all bills must be submitted to the King through the Prime Minister, and if 
the Prime Minister is opposed to a particular bill, he or she can express those 
feelings to the King, who may refuse to approve it in the form in which it is 
submitted to him.  
2.3.1 The Executive Branch 
The Executive Branch is headed by the prime minister and consists of the prime 
minister, the ministers of the various ministries, deputy ministers, and the permanent 
officials of the various ministries.
29
 The prime minister and the other ministers make up 
a body known as the Council of Ministers, often simply referred to as the Cabinet. The 
Cabinet is responsible for the administration of fourteen ministries and the Office of the 
Prime Minister and all of its activities, except those of the parliament and the courts. 
Each ministry is headed by a politically appointed minister, and in most cases, includes 
at least one deputy minister. The Cabinet sets governmental policy and goals, which are 
carried out by designated ministers and deputy ministers. The prime minister is assisted 
by deputy prime ministers as well as a number of ministers holding the portfolio of 
‘Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office’. The individual ministers head up their 
respective departments. They give policy direction to the permanent officials who 
function as part of the civil service. The permanent officials of the agency then give 
direction to the various supervisors and other leaders within their department, and they 
in turn supervise the employees who perform the actual work of the agency under their 
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 Constitution of Thailand, 2007, art 171. 
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control. In addition, all ministers and deputy ministers sit as members of the Council of 
Ministries, which normally meets once a week to establish government policy on any 
and all issues which need governmental attention. The Council of Ministers makes 
annual plans for the administration of State affairs to illustrate the measures and details 
of the administration, which must adhere to State policies. In the administration of the 
state’s affairs, the Council of Ministers must plan and enact any laws which are 
necessary for the implementation of the administrative policies and plans.
30
 
The Council of Ministers has the power to submit urgent legislation to the King for 
immediate implementation by Royal Decree, to be followed by consideration by the 
Parliament within one year. Once such a proposal has been adopted by Royal Decree, it 
is the law of Thailand unless overturned by action of the Parliament. The Council of 
Ministers also prepares a budget for consideration by the Parliament, and approves and 
submits to the Parliament bills desired by the prime minister or by individual ministers 
or ministries affecting governmental policy and procedures. Smaller cabinet committees 
have been set up to help screen proposals from the various ministries before submission 
to the full cabinet. This process enables the government to ensure that no conflicting 
policies are made. Additionally, in the words of a United Nations report on Thailand’s 
public administration, ‘The committee may also be assigned by the prime minister to 
examine the merits of each project or policy for the cabinet so that the latter will not 
have to go into detail before deciding on proposals, thus streamlining its work’.31 
The Office of the Prime Minister is a central executive agency, which is responsible for 
assisting the prime minister in general administration and recommending economic, 
social, political, security, budget and legal development policies.
32
 Some of its primary 
subdivisions are the Budget Bureau, the National Security Council, the Juridical 
Council, the National Economic and Social Development Board, the Civil Service 
Commission, and several other organisations vital to the formulation of national 
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Economic and Social Affairs (DESA, ‘The Kingdom of Thailand Public Administration Country Profile’ 
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policy.
33
 The prime minister must appoint a minister in charge, who is also a member of 
the Cabinet, to oversee its operations. It also houses the offices of the various deputy 
prime ministers of Thailand. The fourteen ministries are divided on a functional basis. 
The head of the civil servants in each ministry is the Permanent Secretary, who has 
administrative control over all the departments of the ministry, each of which is headed 
by a director-general.
34
 
2.3.2 The Legislative Branch 
The legislative branch is the principal law-making arm of the government, charged with 
the primary responsibility of promulgating and approving new statutes.
35
 The full legal 
name of the legislative branch of government is the National Assembly, which 
comprises the House of Representatives and the Senate.
36
 The House of Representatives 
is charged with the duty of enactment of the constitution and is the first legislative body 
to consider most of the proposed legislation submitted by the Cabinet or by a member of 
parliament. If the house approves a proposed bill, it is sent to the Senate for 
consideration. If the Senate approves the bill as submitted, and each house approves the 
bill on the third reading, the bill is then submitted to the prime minister for forwarding 
to the King for his approval.
37
 Aside from the House of Representatives, other bodies 
can introduce a bill. They include the Council of Ministers, and courts of independent 
agency under the constitution. The latter can pass only laws on organisation and laws in 
charge of the President of such court and the President of such organ. Additionally, a 
group of vote-holding citizens may present a bill for consideration, providing that they 
number more than ten thousand.
38
 
Under the present constitution, the House of Representatives consists of 480 members, 
400 of whom are elected on a constituency basis, and 80 of whom are elected on a 
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34
 DPADM Report (n 31).  
35
 Constitution of Thailand, 2007, art 90. 
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 Constitution of Thailand 2007, arts 142,163. 
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proportional basis.
39
 The election of a member of the House of Representatives is by 
direct suffrage and secret ballot.
40
 Seventy-six senators are directly elected; one from 
each province and one from Bangkok, while the other seventy-four are appointed from 
various sectors by the Senate Selection Committee.
41
 The Senate has the authority to 
approve the proposed laws passed by the House of Representatives,
42
 and to appoint and 
to remove persons to or from certain committees or tribunals.
43
 
Although legislation is extremely important, it cannot operate in isolation from the rest 
of the country’s political infrastructure. It requires implementation. On a day-to-day 
basis, that is the function of a wide variety of officials, whose job is either to carry out 
Parliament’s commands itself or to make sure that other organisations or private 
individuals are doing so. Although officials continually work on interpreting both 
primary and secondary legislation, on occasion they require a more authoritative 
statement of what the law means. That process of interpretation is usually undertaken by 
the courts.
44
 
2.3.3 The Judicial Branch 
The Judicial branch is headed by the president of the Supreme Court
45
, and is comprised 
of all the courts of Thailand. The courts are independent bodies, and also serve as a 
check and balance against both the executive and legislative branches of government. 
2.4 The Thai Judicial System 
The Thai judicial administration was initiated by King Chulalongkorn
46
, also known as 
Rama V (1853-1910), who was the King of Thailand from 1868 to 1910. In 1882, he 
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ordered the building of the Courts of Justice. From 1885 he began reforming the 
government, establishing ministries structured on functional lines. The King set in 
motion the modernisation of the country’s administration, stripping power from the old 
nobility, provincial elites, and hereditary court officials.
47
 Before the reforms, Thailand 
was in the so-called ‘Absolute Revolution’, during which period it was a significant 
trading hub, with a large number of foreigners resident there and engaged in 
international trade. These foreigners were de facto outside the law; the treaties made 
between Thailand and the western countries were loosely interpreted to afford 
foreigners special rights not available under Thai law.
48
 The law, at that time, could not 
be enforced to administer and protect peace in the country. King Chulalongkorn, as a 
result, initiated a plan to improve the Thai legal system and judiciary, including the 
education of lawyers, in order to bring back the sovereign right of the judiciary over 
western nationals living in Thailand.
49
 
 
King Chulalongkorn’s major legal reforms of 1892 changed the role of the King from 
executor of ‘moral precepts based on a higher fundamental law’, to a law giver in his 
own right, issuing laws on his own authority.
 50
 In the same year, the Ministry of Justice 
was established and brought about the centralisation of all Courts of Justice. The main 
responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice were to reform and improve the Thai 
judiciary.
51
 In 1897, King Chulalongkorn visited many European countries
52
 and sent 
Thai scholars for legal study in Europe.
53
 The specialists who returned to Thailand 
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played a vital role in developing the Thai judicial and legal system, and replaced former 
advisors, many of whom were foreigners.
54
  
 
The founder of modern Thai law was Prince Rabi Bhadanasak, also known as Prince 
Rajburidireckrit, who played a leading role in introducing a modern system of judicial 
administration.
55
 Prince Rajburidireckrit, born in 1874, was the son of King 
Chulalongkorn and was sent to study law at the Christ Church College, Oxford 
University, in England.
56
 He founded the first law school in Thailand.
57
 At the time, 
there were a number of judges and officials who graduated with law degrees from 
English universities.
58
 In 1897, Prince Rajburidireckrit was promoted to Head Official 
of the Ministry of Justice.
59
 One generation later, Pridi Phanomyong (1900-1983), came 
to prominence. A highly-respected politician, former prime minister and Thai 
statesman, he had studied law and economics in Paris.
60
 He was also one of the leaders 
in 1932 Constitutional Revolution which significantly impacted the Thai legal and 
judicial system, changing the form of government from absolute monarchy to 
constitutional monarchy.
61
 
2.4.1 The Role of Thai Judges and Non-Binding Precedents 
The court decides cases brought before it based on an interpretation of the codified 
laws. Whereas the common law system gives a high level of importance to judicial 
precedent, the role of such precedent is downplayed in Thailand.
62
 The rule of legal 
                                                          
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Darling (n 48) 209. 
56
 Rabibhadanasak Judicial Research Institute (in Thai) 
<http://www.coj.go.th/rabi/userfiles/file/Rabi_history.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.  
57
 Loos (n 49) 51. 
58
 The Judicial System in Thailand (n 18) 65. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Darling (n 48) 207. 
61
 For an explanation of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy, see Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Kings, 
country and constitutions (Routledge 2003) 69-142. 
62
 For more details on the comparisons of civil law and common law systems, see James G. Apple and 
Robert P. Deyling, ‘A Primer on the Civil-Law System’ (the Federal Judicial Center at the request of the 
International Judicial Relations Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States) 34-38 
17 
 
interpretation stated in Section 4 of the Civil and Commercial Code (CCC) can also be 
used for criminal or other areas of law. Section 4 of the CCC provides:  
the law must be applied in all cases which comes within the letter and 
spirit of any of its provisions; where no provision is applicable, the case 
shall be decided by analogy to the provision most nearly applicable, 
and, in default of such provision, by the general principles of law. 
Under the Thai constitution, judicial power rests with the Courts. Judges perform their 
duties in the name of the King and are assured of independence in adjudicating cases 
according to the law.
63
 Thai laws follow the pattern of continental European civil law. 
When a dispute is brought before the court, the court will decide on the basis of an 
interpretation of the statutory provisions. The court’s scope for interpretation is not as 
broad as that of a court in a common law country, and unlike a common law court in 
which interpretations by the Supreme Court become precedent under the doctrine of 
stare decisis
64, the civil court’s decision will not develop a body of law. The judicial 
decisions are not law because no one is bound by the judge's order except the parties to 
the case. The court will normally adhere to precedent for subsequent cases with similar 
circumstances in order to achieve consistency and fairness. The Supreme Court is not 
legally bound to follow its own decisions, and lower courts are not bound to follow 
precedents set by higher courts. In practice, however, the decisions of the Supreme 
Court do have persuasive authority on the Supreme Court itself and influence when 
lower courts are ruling on similar issues. In this respect, the influence of the English 
common law system can be seen. English courts are not only important as interpreters 
of legislation. They are also the second major source of the world’s legal systems 
through the development of the common law system.  
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2.4.2 The Thai Court System under the Constitution 
According to the constitution, there are four main types of courts: the Constitutional 
Court, the Courts of Justice, the Administrative Court and the Military Court. With 
respect to the Courts of Justice, the Thai judiciary adopts a three-tier system: the 
Supreme Court, the Appeal Courts and the Courts of First Instance.
65
 The Supreme 
Court (Sarn Dika) is at the top of the hierarchy, and is the final court of the realm. More 
divisions and branches of courts have emerged because of an increasing number of 
cases in the courts. 
The Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court (see below) were recently 
established as a result of the provisions of the 2007 Constitution. Although this change 
decreases the scope of the jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice, most cases still fall under 
this jurisdiction. Before 20 August 2007, the Ministry of Justice was responsible for the 
administration of all courts. Its main role was to provide courts with support, including 
practicalities such as budget management, personnel and office equipment, and to 
enable them to operate efficiently. At present, the Office of the Judiciary, an 
independent organisation, is the only one responsible for the administration of the 
Courts of Justice.
66
 This change is designed to ensure that the Thai judiciary is not 
subject to political interference or manipulation.  
The following explanation of the first three courts is brief, since the activities and 
responsibilities of the Courts of Justice are of the most importance to this research and 
are discussed in more detail over the course of this thesis.   
2.4.2.1 The Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court has eight members, appointed by the King on the advice of the 
Senate.
67
 The members of the Constitutional Court are three judges of the Supreme 
Court of Justice, two judges from the Supreme Administrative Court, and four 
individuals.
68
 The Constitutional Court has the power to determine whether the 
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provisions of any law, rule or regulation are contrary to or inconsistent with the 
constitution.
69
 It has the power to declare a law void, or to declare any part of a law void 
and unenforceable. Decisions of the Constitutional Court are not subject to appeal.
70
 
However, the issue of whether or not a bill, or the existing law, is inconsistent with the 
constitution might not be an easy issue to decide. It is the duty, therefore, of the 
Constitutional Court to pass judgment or decision on whether or not the laws as well as 
rules and regulations are unconstitutional.
71
 The decisions of the Constitutional Court 
have a binding effect upon the cabinet, court, parliament and other organisations.
72
  
2.4.2.2 The Administrative Court 
The Administrative Court was introduced by the 1997 Constitution (known as the 
‘People’s Constitution’73), which specified that the Administrative Court was to be 
established within two years from the introduction of the 1997 Constitution. According 
to the Act for the Establishment of and Procedure for Administrative Court B.E.2542 
(1999), the Administrative Court has jurisdiction over cases as follows:  
               
(1) Disputes between a private sector organisation or individual and a 
state agency, state enterprise, local government organisation, or state 
official under the superintendence or supervision of the Government. 
(2) Disputes between a state agency, State enterprise, local government 
organisation, or State official under the superintendence or supervision 
of the Government. Administrative courts review how the government 
administers the law, and examine governmental policies.
74
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There are three levels of Administrative Courts: lower, appeals, and higher. The number 
of judges for each level is assigned by the Administrative Court Judge Committee.
75
 
The committee consists of the president of the higher court, a committee of nine 
qualified judges selected by other judges of this court, two qualified committees who 
are selected by the Senate and one selected by the Council of Ministers.
76
  
2.4.2.3 The Military Courts 
Military courts, for the most part, conduct criminal trials and sometimes hear other 
cases involving military officials who fall under the jurisdiction of military courts.
77
 
Military courts have independent power in their trials and other courts may not interfere 
with their procedures. 
2.4.2.4 Courts of Justice  
When the Ministry of Justice was established in 1891, there were several courts under 
the administration of various ministries. The Ministry of Justice was established with 
the aim to unify all of the different courts of the different ministries under its 
administration. All of the separate courts then became Courts of Justice.
78
 Prior to the 
enactment of the 1997 Constitution, the Ministry of Justice had the power to appoint 
and promote judges without being held accountable to third parties, without a clearly 
defined selection procedure, and with only vague eligibility requirements.
79
 Officials 
from other governmental bodies – the executive and legislative branches – generally 
refrained from relinquishing the influence that they held over the judiciary. After the 
1997 Constitution
80
 was introduced, the Court of Justice was separated from the 
                                                          
75
 Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 224. 
76
 Constitution of Thailand 2007 art 226. 
77
 Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 228. 
78
 The Judicial System in Thailand (n 18) 9.  
79
 Mary Noel Pepys, ‘Corruption within the judiciary: causes and remedies’ in Transparency International 
Global Corruption Report 2007 (Cambridge University Press 2007) 4. 
80
 According to Klein, ‘The Constitution of Thailand 1997 establishes the ground rules for transforming 
Thailand from a bureaucratic polity prone to abuse of citizen rights and corruption, to a participatory 
democracy in which citizens will have greater opportunities to chart their destiny’, see James R. Klein 
‘The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for Participatory Democracy’ (1998) 
The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series 8 March 1998. 
<http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Paper_on_the_1997_constitution_2.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
21 
 
Ministry of Justice, becoming an independent institution.
81
 This Constitution was 
considered a landmark in Thai constitutional reform.
82
 
The Courts of Justice have power to adjudicate on criminal, civil, and bankruptcy cases, 
and all cases which are not within the jurisdiction of other types of courts. When there is 
a problem of deciding the jurisdiction of any particular case, the Commission on 
Jurisdiction of Courts, chaired by the President of the Supreme Court, is authorised by 
the constitution to make a decision. The decision made by the Commission on 
Jurisdiction of Courts is final.
83
 There are three levels of Courts of Justice: the Courts of 
First Instance, the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
84
  
2.4.2.4.1 The Courts of First Instance 
The Courts of First Instance are further divided into general courts and specialised 
courts. The general Courts of First Instance are scattered around Thailand. The 
specialised courts, i.e. the Central Labour Court, the Children and Juvenile Courts, the 
Central Tax Court, the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court and 
the Central Bankruptcy Court, are situated mainly in Bangkok but have jurisdiction 
throughout the country. Upon judgment by the general Court of First Instance, the 
parties may appeal the judgment to the Court of Appeal and finally to the Supreme 
Court. As for the specialised courts, the parties may appeal directly to the Supreme 
Court. In appealing the case, the parties may appeal both issues of fact and issues of 
law. There shall follow an overview of the roles of the main courts, with the exception 
of the Child and Juvenile Court, which is not relevant to this thesis.  
a) General Courts 
In Bangkok Metropolis, there are Civil Courts, Criminal Courts, the Min Buri Provincial Court
85
 
and Municipal Courts
86
.
87
 A civil case is brought by the plaintiff to the court where the cause of 
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action arises or where the defendant is domiciled. The Criminal Courts deal with cases in the 
area which the accused lives, is arrested, or is detained. The District Courts or Kwaeng Courts 
are the courts for 'quick' trials; they are limited to offences punishable with a maximum of three 
years imprisonment or a fine not exceeding THB 60,000
88
 and to civil cases where the claims do 
not exceed THB 300,000.
89
 Provincial Courts have, within their own districts, unlimited 
responsibility for all general civil and criminal matters.
90
  
 
A quorum is formed by at least two judges in general courts. This is not applied in District 
Courts. The Chief Judge of the region is regarded as a judge of any court in that region, holding 
power to adjudicate particular cases, such as those concerning offences against public security, 
serious criminal offences, high-amount claims and contempt of court. When it is necessary, the 
Chief Judge of the region has power to order a judge of any court in the region upon the latter's 
consent to work for not more than three months in another court. The Chief Judge, however, 
must immediately inform the President of the Supreme Court about such an order.
91
  
 
b) Specialised Courts 
Four specialised courts currently operate in Thailand: the Labour Court, the Tax Court, the 
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, and the Bankruptcy Court. A judge with 
expertise in a specific field is appointed to each of these courts. It should be noted that each 
specialised court has only a central court in Bangkok. The exception is the Labour Court, which 
now has branches situated in the other provinces. The Central Tax Court will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3. 
2.4.2.4.2 The Courts of Appeal 
The Courts of Appeal include the central Court of Appeal and nine regional Courts of 
Appeal.
92
 The duty of the central Court of Appeal is to hear appeals against the 
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judgments or orders of the Civil Courts and the Criminal Courts while the nine regional 
courts oversee appeals against the judgments or orders of the other Courts of First 
Instance.
93
 Each Court of Appeal is headed by the President of the Court assisted by 
Vice Presidents. Appeals both on points of law, and, in certain cases, on points of fact 
“lie from the Courts of Appeal to the Supreme Court”. 94 
The procedures of the Courts of Appeal more closely resemble reviews than re-trials. At 
least three judges are required to hear an appeal.
95
 Each Court of Appeal has a Research 
Division consisting of research judges. Their primary functions are to assist judges of 
the Courts of Appeal by ‘examining all relevant factual and legal issues of the cases, 
conducting legal research and discussing with those judges to ensure uniformity and fair 
results’.96 The judges will go over the details of the initial case and determine if there 
were any unfair factors or discrepancies in the proceedings. If the Court of Appeals 
affirms the lower court’s judgment the case ends, unless the losing party appeals to the 
Supreme Court. If the judgment is reversed, the Court of Appeals will usually send the 
case back to a lower court and order it to take further action. The appeals court can 
require various actions to take place. It may order that a new trial be held, that the trial 
court’s judgment be modified or corrected, or the trial court consider the facts, take 
additional evidence, or consider the case in light of a recent decision by the appellate 
court. A single judgment of the Court is delivered. When the judges’ opinions differ, the 
majority opinion prevails The dissenting judge may still, however, attach a dissenting 
opinion to the judgment.
97
 The Court may from time to time hold plenary sessions to 
determine cases of exceptional importance or cases of similar nature where conflicting 
conclusions have been reached by different divisions, or any cases as the Chief Justice 
thinks fit.
98
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2.4.2.4.3 The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal in all civil, bankruptcy and criminal 
cases.
99
 It has jurisdiction over all of Thailand. The Supreme Court’s decisions and 
orders are final.
100
 It can hear appeal cases, or petition against judgments or orders of 
the Courts of First Instance or the Courts of Appeal, except in the case where the 
Supreme Court believes that the appeal’s questions of fact and law appearing are not 
essential enough for its consideration.
101
 In such situations, the Supreme Court can 
refuse to accept such a case for trial and adjudication.
102
 The Court consists of the 
President, Vice - Presidents, the Secretary and a number of justices.
103
  
 
Like the Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court also has a Research Division, responsible 
for assisting judges by examining all relevant facts and legal issues of the cases, 
conducting legal research and discussing with the judges to ensure consistent and fair 
judgments.
104
 Each specialised division also has research judges and associate research 
judges appointed as secretaries to the division.
105
 The court’s quorum must be made up 
of at least three Supreme Court justices.
106
 When it is not possible, for any reason, to 
form a quorum, the court may sit in plenary session to discuss exceptionally important 
cases or ones which give reason for reconsideration or overruling of its own 
precedents.
107
 The quorum for the full Court is not less than half of the total number of 
justices in the Supreme Court.
108
 It consists of nine justices of the Supreme Court who 
hold a position not lower than justice of the Supreme Court, and are elected by a plenary 
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session of the Supreme Court justices on a case by case basis. A judgment will be made 
by a majority of votes, provided that each justice constituting the quorum prepares a 
written opinion and makes oral statements to the meeting before making a decision.
109
 
 
It is to be noted that Thailand’s Supreme Court Decisions are published in numbered 
issues according to the series and the year in which the judgment was issued. The 
Supreme Court Decisions quoted in this thesis will follow this practice. For example, 
Supreme Court Decision No. 1238/2502 was made at sequence number 1238 in the year 
B.E.2502 (1959). 
2.5 Thai Legislation and Sources of Law 
2.5.1 History of the Thai Law Code 
Treaties with Western countries, Western legal advisors and the Thai specialists who 
studied in Western countries have had a significant influence on the Thai legal 
system.
110
 Within a few decades the legal codes were altered to modernise concepts and 
practices.
111
 King Chulalongkorn made significant changes to the administrative 
structure of the Thai government, which had an effect on the content of law and the 
legislative process.
112
   
Codified law is a major part of the modern Thai legal system. It incorporates significant 
aspects of the French, German and Japanese legal systems due to the prominent role of 
advisors from these countries in drafting Thailand’s first legal code, the Penal Law of 
1908.
113
 British and other European systems, as well as those of India, China and the 
United States also influenced the early law codes of Thailand.
114
 Also incorporated were 
the country’s traditional and customary laws.  
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All of the ad hoc committees which drew up the new law codes were chaired by Prince 
Rabi of Rajburi. Their members were lawyers from Britain and the United States which 
are common law countries, and Belgium, France and Germany, which used civil law. 
German and French laws had the most significant influence. The Japanese lawyer 
Toshiki Masao served on the committees and also incorporated elements of Japanese 
law into the new Thai system.
115
 The first legal code, dealing with criminal law, was 
developed in 1908, and underwent minor revisions in 1956.
116
 The drafting of the Civil 
and Commercial Code started in the reign of King Chulalongkorn and was finally 
adopted after the Revolution of 1932. Currently, the four basic codes are: the Civil and 
Commercial code, Civil Procedure Code, the Criminal Code, and the Criminal 
Procedure Code. Additionally, there are other special laws with regard to commercial 
activities, for example, the Land Code and the Revenue Code. 
2.5.2 Structure of Laws 
According to the civil law tradition, the simple statements of general principles stated in 
the laws allow scope for interpretation and flexibility. Because it uses a civil law 
system, Thailand has a complicated and time consuming process for enactment of laws. 
In order for a bill to be made law, the National Legislative Assembly comprising the 
Senate and the House of Representatives must first pass a bill
117
 to the King, then the 
King grants Royal Assent to the bill and the statute is formally promulgated in the name 
of the King.
118
 
 
Thailand has a hierarchy of laws that places the Constitution as a supreme law, followed 
by the primary legislation and then the secondary legislation. Each of these levels of 
legislation, except for the Constitution, derives its authority from a higher authority in 
                                                          
115
 Office of the Council of State, Foreign Law Bureau 
‘Factbook: Council of State (Kritsadika)’, Office of the Council of State, Thailand (2008) 3 
<http://www.lawreform.go.th/lawreform/index.php?option=com_content&task=downloadmedia&file=c4
68_3.pdf&filetemp=copy%20of%20ocs%20factbook%20as%20of%20october%202008.pdf&lang=th&id
=468 > accessed 10 November 2011 referred to as ‘Fact book’. 
116
 Darling (n 48) 209. 
117
 See the introduction of a bill in The Parliament of Thailand. 
<http://www.parliament.go.th/files/library/b06.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
118
 Thailand Business Legal Handbook (n 21) 1. 
27 
 
the hierarchical structure of legislation. The superior legislation prevails over the 
inferior law in the hierarchy.
119
  
2.5.2.1 The Supreme Law 
Thailand’s judicial and legal system was transformed from absolute monarchy to a 
constitutional monarchy. In a bloodless coup of 1932, the first Constitution was 
established and granted by King Pra Pokklao Chaoyouhua (Rama XII).
120
 All 
successive Constitutions have been developed and amended in order to be compatible 
with the changing situations of each period.
121
 The present Constitution was enacted and 
promulgated on 24 August 2007. 
The Constitution is the highest law of the country. The provision of any law, rule, or 
regulation which is contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution is considered 
void.
122
 The Constitution is a lengthy document and provides for the powers of the 
King. It also establishes the powers and duties as well as the structure of the Executive, 
the Legislative and the Judiciary bodies, other constitutional organisations and State 
agencies.
123
 It also includes provisions outlining the rights, liberties and duties of the 
people
124
, and enumerates directive principles of fundamental state policies relating to 
national security, social and cultural affairs, foreign affairs, the economy and the 
environment.
125
 The constitution states that: 
it itself may be amended by a motion proposed either by the Council of 
Ministers or members of the House of Representatives of not less than 
one-fifth of the total number of existing members of the House of 
Representatives or member of both Houses of not less than one-fifth of 
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the total number of the existing members thereof, or voters of not less 
than fifty thousand on the lodge of proposal on law.
126
  
However, amendments changing the form of government are not permitted.        
2.5.2.2 Primary Legislation 
In Thailand, the primary or substantive legislation can be divided into Codes, Acts of 
Parliament and Emergency Decrees.  
2.5.2.2.1 Codes 
A system of laws that have been systematically arranged and comprehensively 
organised or codified by subject matter can collectively be considered a legal code. The 
Legislative Branch takes responsibility for promulgating codes. It is the duty of the 
House of Representatives to enact the statutes and of the Senate to approve the proposed 
laws passed by the House of Representatives.
127
 At the time of writing, there are four 
important codes: the Civil and Commercial Code 1925; the Penal Code 1956 as 
amended by the Penal Code (No. 17) 2003; the Civil Procedure Code 1935 as amended 
by the Civil Procedure Code (No. 22) 2005; and the Criminal Procedure Code 1934 as 
amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (No. 2) 2005. In addition, there are codes 
dealing with specific areas, for instance, the Land Code and the Revenue Code. This 
thesis relates to the Civil and Commercial Code and the Revenue Code; other Codes 
will not be discussed in detail. The Revenue Code will be described in the next chapter, 
discussing the Thai revenue system. 
 
The Civil and Commercial Code (CCC), which became effective on 1 January 1925, 
sets forth general principles and specific rules regarding civil law issues.
128
 These issues 
specified under the CCC affect businesses and individuals. The topics under the CCC 
cover specific interest of businesses including company and partnership law, contracts, 
sales, obligations, wrongful acts (torts, such as liability for negligence or intentional 
harm), property, mortgage and other forms of loan security, leases and agency.
129
 For 
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individuals, the CCC covers the subjects, namely, marriage, divorce, wills and estate 
administration, and parental rights and duties.
130
 The provisions relating to general 
principles are particularly significant because they are regularly applied to laws outside 
the CCC.
131
 Despite frequent and sometimes dramatic changes of government and 
constitutions in Thailand, the CCC has endured, providing a consistent legal framework 
and structure during otherwise chaotic times.  
 
2.5.2.2.2 Acts of Parliament 
Acts are passed specially for specific matters or aims. Many important social and 
economic laws are embodied in Acts. They relate primarily to public matters, although 
some provisions may govern private relationships. They are passed by the Executive 
branch, and so they represent the government’s policies in accordance with the current 
social economic situation. With regard to the passing of the Acts, a bill is introduced by 
the Council of Ministers. However, under the circumstances stated in Article 163 of the 
2007 Constitution, a law may also be introduced by the people.
132
 A bill shall be first 
submitted to the House of Representatives and has to be accompanied by an analysed 
and summarised note of such bill. The bill submitted to the National Assembly must be 
disclosed to the people and the people are entitled to convenient access to the 
information and details of the bill. 
 
When the House of Representatives has considered a bill and resolved to approve it, the 
House of Representatives submits it to the Senate. The Senate must finish the 
consideration of the bill within sixty days.
133
 After a bill has already been approved by 
the National Assembly, the Prime Minister shall present it to the King to be approved 
and signed and it shall come into force after publication in the Government Gazette.
134
 
If the King refuses his assent to a bill he may return it to the National Assembly. Should 
this be the case, the Assembly must re-deliberate the bill. If it decides to pass the bill 
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with ‘the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of existing members of 
both Houses’, the Prime Minister shall present it to the King for signature once again. If 
the King does not sign and return the bill, ‘the Prime Minister shall cause the bill to be 
published in the Government Gazette and it shall have the force of law as if the King 
has signed it’.135 
2.5.2.2.3 Emergency Decrees 
Emergency Decrees are laws promulgated by the Executive branch in an emergency 
situation. Such emergencies include those related to national security, public safety, 
natural disasters, economic security or urgent matters concerning tax and fiscal 
emergencies.
136
 Emergency Decrees have to meet certain criteria in order to be passed 
and require ratification by the National Assembly thereafter. An example of the use of 
an Emergency Decree in Thailand was that on Public Administration in Emergency 
Situation which was issued on 7
 
April 2010 regarding the anti- government protests.
137
 
After violent protests by the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship, Prime 
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva declared states of emergency in Bangkok and elsewhere in 
the country.
138
 He passed the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in 
Emergency Situation. This endowed an ad-hoc organisation of military personnel and 
pro-government civilians, known as the Centre for the Resolution of Emergency 
Situations with effective extra-judicial powers. It could detain suspects without charge 
and use makeshift or unofficial jails, was not checked against the abuse of detainees, 
and could impose censorship, detaining those who spoke against the government. Under 
the Emergency Decree, governmental officials had de facto immunity from prosecution 
for most acts committed.
139
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2.5.2.3 Secondary or Subordinate Legislation 
Secondary or subordinate legislation is issued by the executive branch under the 
authority granted to them by primary legislation in order to implement and administer 
the requirements of that primary legislation. Where primary legislation specifies any 
secondary legislation, administrative agencies together with their officials must comply 
with the procedural conditions as follows: Firstly, primary laws must specify the 
authorised administrative agencies which are in charge of issuing secondary laws. The 
rationale for this delegation of power to issue laws is that there are competent officials 
in such administrative agencies who can employ their skills, experience and expertise in 
drafting secondary laws. This ensures that the secondary laws can best serve the public 
interest, and least affect citizens’ rights and liberty. Secondly, primary laws must 
specify procedures which need to be strictly followed. For example, authorised agencies 
may specify the date that a law becomes effective, or it may be necessary to have a 
public inquiry for such secondary laws. Lastly, the date that secondary laws become 
effective must be announced by the Government Gazettes. 
Secondary laws must be issued by parliamentary acts or royal decrees. The contents of 
the secondary laws must not contradict the Constitution, the primary laws which gave 
power to such secondary laws, as well as, other primary laws. Moreover, the secondary 
laws must not specify criminal penalties punishing persons who do not comply with 
them. Any law which specifies criminal penalties must receive legislative consent. 
Secondary legislation ranks below primary legislation in the hierarchy of laws. In cases 
in which the primary legislation does not grant the authority to create secondary 
legislation, state officials have no authority to issue such legislation. In addition, 
secondary laws must comply with the principle of ‘delegatus non protest delegare’. 
According to this principle, an executive agency to whom the primary law has delegated 
authority or decision-making power, cannot, in turn, re-delegate it to another agency, 
unless explicitly authorised by the primary law. Secondary legislation is considered as 
ultra vires (Latin for ‘outside the powers’, that is, invalid) if it is beyond the powers 
conferred by the primary legislation or the delegating Act.
140
 Hence, when employing 
secondary law, the administrative bodies must use the delegated power in accordance 
with principles and policies as prescribed under the primary law. The secondary laws 
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issued by the executive body cannot have effect before the issuing date, unless the 
primary law explicitly specifies so. 
Examples of secondary legislation which are considered as another source of Thai law, 
are in the form of Royal Decrees, Ministerial Regulations, Notifications and 
Departmental Orders.  
Royal Decrees are issued by the Executive Branch only where it is stated in the 
Constitution to issue a Royal Decree ‘for convocation, the prolongation of session and 
the prorogation of the National Assembly’.141 Royal Decrees are also issued to dissolve 
the House of Representatives for new members to be elected.
142
 In addition, Royal 
Decrees are issued by virtue of the relevant Acts or Emergency Decrees. One example 
is the Act for the Establishment of and Procedure for Tax Court, B.E. 2528 (1985), 
under which the Provincial Tax court open day has to be declared by Royal Decree. In 
other necessary matters, Royal Decrees can be issued provided that they do not 
contradict or conflict with other laws. 
 
Ministerial Regulations are issued by Ministers by virtue of primary legislation, such as 
Acts or Emergency Decrees, in order to comply with such laws. This is because Acts 
and Emergency Decrees only specify the general principles or rules and leave the 
Ministerial Regulations to specify specific details or procedures. Another type of 
subordinate legislation is an administrative agency order. Administrative agencies are 
empowered by the legislature to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out 
government functions. Administrative Agency Orders require the consent of the cabinet 
to be enforceable, and must be published in the Government Gazette in order to make 
them known to the people. Announcements of the Administrative Agency do not need 
the consent of the cabinet, and are issued by ministers.  
 
With respect to legal interpretation, in order to obtain a complete perspective of any 
legislation on a particular legal issue, provisions of the Codes and the Acts should be 
considered together with the relevant secondary legislation.
143
  
                                                          
141
 Constitution of Thailand 2007, art128. 
142
 Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 108. 
143
 Manit Jumpa, Principle of La (Chulalongkorn Press 2004) 55, 56 (in Thai). 
33 
 
 
2.6 Legal Opinion of the Council of State 
2.6.1  History of the Council of State 
King Chulalongkorn established the Council of State in 1874 on the model of the 
French Council of State (Conseil d’Etat)144 to advise the King on the state’s 
administrative affairs and legislative drafting. In 1923, the Legislative Redacting 
Department had been established in the Ministry of Justice by the Royal Proclamation 
of King Vajiravudth (Rama VI), to be directly responsible for the country’s legislative 
drafting, in place of the ad hoc Committee. The year 1932 saw the so-called 
‘Constitutional Coup’ which turned Thailand into a democratic constitutional monarchy 
with the King as head of state.
145
 After this, the Legislative Redacting Department was 
transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister and was entrusted with adjudicating the 
administrative cases (both petition and adjudicatory functions) in addition to its legal 
advisory and law drafting functions in the manner of the French Conseil d’Etat.146 
 
The Legislative Redacting Department was consequently renamed the ‘Council of State’ 
by the Council of State Act B.E.2476 (1933).
147
 However, under the Act of 1933, it was 
not granted the ability to administrate the petitions of the people. Thai citizens tried to 
use the Civil Court to pursue their petitions, but were deterred by technicalities and 
bureaucracy.
148
 In 1979, the Council of State Act (B.E. 2522) enabled the Council of 
State to perform both consultative and petition functions.
149
 Later in 1999, the 
Administrative Court was established by the Act on Establishment of the Administrative 
Court and Administrative Case Procedure B.E. 2542 (1999), with both Government and 
Parliament agreeing ‘to transfer the petition function of the Council of State to the 
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Administrative Court. Since then, the Council of State attains only consultative 
function’.150 
2.6.2 Organisation and Functions 
The Council of State comprises the Prime Minister as ex officio President
151
 along with 
108 Law Councillors who are appointed by the King upon the recommendation of the 
Cabinet.
152
 They are well-qualified specialists with knowledge and experience in law, 
political science, economics, social science or public administration.
153
 The Council of 
State (a) drafts laws, by-laws, rules, regulations or notifications upon the direction of 
the Prime Minister or resolution of the Cabinet; (b) gives legal advice to State 
agencies
154
 or State enterprises upon direction of the Prime Minister or resolution of the 
Cabinet, and (c) submits opinions or remarks to the Cabinet on the need for new 
legislation, revision, amendment, or repeal of existing legislation.
155
 In the performance 
of duties, the Law Councillors meet as a Committee.
156
 There are 12 Committees, each 
of which deals with a different area of law.
157
 
 
The Council of State is served by the Office of the Council of State (OCS), a body 
which functions as its secretariat. The OCS is also responsible for drafting technical 
works of the Law Reform Commission, the Code Revision Committees and the 
Administrative Procedure Development Committee.
158
 Under the provisions of the 
Council of State Act of 1979, the Secretary General of the Council of State oversees the 
running of the OCS.
159
 He or she is recommended by the Cabinet, approved by the 
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National Assembly, answers to the Prime Minister, and is officially appointed by the 
King.
160
  
 
The Thai Cabinet passed its resolution No. Nor Ror 0203/Wor.69 dated 22 April, stating 
that all state agencies are required to follow the opinions of the Council of State. There 
would be punishments for any governmental officials who do not follow the opinions of 
the Council of State as it is considered to be ‘disciplinary breach’.161 However, the 
Cabinet Resolutions generally are not legally binding on individuals who are not 
administrative agencies
162
 and government officials. Cabinet Resolutions establish 
policies for the administration of particular state agencies. The officials of such state 
agencies must follow them, although they are not legally binding on the general 
public.
163
 This is supported by Supreme Court Decision No. 4431/2550 (2007), which 
held that Cabinet Resolutions are purely a form of guidance for governmental agencies 
to follow, are not law and that a person can own agricultural land only when he/she 
meets the conditions stipulated under Section 4 of the Agricultural Land Reform Act 
B.E. 2518 (1975).
164
 The Supreme Court must rule in accordance with the applicable 
law in each case. In this case the defendant must comply with the Agricultural Land 
Reform Act of 1975, and not merely comply with conditions set up by the Cabinet 
Resolution. Applying the same reason, the Cabinet Resolution which requires state 
agencies to comply with opinions of the Council of State is only an order for those state 
agencies to follow. Individuals, in contrast, are not bound to follow the opinions. In 
theory, the Council of State is a central legal agency, officially holding the ability to 
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draw up legal documents and legislation, offer legal opinion to government agencies, 
and reform and amend laws. Its practical function, however, is essentially consultative. 
The Council of State’s opinions generally have no legally binding function. 
  
 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the Thai legal system as a whole, notably its mixed character as 
a civil law system with common law traits, a result of the influences of various 
European systems during its first drafting in the late 19
th
 Century. It outlined the various 
types of court procedures and the similarly varied roles of judges in interpreting the law. 
This chapter has demonstrated that non-binding precedents are used only as a 
consideration and source of information in the case of Thai judgments. This stands in 
contrast to common law systems, including Britain’s, which are bound by the 
precedents of earlier judgments and are subject to a greater degree of interpretation by 
judges. The discussions on Thai legislation and sources of law presented in this chapter 
provide important context for the issues to be considered in the rest of this thesis. The 
Council of State and its functions will be referred to in Chapter 6 in relation to one of 
the current administrative problems. Chapter 7 discusses the conflict of norms, that is, 
cases in which two conflicting or contradictory laws can be applicable in the same 
situation. The discussion on the balance of power and legislative procedure in this 
chapter will feature again in Chapter 6 and 7, which will consider the problematic 
legislation and the role of courts. There follows a discussion of the Thai Revenue 
System. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 The Thai Revenue System 
 
Introduction 
Economic development and its resulting benefits to a nation must involve gains in 
wealth. Government policies in many countries generally aim for continuous and 
sustained economic growth, so that their national economies expand and become more 
developed. Taxation and its policies play an essential role in the development of any 
country through the generation of revenue or public funds. In Thailand’s case, taxation 
is the main source of government revenue.
165
 It is generated by three agencies 
comprising the Revenue Department, the Excise Department and the Customs 
Department.
166
 Out of these three agencies the Revenue Department is the highest 
revenue collector, accounting for more than half of the total of taxes collected 
nationally.
167
 The Thai taxes can be divided into four areas: income taxes, customs duty, 
excise tax and value added tax. Before dealing with the problematic jurisdiction over tax 
incentives for companies which are promoted by the Thai Board of Investment, four 
main areas will be discussed. The first of these concerns the objectives of using taxation 
and the second covers sources of revenue law and the principal taxes in Thailand. Third, 
this chapter examines Thai tax administration, as well as, its tax Court system. The final 
part discusses statutory interpretation by the Thai tax court. 
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3.1 The Purpose of Taxation in Thailand 
Taxation is one of the tools that every government, including the Thai government, 
adopts to achieve economic and political sustainability,
168
 and it is used to achieve four 
main targets. Firstly, taxation ‘raises resources to finance government’169 and supports, 
especially in developing countries, economic growth by increasing Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).
170
 Secondly, taxes on consumption can be used to encourage savings,
171
 
which serves as a growth driver. Thirdly, unemployment and inflation, which result in a 
slowdown of the economy, can be mitigated by taxation.
172
 Lastly, taxation can 
facilitate in cases where national income and properties are not properly allocated.
173
 
This occurs when a minority of the population acquires the majority of the income and 
properties, while the majority of the population is poor, leading to a decrease in public 
interest, which could consequently cause social and political instability.
174
  
Thailand is currently reorienting its taxation policy from focusing on targeting revenue 
collection to meeting budget expenditure and protecting domestic industries. The Thai 
government now implements a more proactive policy, with the aim of enhancing the 
country’s competitiveness, broadening trade and investment opportunities for 
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businesses, and addressing social development and the conservation of the 
environment.
175
 In Thailand the main source of government revenue is taxation, so all of 
these strategies for the progress of the country must be on the basis of tax equity, as 
well as the neutrality and efficiency of the taxation system.
176
 
3.2 Sources and Scope of the Thai Tax Law  
3.2.1 Primary Legislation 
In Thailand, two codes and four Acts cover tax law, which shall be discussed in the 
following subsections. 
3.2.1.1 The Thai Revenue Code   
Fundamental tax law in Thailand is found in the Thai Revenue Code of 1938, which 
includes provisions on Corporate Income Tax (CIT), Value Added Tax (VAT), Specific 
Business Tax (SBT), Personal Income Tax and Stamp Duty. The Minister of Finance is 
in charge of the Revenue Code,
177
 which has been amended, since it was first adopted, 
in order to keep pace with the economy and the development of the country. There are 
two types of amendments, one of which involves inserting additional terms into or 
rewriting the provisions of particular sections. The other type involves adding new 
descriptions and marking with Thai numerals such as, Bis, Tri, Jatawa, and Benja. In 
order to avoid any confusion, the aforesaid Thai terms are substituted in this thesis with 
numbers, for instance, (2), (3), (4), and (5). In order to amend the Revenue Code to 
increase its efficiency, the ‘Revenue Code Study and Development Project’ was 
exclusively set up by the Law Development Foundation of Thailand. The project 
committee includes the Revenue Department, academia, courts, economists, lawyers, 
auditors, the Thai Chamber of Commerce and other relevant agencies.
178
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3.2.1.2 The Thai Civil and Commercial Code  
Along with the Revenue Code, the provisions of the Civil and Commercial Code 
(CCC), which specifies the fundamental principles to be applied by all Thai laws,
179
 are 
also important because in any given case both of them are considered; if for a certain 
issue no provisions are given in the Revenue Code, then the authorities can refer to the 
provisions provided under the CCC. For example, Section 41 of the Revenue Code does 
not define precisely the term ‘person’ in the context of who will be obliged to pay 
personal income tax, so it must be made clear by including ‘natural person’ as defined 
by Section 15 of the CCC, i.e. ‘personality begins with the full completion of birth as a 
living child and ends with death’.180 
3.2.1.3 Acts 
The following Acts cover taxation: The Customs Act B.E. 2469 (1926) as amended by 
the Customs Act (No. 17) B.E. 2543 (2000) regulates customs duties. The Excise Tax 
Act B.E. 2527 (1984), as amended by the Excise Tax Act (No.3) B.E. 2543 (2000) 
governs excise tax. The Petroleum Income Tax Act B.E. 2514 (1971), as amended by 
the Petroleum Income Tax Act (No. 6) B.E. 2550 (2007), governs petroleum income 
tax. This thesis does not significantly involve the aforementioned Acts. However, it 
should be noted that the Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1977), as amended by 
the Investment Promotion Act (No. 2) B.E. 2534 (1991) and the Investment Promotion 
Act (No.3) B.E. 2544 (2001) provide investment incentives including tax incentives. 
Details regarding tax incentives provided by this Act will be explained in the next 
chapter. 
3.2.2 Secondary Legislation 
3.2.2.1 Royal Decrees 
It was explained in the previous chapter that Royal Decrees are generally considered as 
secondary legislation, which is inferior to primary legislation and therefore requires 
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authority from the latter. Royal Decrees provide further explanation to the Revenue 
Code since the Revenue Code specifies merely general principles, and they are issued to 
grant a reduction of rates or an exemption, whichever suits the circumstances, under 
specific or general conditions provided to a person or international organisation, the 
government and other types of governmental organisations.
181
 Royal Decrees aim to 
specify rules of practice, management or operation. One example of Royal Decrees is 
Royal Decree No. 480 Re: tax exemption on income other than from employment. 
Under this Royal Decree, the total amount of tax computed which does not exceed THB 
5,000,
182
 will be exempt from personal income tax. Another is Royal Decree No. 473 
B.E. 2551 (2008), which specifies circumstances regarding tax deduction for the 
amortisation of computer software within three accounting periods, the deductible initial 
depreciation of computer software, and a deductible depreciation of assets. 
3.2.2.2 Ministerial Regulations, Ministerial Instructions and Ministerial 
Notifications  
The Ministry of Finance issues legal documents such as Ministerial Regulations 
(M.R.s), Ministerial Instructions and Ministerial Notifications. M.R.s specify the 
conditions for exemptions and deductions from taxes, and they have the same effect as 
U.S. Treasury Regulations.
183
 M.R.s lay down rules and conditions for provisions in the 
Revenue Code,
184
 examples of M.R.s are: M.R. No. 266, in 2008, and M.R. 271. The 
former provides an increase in the tax exemption limit for income paid on saving funds, 
pension funds, private schools’ contributions and payment used to purchase units of 
mutual funds. The income paid for life insurance premiums is also included in the 
provisions. This M.R. also states an exemption from income tax for a partnership and an 
unincorporated group of persons under the Community Enterprise Act B.E. 2548 (2005) 
earning an assessable income of no more than THB 1,200,000
185
 per annum from 1 
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January 2008 to 31 December 2010. The latter example, M.R. No. 271, provides tax 
deduction for the purchase of immovable property, which specifies that individual 
taxpayers under certain conditions are allowed to deduct the actual amount paid up to a 
maximum of THB 300,000
186
 for the purchase of a property or a condominium unit for 
use as a residence. Ministerial Instructions (M.I.) and Ministerial Notifications (M.N.) 
are generally issued for the purpose of internal reorganisation involving official 
appointments or promotions.
187
 
3.2.2.3 Director-General’s Notifications, Director-General’s Notifications on 
Income Tax, Departmental Notifications and Department Regulations 
Instructions for procedures and conditions with respect to tax exemptions, reductions 
and incentives are provided by Director-General’s Notifications (D.G.N.s) and Director-
General’s Notifications on Income Tax (D.G.N.I.T.s); for instance, D.G.N. dated 3 July 
2009 re: bases, procedures and conditions respecting transfer of certain parts of 
businesses of public limited companies or limited companies for exemption of taxes and 
duties. This notification defines the conditions which need to be satisfied for a partial 
business transfer to qualify under Royal Decree No. 484
188
. Another example is 
D.G.N.I.T. No. 190-191 dated 15 November 2010 regarding tax incentives for regional 
operating headquarters in Thailand. The function of a Departmental Notifications (D.N.) 
is to clarify the conditions of legal forms or documents for tax purposes.
189
 
Departmental Regulations (D.R.s) are used to identify terms under the provisions of 
other laws or relevant D.R.s, an example of which is D.R. No. Taw Paw
190
 176/2552 
(2009), which clarifies the term ‘leasing’, which is not subject to withholding tax. The 
term ‘leasing’ is mentioned in Clause 6 of D.R. No. Taw Paw4/2528 (1985). This type 
of D.R is for taxpayers to follow. Another kind of D.R. is a D.R. Paw, which sets up 
rules to be followed by revenue officials and gives more recommendations to taxpayers; 
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for example, D.R. Paw 73/2541 specifies that the refund of a deposit, advance money, a 
down payment or rent guarantee payment, which have been booked as ‘income’, are 
deemed ‘expenses’ of the landlord or service provider for the accounting period during 
which these amounts have been returned. 
3.2.3 Double Tax Agreements  
To eliminate double taxation, whereby tax can potentially be levied from the same 
amount of income in two or more states, the Thai government has made special 
agreements with other countries, namely double tax agreements (DTAs), or double tax 
conventions.
191
 Different methods under each DTA are employed to eliminate the 
double taxation of a person by the resident country, including exemption and credit 
method.
192
 DTAs apply only to income taxes, specifically personal income tax, 
corporate income tax and petroleum income tax.
193
 Currently, Thailand has 54 double 
tax agreements with other countries, all of which are in force
194
    
3.2.4 Legal Opinion  
3.2.4.1 Revenue Department’s Rulings and the Board of Taxation’s Rulings 
The Revenue Department produces guidelines and information which add up to a 
substantial body of published statements and also assist taxpayers or revenue 
administrators. However, in every case these views or rulings express only the Revenue 
Department’s view of the law.195 The rulings are always general and do not relate to 
individual taxpayers. Although the Revenue Department’s rulings have no legally 
binding force on any party, they may be used by taxpayers and are in practice used by 
revenue administrators.  
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The Revenue Department has issued two main types of rulings, Advance Rulings and 
the Board of Taxation’s rulings. Advance Rulings are simply legal advice provided by 
the Legal Bureau of the Revenue Department and are available to an individual taxpayer 
in relation to the tax consequences of a business or transactions that are the subject of 
enquiry. If rulings are found to be for the purpose of public interest, then they are 
published unofficially, but without revealing the identities of the taxpayers. Similarly, 
for the purpose of confidentiality, most Advance Rulings are issued privately to the 
taxpayer, and in order to maintain secrecy they are used for internal purposes only. The 
official format of the Advance Rulings is an abbreviation of the Thai alphabet ‘Gor 
Kor’196 followed by an official code, then a serial number of the Ruling and the issuing 
date; for example, Gor Kor 0702/9578 issued on 1 December 2010.
197
 
 
Taxpayers can refer to the Revenue Department’s advice through letters. Taxpayers can 
also meet with revenue officers to clarify and discuss their tax duties. In this regard, the 
Revenue Department’s purpose is simply to observe the law by sufficiently resolving 
the enquiry of the taxpayer. These rulings help taxpayers to understand in advance the 
interpretation of particular laws and their application to particular cases by the tax 
authority.
198
 Even though the views given by the Revenue Department are not always 
followed by every taxpayer, in many cases taxpayers, especially those who are directly 
involved, tend to take these views into consideration and follow them. Nonetheless, 
when it comes to the view of the court, the Advance Ruling is usually treated merely as 
a legal opinion and has no legal status.  
 
Advance Rulings are considered essential, according to tax lawyers and academics, as a 
reference point for information related to the revenue of the country. In general, tax 
assessment practice follows the self-assessment system whereby taxpayers have a legal 
duty to declare their income and pay tax to the authorities. Declaration and tax payment 
are assumed to be correct; however, the Revenue Department can make assessments in 
cases of failure to file tax returns or the filing of false or inadequate tax returns. A tax 
assessment notice is deemed an administrative order under the Revenue Code, which 
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specifies the tax obligations of persons who are subject to taxation. The Revenue 
Department issues a tax assessment notice without having to give any ruling, and as 
such is not a part of tax administration procedures but merely a request for advice from 
revenue officers. 
The Board of Taxation
199’Ruling is the second type of Ruling made by the Revenue 
Department. Similar to the Advance Rulings, this Ruling serves as another source of the 
opinions of the Revenue Department. An officially appointed board, which comprises a 
group of tax specialists selected from heads of tax departments, economists and legal 
experts,
200
 expresses the views of the Revenue Department on particular contentious 
issues. Although the Revenue Department is statutorily bound by it
201
, this Ruling has 
no legally binding force. A Ruling of the Board of Taxation is the view of selected tax 
specialists and is binding on the Revenue Department, but the courts do not accept them 
as conclusively authoritative and deem it to be the mere opinion of government 
departments. Two examples are: the Board of Taxation Ruling No. 28/2538 (1995), 
which sets out the guiding principles in determining the value of the shares for 
calculating personal income tax regardless of whether such shares are issued by the 
employer or its overseas parent, and the Board of Taxation’s Ruling No. 37/2551, 
issued on 9 April 2008 regarding tax credit on dividends paid by a petroleum business. 
This ruling was issued by the Board of Taxation in order to clarify the situation 
regarding tax credits on dividends paid by a petroleum business. 
When comparing an administrative order with the Revenue Department’s rulings, one 
must consider Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act B.E. 2539 (1996), which 
defines an administrative order as: 
[…] a use of lawful power by officers, which formulates a legal 
relationship between persons that would establish, change, transfer, 
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waive, withdraw or affect the persons through the status of obligations 
or rights of persons either permanently or temporarily.  
Specific examples of administrative orders are an order, an appellate decision, an 
endorsement, permission, approval and registration. This does not include legislation. 
Hence, an administrative order is an order made by government officers and according 
to the law, which has a direct effect on a person. Other actions are also included in the 
administrative order as stated in Section 5 
202
 specified in Ministerial Regulations. 
When considering the Revenue Department’s ruling in accordance with aforementioned 
administrative order criteria, the Revenue Department’s ruling is only for the purpose of 
rendering a service to taxpayers by giving legal opinions and recommendations 
regarding tax obligations. Consequently, the Revenue Department’s rulings do not 
legally obligate the taxpayer to pay, alter, transfer, waive or cease their duty to pay tax. 
More specifically, only the facts that have already occurred are responded to by a ruling. 
The revenue officials are not obliged to look for facts for the purpose of making 
decisions or orders. Rulings issued by the Revenue Department do not imply any 
administrative force, which excludes taxpayers from standing by these rulings; 
nevertheless, taxpayers have to pay their taxes, since they must comply with the law and 
not the Rulings. As it is evident that Rulings are superseded by the law, they do not 
have any power over changing or overruling the provisions of the law. If a person 
refuses to pay the tax, which he is obliged to do by a Ruling, the option of not paying 
tax does in fact remains with the person. Furthermore, in a situation of non-compliance 
with Rulings, the Revenue Department is not allowed to confiscate the assets of the 
person for a public auction in order to pay the dues in account of his taxes, or to file the 
case with the court. In such an instance, the Revenue Department must refer to the 
provisions provided in the Revenue Code which suggests that an assessment has to be 
carried out prior to the confiscation.
203
 Similarly, where there is disagreement with the 
Ruling, the taxpayer cannot appeal the case to the court because the Ruling is not by any 
means a form of tax collection or an order to the taxpayer. Therefore, it does not itself 
endow the Revenue Department or the persons who request the Ruling to have any legal 
binding effect and so are the courts on account of binding by the Rulings. There have 
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been instances where taxpayers have claimed that they have followed an opinion stated 
in the Rulings; however, the court may choose to rule differently. 
3.2.4.2 Motif of Judgments 
As explained previously in Chapter 2, Thailand generally operates a civil law system 
that does not use judicial precedent or binding case law. Thai courts do not have to 
follow their own previous decisions nor do the lower courts have to follow the 
precedents set by higher courts. However, the common law system has had an influence 
on Thai law, as it employs a process of using the earlier decisions of higher courts, 
especially the Supreme Court, which publishes its reasoning and decisions. A similar 
practice is adopted in tax cases where the opinions of the Supreme Court, (which are a 
legitimate source for providing specific interpretations of provisions under tax law), are 
largely accepted among legal specialists and academics to apply as a secondary 
authority, and which are believed to have influence over subsequent judgments. 
 
3.3 Thai Principal Taxes 
In order to consider the problematic jurisdiction in the field of tax incentives in the 
upcoming chapters, it is essential to comprehend the characteristics of each type of tax 
employed in Thailand.  
3.3.1 Direct Taxes 
3.3.1.1 Personal Income Tax 
A person receiving an assessable income in Thailand is legally responsible for personal 
income tax as per the tax rate specified under the income tax schedule. A person can be 
defined as an individual,
204
 an ordinary partnership,
205
 a non-juristic body of persons,
206
 
a deceased person
207
 or an undivided estate.
208
 Further, an individual residing in 
Thailand for a period, or periods, amounting to 180 days or more in a tax (calendar) 
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year, is considered a Thai resident for tax purposes.
209
 Any person residing in Thailand 
is required to pay tax on income drawn from sources available in Thailand on a cash 
basis, regardless of where the money is actually paid, as well as income drawn from 
sources outside of Thailand, i.e. foreign sources brought to Thailand are subject to 
personal income tax in the same year they were acquired.
210
 However, any person who 
does not qualify as a resident of Thailand is only liable to pay income tax on the share 
he has earned within Thailand.
211
 Personal income tax returns are supposed to be filed 
by 31 March every year.
212
 Assessable income is segmented into eight categories.
213
 For 
the purpose of calculating taxable income, certain deductions and allowances can be 
offset against assessable income.
214
 Exemptions from personal income tax are granted 
to certain persons in accordance with Section 42 of the Revenue Code. 
3.3.1.2 Corporate Income Tax  
Corporate income tax (CIT) is a form of direct tax levied on a juristic company or 
partnership involved in any type of authorised business in Thailand, or which is not 
conducting business in Thailand, but is drawing certain types of income from the 
country.
215
 For the purpose of CIT calculation, a juristic company or partnership 
includes a public company, a private company, a limited partnership or a registered 
partnership incorporated under Thai law or foreign law as well as an association or a 
foundation.
216
 The bracket of a juristic company or partnership also entails any joint 
venture, any trading or profit-seeking activity, conducted by a foreign government or its 
agency deployed in Thailand, or by any other juristic body incorporated under foreign 
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law.
217
 Companies that are registered in Thailand have to pay tax on income earned 
from sources within and outside Thailand.
218
 
 
The rate specified for CIT is generally at the rate at 30% of net profits,
219
 frequently 
known as net income or net earnings, and which are based on an accrual basis following 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
220
. According to the conditions 
prescribed by Section 65 of the Revenue Code, 
[…] a company must take into account all revenue arising from, or in 
consequence of, the business carried on in an accounting period after 
deducting all the expenses incurred in that accounting period. The 
accounting period for companies which is their taxable year shall be of 
twelve months duration.
221
  
 
Revenue Code Sections 65 and 65 (2) set the principles for the determining the 
computation of the taxable net profit of resident juristic persons. In addition, it is 
essential for the taxpayer to understand that only those expenses incurred exclusively 
for the purpose of generating income or for the purpose of doing business are tax 
deductible.
222
 Nonetheless, these deductible expenses do not take into account certain 
expenses specified under Section 65 (3) of the Revenue Code. Net losses can be carried 
forward up to a maximum number of five consecutive accounting periods but cannot be 
carried back. 
 
A foreign company is defined as one incorporated under foreign law and engaged in 
activities for the purpose of doing business in Thailand, if it has a permanent 
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establishment including an office, a branch or any other place of business in Thailand, 
or has an employee, an agent, a representative or a go-between for undertaking business 
deployed in the country.
223
 A foreign company carrying on business in Thailand is 
subject to tax, but only for net profit arising from, or as a result of, business carried on 
in Thailand at the end of each accounting period.
224
 Foreign companies engaged in 
international transport operations are liable to tax on gross receipts.
225
 When a foreign 
company remits its earnings out of Thailand, the amount of earnings transferred are 
subject to tax.
226
  
 
A foreign company not involved in any specific business in Thailand but nevertheless 
drawing certain types of income from the country, such as service fees, interests, 
dividends, rents and professional fees, is subject to corporate income tax on the gross 
amount received.
227
 This corporate income tax is collected in the form of withholding 
tax, according to which the payer of the income must deduct the tax from particular 
rates depending on the category of income and the tax status of the recipient.
228
 Income 
tax is withheld from the amount being remitted abroad by a branch office in Thailand,
229
 
and it is levied at the rate of 10% in total. Moreover, the rate of 15%, except for 
dividends, which are subject to 10% rate, is withheld from payments of income such as 
loan interest,
230
 royalties,
231
 management fees or rentals paid to a foreign legal entity not 
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doing business in Thailand.
232
 In the case of double tax agreements, withholding tax 
rates applied to foreign companies may be reduced or exempted. 
233
 
3.3.2 Indirect Taxes 
3.3.2.1 Value Added Tax (VAT) 
On 1 January 1992, VAT became effective because of an ineffective business tax.
234
 It 
is an indirect tax levied on the goods consumed at each stage of the production, 
distribution of goods, or provision of services. Value added at every phase of the 
production process is subject to tax, and is applied to all retailers, wholesalers, 
manufacturers, importers, producers and others providing direct services.
235
 All 
companies are required to register and adopt the VAT system,
236
 apart from firms with a 
turnover of less than THB 1.8 million
237
 a year and certain other business activities 
including the sale and import of raw agricultural products and related goods, the sale 
and import of newspapers and textbooks, and basic services such as health and 
educational services, domestic transport and the leasing of immovable property.
238
 
Goods exempt from import duty and intended for export processing zones are included 
in this category, along with research and technical services, labour contracts and 
auditing and legal services.
239
 VAT is currently levied at a rate of 7%
240
 on gross 
receipts, which has two components: a standard 6.3% VAT rate and a municipal tax of 
0.7%.
241
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3.3.2.2 Specific Business Tax (SBT) 
For the purpose of replacing business tax, specific business tax (SBT) was introduced in 
Thailand in 1992 and is included in the category of indirect tax.
242
 The difference 
between SBT and VAT is that any person or entity who engaged in certain businesses in 
Thailand is subject to SBT instead of VAT.
243
 Businesses that are subject to pay SBT 
include banking, finance, repurchasing and factoring organisation at the rate of 3.3%, 
and life insurance and pawn brokerages at 2.75%.
244
 Similar to VAT, SBT has a local 
tax element. A company that sells its factories and land to move to an industrial estate 
may be entitled to a waiver of the 3.3% SBT if the company relocates to the industrial 
estate within one year of selling its property.
245
 Any person or entity that is liable to 
SBT is required to register to become an SBT-registered person or entity within 30 days 
from the date of operation, and must file a monthly SBT return regardless of whether 
the business is generating income.
246
 
3.3.2.3  Customs Duty 
Customs duty is imposed primarily on import and certain export goods specified by the 
Customs Act B.E. 2469 (1926) and the Customs Tariff Decree B.E. 2530 (1987).
247
 
Most tariffs are ad valorem. In certain situations, however, both ad valorem and ad 
naturam rates are given and the tariff that gives the most revenue will be applicable to 
it.
248
 Commonly, the invoice price acts as the basis for computing duty and is normally 
applied to the CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) value for imports and FOB (Free On 
Board) for exports.
249
 Customs duty is levied according to the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System or Harmonized System. Most imported goods are liable 
to customs duty rates of 0% to 100%, but exemptions are issued to promoted persons in 
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accordance with the Investment Promotion Act of 2001
250
 and to petroleum 
concessionaires under the Petroleum Act of 1971
251
. As a member country of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
252
 the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA),
253
 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
254
 and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO),
255
 Thailand is required to adopting the protocols of these 
organisations when determining customs prices with a reduction of or exemption from 
customs duties on imported goods. 
3.3.2.4 Excise Tax 
Adjustments to the excise tax system have been made in order to complement the VAT 
system. For products which are subject to both taxes, the Revenue Department collects 
the VAT and the Excise Department collects the excise.
256
 Both of the above taxes can 
be paid to the Excise Department, whereas for VAT can only be paid to the Revenue 
Department. Excise tax is levied on selected goods (mainly luxury goods) such as 
petroleum products, tobacco, liquor, beer, soft drinks, crystal glasses, perfume and 
cosmetic products, yachts, air conditioners (not over 72,000 BTU) and passenger cars 
with 10 seats or less. Excise tax is calculated on an ad valorem basis (a percentage of 
the price of the goods) or a particular rate depending on the quantity or weight of the 
goods, whichever is greater.
257
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3.3.3 Local Administration Revenue 
The local administration directly administers and collects the revenue from the local 
levied tax, which includes taxes on house rent, land development, signboards, 
slaughterhouses, hotels, petrol stations and retail tobacco taxes income.
258
   
3.4 Tax Administration and the Revenue Department 
3.4.1 Ministry of Finance: History, Powers and Responsibilities 
The management of Thailand’s national revenue began in the 15th Century following the 
establishment of the Royal Treasury Department in 1448. The four principal 
government agencies established in the reign of King Boromtrilokkanat of the Ayuthya 
Era were created with the purpose of collecting taxes and import duties, trading with 
foreign merchants and operating the Crown's warehouse business and merchant 
fleet.
259
 Nevertheless, the process of revenue collection was not organised well until the 
19
th
 Century, when, in 1873, King Chulalongkorn established the Royal Treasury to act 
as a central agency for revenue collection.
260
 The main duty of treasury officials was to 
manage the delivery of revenue collection through different agencies.
261
 
By virtue of the Royal Treasury Act of 1875, the Royal Treasury officially came into 
existence as the government agency charged with administering national finance for the 
purpose of collecting revenues, the management of Crown Property and the 
disbursement of royal funds. In addition, responsibilities were laid down by the Act for 
the ranks of civil servants and the revenue collection duties for tax and customs officers. 
The Royal Treasury developed in stages. The form of government was changed from 
absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy in 1932, following which the Ministry of 
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Finance (originally called the Treasury Ministry)
262
 became independent by virtue of the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1933.
263
  
The Ministry of Finance is authorised to administer various matters related to public 
finance, taxation, treasury, government property, operations of government monopolies 
and revenue-generating enterprises, which can be legally operated only by the 
government, as well as other organisations to which the government has contractual 
obligations. In addition, it is also has the power to provide loan guarantees for 
government agencies, financial institutions and state enterprises. The Minister of 
Finance, as the top administrator, sets the overall policy directions with assistance from 
deputy ministers, for the purpose of discharging responsibilities. Furthermore, the 
Minister of Finance may notify in the Thai Government Gazette and issue ministerial 
regulations to appoint assessment officers and other officials.
264
 The Permanent 
Secretary for Finance is responsible for supervising the management and functioning of 
the ministry, whereas the Director-Generals deal with matters concerning their own 
individual departments. For administrative purposes, work is divided among eight main 
agencies, namely the Office of the Secretary to the Minister, the Office of the 
Permanent Secretary, the Fiscal Policy Office (FPO), the Treasury Department, the 
Comptroller General's Department, the Customs Department, the Excise Department 
and the Revenue Department.
265
  
The Fiscal Policy Office was founded on 18 October 1961 under the instructions of the 
then Finance Minister, Mr. Sunthorn Hongladarom,
266
 who believed it necessary that 
Thailand should make use of the most up-to-date public finance expertise and formulate 
its fiscal policy accordingly. The FPO was established to facilitate the dissemination of 
expertise and to provide a focal point for the formulation of policy.
267
 It is engaged in 
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studying and accordingly advising to the government agencies on economical, fiscal 
and tax policies domestically and internationally,
268
 and is also responsible for 
monitoring, supervising and evaluating implemented policies and measures on taxes, as 
well as suggesting and recommending improvements to these measures.
269
 
3.4.2 The Board of Taxation 
The Board of Taxation consists of the Permanent Secretary of State of Finance, a 
chairman, the Director-General of Fiscal Policy, the Secretary General of the Juridical 
Council and three technically qualified persons appointed by the minister.
270
 Officials in 
the Ministry of Finance must be appointed by the Board of Taxation to act as Secretary 
and Assistant Secretary.
271
 The presence of at least 50% of the total number of members 
constitutes a quorum at a meeting of the Board of Taxation.
272
 The Board is empowered 
with the following authorities: first, to prescribe the limit within which the power of the 
Assessment Officer and any competent official may be exercised; second, to prescribe 
rules and procedures for the purposes of auditing and assessing tax; third, to give rulings 
on questions regarding taxes, as the Revenue Department may seek its opinion and 
fourth, to give advice to the minister in connection with the administration and 
collection of taxes.
273
 
3.4.3 Administrative Organisations  
Administrative organisations comprise of the Provincial Administrative Organisation, 
Tambon (sub-district) Administrative Organisation, Municipality, Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration and the City of Pattaya), which are responsible for the 
following: local tax, sign tax, slaughter house duty, swallow nest harvest duty, tobacco-
based local tax, oil-based local tax and local tax from hotels. 
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3.4.4 The Customs Department  
The Customs Department is responsible for the administration of import and export 
duties. 
3.4.5 The Excise Department  
The Excise Department is in charge of collecting excise tax. 
3.4.6 The Revenue Department  
The initial vision of King Chulalongkorn was to establish a country-wide infrastructure, 
and to provide a revenue collection platform, in order for Thailand to compete 
economically with the rest of the world. Following this idea, the Revenue Department 
was founded on 2 September 1915 by King Rama VI.
274
 The current Revenue 
Department, under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for the 
administration of the following taxes: personal income tax, corporate income tax, 
petroleum income tax, value added tax, specific business tax and stamp duties.
275
 The 
Revenue Department plans to establish a countrywide infrastructure and provide a 
revenue collection platform to bring Thailand into line with other developed countries. 
The Revenue Department is responsible for collecting taxes as provided under the 
Revenue Code and related laws. It is also in charge of reviewing and improving laws 
and regulations pertaining to the tax collection system in order to promote savings, 
investment and competitions as well as to equalise income distribution and ensure tax 
compliance. It can make suggestions on the use of tax policy as a tool for social and 
economic development to the Ministry of Finance and can negotiate with other 
countries to avoid double taxation and promote trade and investment.
276
 
The revenue authorities’ most important role is to ensure compliance with tax laws.277 
The effectiveness of their tax collection depends, however, on a variety of external 
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factors, such as the state of the economy, public support for government policies and the 
willingness of taxpayers to comply with tax rules. In an ever-changing environment, 
revenue authorities must be clear about and focused on their goals and continually 
review their operating approaches and procedures to ensure that they are making the 
most effective and efficient use of the available resources. By adapting and 
implementing appropriate technologies, as well as by being open to the benchmarking 
and testing of their operations to achieve ‘best practice’. Good revenue authorities must 
seek to improve both their public image and the organisation of their work processes.
278
 
The Revenue Department is headed by the Director-General, who is the highest 
authority of the Department, supported by other executives who are principal advisors 
on tax base management, performance improvement and information and 
communication technology. The four main department units are currently working 
under the responsibility of four Deputy Directors-Generals.
279
 
3.5 Thai Tax Courts  
3.5.1 History of the Thai Tax Courts 
The foundation of the Central Tax Court complied with the Act for the Establishment of 
the Tax Courts and Procedure for Tax Cases B.E. 2529 (1986). This Act presents two 
types of tax courts, namely the Central Tax Court, and the Provincial Tax Court.
280
 It 
should be mentioned that the original draft law for establishing the tax courts was to set 
up Commercial and taxation courts. In the process of making this legislation the 
commercial jurisdiction was not included, allowing only jurisdiction over tax. As tax 
cases are considered to be different in nature from regular civil cases, the Act for the 
Establishment of and Procedure for Tax Court (AEPTC) B.E. 2528 (1985) was ratified 
on 20
 
August 1985 and has been active since 5 September 1985 for the purpose of 
providing special and accelerated procedures for tax litigation. Tax courts have the 
power to hear and judge appeals against the decision of the tax officers or committees, 
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disputes over the claims of the state on tax obligations, disputes over tax refunds, 
disputes over the rights or obligations related to tax collection obligations and other 
cases made subject to the Act and as recommended by other laws.
281
 
3.5.2 Structure, Functions and Jurisdiction of the Tax Courts  
The territorial jurisdiction of the Central Tax Court includes Bangkok and five 
provinces, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon, Nakhon Prathom, Nonthaburi and 
Pathumthani.
282
 As no provincial tax courts have yet been set up, the Central Tax Court, 
established in Bangkok,
283
 therefore, at present has jurisdiction over the whole of the 
territory. Cases that are brought to the tax court generally relate to disagreements 
between an individual and the Tax Department or the Custom and Excise Department. 
However, tax cases relate to disagreements between an individual and an administrative 
agency and hence should be considered as administrative cases. Nevertheless, a case 
within the jurisdiction of tax courts is not within the jurisdiction of administrative 
courts.
284
 In cases where there is a question as to whether a case arising is under the 
jurisdiction of the tax court or another court, the President of the Supreme Court is 
authorised to give a decision.
285
 
Legislation states that there shall be provided a Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justices 
in such a number to be determined by the Minister of Justice.
286
 However, judges in the 
tax courts are assigned by the king under the law on judicial service and chosen from 
the judicial officials who possess knowledge and proficiency in the law of taxation. 
Two judges form a quorum for trial and adjudication in the Central Tax Court.
287
 These 
judges, specialised in tax law, ensure fast and appropriate judgments.
288
 To ensure the 
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convenience, expediency and justice of the proceedings, the Chief Justice of the Central 
Tax Court, with the agreement of the President of the Supreme Court, is authorised to 
issue rules of the court on proceedings and the hearing of evidence in the tax cases.
289
 
An expert can be summoned by the court upon special remuneration for the purpose of 
providing advice during the trial.
290
 However, this practice is not common in ordinary 
courts. The Tax Court was set up with the objective of shortening the previously lengthy 
procedures endured in the Civil Court. It seeks to avoid uncertainties in trial process, 
and interruption of business operations, which could affect the decision of investors to 
operate their businesses in Thailand. 
3.5.3 Procedure of Tax Cases  
Tax procedures are elaborated upon under the AEPTC of 1985
291
 and the Regulations 
on Tax Cases of 2001. The process and procedure of the tax court differs to that of the 
normal civil courts. Nevertheless, any issue of proceedings not specifically provided for 
in this Act and its rules must comply with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code 
mutatis mutandis.
292
 
Unlike the normal civil court’s procedure on appeals, decisions or judgments of the tax 
courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court
293
 within one month from the date on 
which the judgments or orders are pronounced.
294
 If the value of the asset or the amount 
in dispute does not exceed THB 50,000,
295
 no party is entitled to appeal against the 
judgment of the tax court on the questions of fact, unless the judge who sat in the case 
has made a dissenting opinion or has certified that there is a motive to appeal. In other 
situations, written approval of the Chief Justice of the Central Tax Court is required.
296
 
                                                          
289
 AEPTC 1985, s 20. 
290
AEPTC 1985, s 21. 
291
 AEPTC 1985, s 17. 
292
 An example can be seen from RC, s 12 regarding the procedures for seizure and sale at public 
auctions. 
293
 AEPTC 1985, s 24, the Tax Section is set up, by the President of the Supreme Court, in the Supreme 
Court. 
294
 AEPTC 1985, s 24. 
295
 Approximately GBP1,010. 
296
 AEPTC 1985, s 25. 
61 
 
In accordance with the appeal rules, tax cases are also governed by the provisions 
specified in Sections 225 (paragraph one) and 226 of the Civil Procedure Code. If the 
President of the Supreme Court considers it appropriate, questions of law surrounding 
tax cases can be decided in the general meeting of the judges.
297
 It should be noted that 
the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applied to an appeal against a specific 
court orders to imprison, detain or fine any person, or in regard to provisional measures 
before judgment, or to the execution of a judgment or order.
298
 Appeals against the 
orders of these courts are heard by the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme 
Court.
299
 
The provisions of the AEPTC of 1985 and of the Civil Procedure Code for the 
proceedings of cases in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court relate mutatis 
mutandis to the proceedings of tax cases in the Supreme Court.
300
 
3.5.4 Statutory Interpretation by the Thai Tax Court 
As far as civil law jurisdictions, including Thailand, are concerned, statutory 
interpretation is performed by the courts to determine the intent of the legislator by 
investigating the legislation as a whole.
301
 Regarding tax cases, two principles of 
interpretation are utilised by the tax court: literal interpretation and purposive or 
intentional interpretation.
302
 The courts often make an effort to determine the actual 
meaning of a statute. Neither literal interpretation nor intentional interpretation must 
lead to irrationality. The following six rules have been adopted by Thai tax courts to 
interpret tax laws. 
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3.5.4.1 Strict Construction  
Tax is the government’s main source of revenue, and it is a responsibility of the Thai 
people to pay taxes.
303
 However, taxation affects the rights and property of people, 
which may only be infringed upon by an Act of Parliament.
304
 A tax statute is 
categorised as public law, since failure to abide by the tax laws can result in criminal 
penalties including fines
305
 and imprisonment.
306
 Furthermore, other civil penalties such 
as surcharges,
307
 seizure,
308
 and the cost of prosecution can be assessed. Subsequently, 
revenue statutes must be construed strictly. In cases where a provision has many 
possible interpretations, or has more than one meaning, the court is obliged to interpret 
such a provision in favour of the taxpayer.
309
 Moreover, the court may not apply an 
extended interpretation based on the objective or spirit of the law in cases where there 
are clear statutory words.
310
 Tax statutes should not be construed so as to increase the 
tax burden on taxpayers, although in a situation of necessity, tax law should be 
interpreted so as to result in the least tax burden upon the taxpayer. The same rule has 
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been applied in the United Kingdom since the House of Lords ruled in Partington v 
Attorney General that the wording of a tax provision must be as clear as possible. The 
taxpayer is not liable to pay tax if there are any ambiguities or lack of clarity in the 
wording of the applicable provision. In cases where there is doubt, the court should rule 
in favour of the taxpayer. In the Partington case, the court held that: 
 
If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he 
must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial 
mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, 
cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, 
however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might 
otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible, in any 
statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a 
construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, whether you can 
simply adhere to the words of the statue.
311
 
 
The strict construction of tax law can be seen in a number of cases decided by the Thai 
Supreme Court.
312
 One of these cases is Supreme Court (plenary meeting) Decision No. 
4687/2540 (1997)
313
, which held that with respect to Section 122 of the Revenue Code, 
‘any person who overpaid the tax or the surcharge by two Baht or more in respect of an 
instrument of one transaction shall be entitled to enter a claim in writing to the official’. 
The intent of the provision in specifying the term ‘any person who overpaid the tax or 
surcharge’ is to cover only a person who has a duty to pay the duty or the surcharge 
which was ‘overpaid’. This should not be interpreted to cover a person who has no 
obligation to pay or is exempt from this tax; in such a case, the intended term ought to 
be defined clearly in law. As a consequence, the time limit for returning any overpaid 
tax in this case shall not be under the control of Section 122 of the Revenue Code.  
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Following the rule that the tax statutes should be construed strictly, tax exemption or 
deduction provisions should also be firmly construed. To enjoy any form of exemption, 
a taxpayer must fall clearly within specific criteria. The reason for strict interpretation is 
to achieve fairness treatment of both taxpayers and tax collectors. In addition, the court 
should be aware of the absurdity doctrine, where the strict interpretation of a statute 
may run entirely against common sense. One example can be seen in Supreme Court 
Decision No. 3110/2535 (1992), where a surcharge which is paid according to the 
Customs Act B.E. 2469 (1926), Section 112 (4) is not due only in the case where 
security is given in Section 112 (2). An interpretation which results in a surcharge only 
incurred in the case where security was given is considered absurd. In this regard, the 
charging provisions should be firmly construed.  
 
It should be noted that where the law is unclear, or where it can be interpreted in several 
ways, the court shall consider the intention of the legal drafter or the spirit of the law. 
Nevertheless, the spirit of the law may alter with the passage of time, political incidents 
and opinions of the courts.  
3.5.4.2 Literal Interpretation  
Thailand, as a civil law system, adopts grammatically literal interpretation, whereby the 
objective of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the purpose of the legislature enacting it 
(legislative intention). The interpretation of tax statutes should be based on the intent of 
the law. In democratic countries, including Thailand, in accordance with the rule of 
separation of powers, the power to legislate statutes belongs to a legislative body, which 
in Thailand’s case is the National Assembly. Citizens should be taxed only if that they 
give their approval through the House of Representatives. The legislative body utilises 
statutes to create social policy
314
 and fiscal policy, so an interpretation of tax law should 
consider the intent of the legislature. 
3.5.4.3 Consideration of an independent trait of tax law  
The principle of an independent trait of tax law (autonomic du droit fiscal) is that the 
legislator is entitled to plan tax legislation so that the contents differ from basic norms 
in other fields of law, including the CCC. For example, the terms ‘juristic company or 
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partnership’ and ‘sale’, as defined by Section 39 of the Revenue Code, vary from the 
definitions provided by the CCC
315
. Meanings of the terms ‘juristic company and 
partnership’ and ‘sale’ in the Revenue Code are extended to cover more units in the case 
of ‘juristic company or partnership’ and more activities in the case of ‘sale’.316 Another 
example of an independent trait of tax law can be observed in a case of double tax 
agreement, which exempts the imposition of two or more taxes on similar incomes, 
assets or financial transactions. 
3.5.4.4 The interpretation of tax law does not rely on the principle of ‘the 
autonomy of the will’ 
The principle behind the autonomy of the will of the contractual parties, which is one of 
the principles of private law, stipulates that the contractual parties express their 
intention to enter into a contract.
317
 The courts, in several cases, acknowledge this rule 
provided that the contract complies with section 150 of the CCC, which states that ‘an 
act (contract) is void if its object is expressly prohibited by law or is impossible, or is 
against to public order or good morals’. Furthermore, Section 368 of the CCC accepts 
an interpretation of contract according to the parties’ intentions with a consideration of 
good faith and ordinary usage. 
In one Supreme Court case,
318
 the court accepted the principle of the autonomy of the 
will in a tax case under public law. The case was between Bell Telephone 
Manufacturing Company (Bell) and the Revenue Department, concerning the issue of 
whether two contracts between Bell and the Telephone Organisation of Thailand (TOT) 
were valid. The court took the view that the two parties
319
 in this case aimed to have 
two agreements, one of which was a telephone tool and equipment sale agreement, and 
the other a telephone network construction agreement. The plaintiff in this case did not 
have to pay tax on the amount of money under the sale agreement, since it was exempt 
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under the double tax agreement between Thailand and Belgium
320
 regarding the 
permanent establishment rule
321
. If Bell had not separated their agreements into two 
contracts, they would be deemed liable to pay full income tax, since only one agreement 
would be a hire of work agreement under the CCC’s Section 587322, and the company 
would be deemed as having a permanent establishment in Thailand. 
This case was argued by a well-known academic, Trachutham, who stated that the court 
accepted the structuring of a construction contract by separating one contract into two 
dealing with the supply of goods and the provision of services, in order not to be bound 
by the permanent establishment rule. The rule of a permanent establishment is adopted 
when a foreign company derives income in Thailand through an employee, 
representative or intermediary, and may therefore be considered as carrying on business 
in Thailand. As a result, it creates a Thai tax liability on that income.
323
 Trachutham 
argued that structured contracts contained a factor of tax avoidance.
324
 In later cases, the 
autonomy of the will was challenged by the court on the basis that taxation in Thailand 
has to depend on the appropriate legal qualification of the legal acts and agreements of 
the taxpayer. The form or the name of the contract, and even the text thereof is not in 
itself determinative, so taxation must be based on the taxpayers’ actual behaviour, 
which establishes their legal rights and obligations. 
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3.5.4.5 Where there is no tax provision on a specific matter, interpretation shall be 
based on general law 
Statutes are drafted with a consideration of fundamental jurisprudential viewpoints, 
legal concepts and general law. It is crucial for an interpreter to understand the 
importance of legislative harmony. For example, when phrases in private statutes are 
used in public statutes, including tax statutes, they should present the same meanings as 
they hold in private statutes.
325
 The main aim of the legislator is to harmonise all the 
statutes. However, it is not always possible, and occasionally statutes contradict each 
other.
326
 As a consequence, where a word is not specified in tax law, that word shall 
have a meaning as specified by general law or other relevant laws. According to 
Supreme Court Decision No. 7671/2546 (2003), the Revenue Code does not define the 
term ‘dividend’. In this case, the court applied provisions in the CCC to consider 
whether taxable income, received by the shareholder after the closure of the company, is 
deemed as a dividend.
327
 According to provisions regarding dividends in the CCC
328
, 
the dividend which has been distributed among shareholders is part of the profits of the 
company within an accounting period and is deemed as a dividend for the purpose of 
taxation.  
3.5.4.6 Where there is a specific provision on the matter, tax law shall be strictly 
interpreted in accordance with such provision 
Tax statutes should be strictly construed where there is a specific or clear provision. For 
instance, Part I annexed to the Customs Tariff Decree B.E. 2530 (1987) specifies an 
interpretation of the customs tariff rate, so any interpretation of it has to comply with 
such provisions. In addition, Section 15 of this Decree states that the Director-General 
of the Customs Department is authorised to interpret provisions in the tariff schedule. 
However, any such interpretation is governed by the General Rules for Interpretation in 
Part I annexed to the Decree, and the Explanatory Notes to the Harmonised System of 
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the Customs Co-operation Council.
329
 In the case of excise tax, the Excise Tariff Act 
B.E. 2527 (1984) authorises the Director-General of the Excise Department to clarify 
the schedule attached in this Act, and the clarification must be according to the rules as 
published by the Minister of Finance in the Thai Government Gazette.
330
 Chapter 8 of 
this research discusses further to what extent the administrative body should have power 
to specify tax laws and to determine how much clarification the administrative body is 
able to make. 
 
Conclusion 
Taxes are the main source of revenue used to finance public sector spending. It is 
evident that taxation has played a crucial role in the economy of Thailand, including in 
economic growth support, resource management, the maintenance of economic stability 
and income allocation. This chapter discussed the sources and scope of Thai revenue 
law, along with its administration and authority responsible for tax collection. This 
chapter illustrated the hierarchy of tax legislation in Thailand, which will form a 
substantial discussion in the norm conflict resolutions examined in Chapter 7. A general 
consideration regarding the interpretation of tax law is that in the case of ambiguity, 
statutes are to be strictly interpreted, and must be for the benefit of the taxpayers. In 
cases of tax exemption or deduction, the provisions must be strictly construed, possibly 
raising a question as to whether the taxpayer or the state bears the burden of tax, 
because tax exemption or deduction may result in the loss of tax revenue. This issue 
will be discussed further with respect to authority and the law governing tax incentives 
in Chapters 7 and 8.  
This chapter outlines Thailand’s tax procedure, including the process of assessments 
and the possibility of taxpayers taking disagreements with the tax officer to the Board of 
Appeals. After this stage, a case against the order of the tax officer can be filed with the 
Central Tax Court. In addition, it determines that unclear tax law gives rise to 
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significant problems, requiring the interpreter to be cautious when interpreting statutes 
and to reflect as accurately as possible the spirit of the draft legislation.   
70 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4 Investment in Thailand and the Board of Investment of Thailand 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will deal with Thailand’s economic and investment situation and its use of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). It will then examine the Thai government’s policy on 
investment and the role which the Thai Board of Investment (BOI) plays in it. Received 
wisdom has it that FDI is beneficial to economically developing countries such as 
Thailand.
331
 This chapter focuses on the benefits of FDI to the Thai economy, arguing 
that it is necessary to support the policy of granting incentives (including tax 
incentives). The 1997 Asian financial crises proved that FDI had a major role to play in 
providing foreign capital to help economic recovery in countries including Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
332
 This chapter will emphasise the importance 
of FDI to the development of Thailand’s ongoing economic growth and future 
prosperity, and that the Thai government should encourage it through relevant schemes 
and incentives.  
Domestic political instability in Thailand, the current global financial crisis and other 
events, which will be explained later in this chapter, have affected Thailand’s appeal as 
a host for FDI. A number of foreign companies have lost confidence or experienced 
difficulties in either continuing or setting up their businesses in Thailand. As such, it is 
necessary for the government to regain investors’ confidence by establishing effective 
policies, an appealing investment environment and strong financial organisation. 
Mathew Verghis, the World Bank’s Lead Economist for Southeast Asia, has 
commented that ‘investors normally want to see a stable political environment and clear 
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policy direction before they gain enough confidence to start investing again’.333 With 
this in mind, this chapter will provide an overview of the Thai government’s policies 
that aim to promote investment from abroad, under the auspices of the BOI. Tax 
incentives are one of the key factors taken into account by potential investors from 
overseas because they are considered effective in eliminating some of the problems that 
can face investors establishing a new business in a foreign country, such as bureaucracy 
and high outgoings in the first few years of business. This chapter will examine in detail 
the BOI, which is the key organisation (along with the Revenue Department) in the 
administration of tax incentives, and will discuss the implementation of its policies. It is 
important to clarify that, although the BOI is not one of the revenue authorities (which 
in Thailand are the Revenue Department, the Custom Department and the Excise 
Department), tax incentives offered to BOI-promoted companies are granted by the BOI 
through the Investment Promotion Act of 2001. 
4.1 Overview of Thailand’s Economic and Investment Situation 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Thailand’s wealth of natural resources, along with an 
entrepreneurial private sector and skilful economic management, meant that its 
economy grew quickly and became one of the most prosperous in the developing 
world.
334
 Since the 1970s, economic growth has been significantly driven by 
investment.
335
 Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, economic development was 
perceived as a continuous success, with an average economic growth rate of 8% per 
year
336
, the second highest growth rate after China.
337
 Overall, economic growth in the 
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mid-1990s was driven by FDI inflows and exports with key competitors.
338
 The Asian 
financial crisis,
339
 which started in Thailand in 1997, was the key factor affecting Thai 
economic performance.
340
 It began when ‘large external deficits accompanied by 
tremendous external borrowings excessively exposed the country to foreign exchange 
risk in both the financial and corporate sectors.’341 The Thai government reacted by 
converting the fixed exchange rate to a managed float system.
342
 According to 
Lauridsen, ‘financial liberalisation in an uncontrolled financial sector resulted in 
misallocation and mismatching’.343 He also took the view that political instability, 
indecisiveness and mismanagement at the political and administrative levels also 
contributed to the financial meltdown in Thailand.
344
  
As a result, the Thai economy lost the momentum it had been gathering over the 
previous few decades, and it failed to meet the targets set out in its ‘Fifth Economic 
Development Plan’, largely as a result of ‘serious macroeconomic imbalances’345 
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including increasing budget deficits, decreased savings and investment rates and 
increased debts. 
The Thai Baht depreciated against the US Dollar and reached a record low of THB 44 
per USD 1, whereas it had been THB 25 per USD 1 in 1995.
346
 This crisis resulted in 
comparatively decreased levels of both private domestic and foreign investment.
347
 
Furthermore, levels of investment fell dramatically, from 42% of GDP in 1996 to 20 % 
in 1998.
348
 A significant proportion of this remaining investment was in the non-traded 
sector, limiting its potential for enriching the economy.
349
 After the crisis, export 
performance worsened considerably, falling by 1.3% following earlier years of between 
10 and 20% growth rates. The slowdown in world trade, the emergence of China in 
global markets, EU restrictions on certain Thai exports and fluctuations in global 
electronic markets all contributed to the rapid decline in exports.
350
 A USD17.2 billion 
loan had to be arranged through the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
351
 and the 
government adopted a reform package for macroeconomic stabilisation and to tackle the 
crisis in financial institutions.
352
 These methods, designed by the IMF, assured price 
stability, a viable balance of payments, and sustainable growth in Thailand.
353
 
The Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006) was 
formulated in response to the 1997 crisis, to articulate a strategy for the country’s 
growth. It took into account political, social, administrative and external factors,
354
 and 
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adopted the philosophy of a ‘sufficiency economy’355 a theory developed by the current 
king.
356
 This theory stresses the middle path, moderation and due consideration in all 
manner of conduct as the guiding framework for national development.
357
 It is promoted 
as a framework by which the Thai people can live.  
From 2002 to 2004, a slowdown in domestic demand caused a decrease in overall 
economic growth rate. The causes were domestic political uncertainty, high energy 
prices and increasing interest rates.
358
 The growth trend recovered in 2006, when the 
demand for exports from Thailand increased by 9% and 18% in volume and value 
respectively,
359
 however, in 2006, political upheaval in the country resulted in the end 
of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s political career and the overthrowing of his 
party (Thai Rak Thai).
360
 The media, led by Sondhi Limthongkul, raised questions about 
the role of the constitution in breaking political deadlock, ongoing unrest in three 
provinces in the southern part of Thailand, the need for political stability and the 
considerable difference in political orientation between urban and rural groups, as well 
as the prime minister’s perceived conflicts of interest.361 The coup was organised by a 
council for democratic reform led by Sonthi Boonyalatglin.
362
 The movement had its 
origins in a number of grievances against Thaksin, most notable of which were 
criticisms of his government’s creation of an unprecedented rift in society, privatisation 
plans, the claim that Thaksin showed no respect for the king, and the highly 
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controversial fact that Thaksin did not pay taxes on the sale of Shin Corporation to 
Temasek Holdings.
363
 When Thaksin eventually went into self-imposed exile, and the 
Council for National Security came into power, a military government led by Surayud 
Chulanont, took interim control.
364
 This government transpired to be indecisive, 
implementing policies inconsistently and unable to lead the country through a period of 
turmoil.
 365
  
Since 2006, Thailand has been experiencing an economic downturn due to political 
unrest.
366
 During the same period, global economic growth also continued to slow down 
as evidenced by the downward economic growth of the United States
367
, Japan and 
European countries.
368
 This trend also led to a slowdown in demand for exports from 
Thailand.
369
  
Thailand has one of the fastest growing economic markets in the world.
370
  
Consequently, many investors consider Thailand to be a gateway to Southeast Asia and 
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the Greater Mekong sub-region, comprising Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar (Burma) 
and Vietnam.
371
 Due to its location, setting up a business in Thailand allows foreign 
businesses opportunities to trade conveniently with much of Asia, including China, 
India and member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
372
   
Thailand appeals to foreign investment, as it enjoys abundant natural resources as well 
as a skilled and cheap labour force.
373
 The country’s infrastructure has been improving, 
with standardised transportation facilities covering major routes.
374
 Furthermore, 
communications and information technology networks are well established to meet the 
requirements of business.
375
 The country’s educational standards have been reformed 
since the 1999 National Education Act, which implemented new organisational 
structures, promoted the decentralisation of administration and called for innovative 
learner-centred teaching practices.
376
 The Thai education system provides nine years of 
compulsory education, with twelve years of free basic education guaranteed by the 
constitution.
377
 The literacy rate in 2007 was 92.6%,
378
 and a wide range of subjects are 
available in educational institutions to respond to the market’s needs. Thailand also 
offers facilities and qualified medical personnel recognised throughout the world. They 
are funded in part by the increase in medical tourism by international patients due to 
Thailand’s expertise and reasonable costs.379 Taking into account all of the above 
factors, as well as the fact that Thailand is ranked 19
th
 out of 183 by Doing Business 
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2011, it is apparent why Thailand has become one of the most attractive destinations in 
the world to set up a business.
380
  
4.2 Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Thailand 
Foreign capital flows are usually divided into foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). FPIs are defined by Mooij and Ederveen as ‘foreign 
investments in cases where the investor controls less than some fixed proportion of the 
capital stock that is invested in’.381 FPI refers to household investment in foreign 
securities. FDI, on the other hand, has been defined by various sources in a number of 
different ways at different times.
382
 According to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD),  
Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of establishing a lasting 
interest by a resident  enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an 
enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy 
other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
direct investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the 
management of the enterprise.
383
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FDI occurs when an investor based in one country (the home country) acquires an asset 
in another country (the host country), with the intent to manage that asset.
384
 The 
management dimension is what distinguishes foreign direct investment from portfolio 
investment in foreign stocks, bonds and other financial instruments or FPI.
385
 According 
to Kasipillai, FDI comprises three components: first, new equity from the parent 
company in the home country to the subsidiary located in the host country; second, 
long- and short-term net loans from the parent to the subsidiary company and third, 
reinvested profits for the subsidiary.
386
 From these definitions of FDI, it becomes 
apparent that one of its main characteristics is to ‘control or participate in’ the running 
of a business enterprise. In this respect, the operations of FDI companies are closely 
related to those of MNEs (multinational enterprises),
387
 described broadly in this thesis 
as firms ‘which operate and control income creation activities in more than one 
country’. 388 
Prior to the Japanese yen’s appreciation in 1985, Thailand was considered a less 
attractive destination for foreign investors in Asia-Pacific countries.
389
 As such the 
country depended mostly on FDI inflows from the United States and Japan, which 
accounted for approximately 50% of all incoming FDI.
390
 Due to the relocation of 
investment from Japan, which was looking for overseas production bases to escape 
appreciating home currencies,
391
 foreign investment in Thailand continued to increase, 
                                                          
384
 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2
nd
 edn Cambridge 
University Press 2004) 7. 
385
 For distinctions between portfolio investment and foreign direct investment, see Sornarajah (n 383) 7-
9. 
386
 See Jayapalan Kasipillai, ‘Malaysia: Linking FDI with Investment Incentives?’ (2001) Asia-Pacific 
Tax Bulletin Vol. 7, No.2. 
387
 Sarinthorn Sosukpaibul, The relationship among foreign direct investment flows, government policy 
and investment strategy: the case of Thailand (Doctor of Philosophy, Waseda University 2007) 16. 
388
 John H. Dunning, ‘The Determinant of International Production’ (1973) (Oxford Economic Paper, vol 
25, no.3) 289-336. 
389
 Mingsarn Kaosa-ad. ‘Economic Development and Institutional Failures in Thailand’ (1998), Thailand 
Development Research Institute Quarterly Review Vol.13, No. 1 (March 1998) 239 
<http://www.info.tdri.or.th/library/quarterly/text/m98_1.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
390
 Chanikarn Teresa Tosompark and Kevin Daly, ‘The Determinants of FDI Inflows – Recent Evidence 
from Thailand’ (June 25, 2010) 1 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630642> accessed 10 November 2011. 
391
 Ibid. 
79 
 
particularly in the automobile parts and electronics industries.
392
 Until 1996, Thailand 
had been one of the ASEAN 4 countries (along with the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Indonesia) which attracted a large number of foreign investors. FDI inflows in many 
ASEAN 4 countries decreased as a result of the 1997 crisis, although at the time 
Thailand’s inflows were not significantly affected. Among the four countries, Thailand 
showed the highest FDI growth between 1996 and 1999.
393
 In 2006, investment from 
Singapore ranked the highest among foreign investors in Thailand. There has been an 
increased trend of intra-ASEAN investment, particularly for mergers and acquisitions, 
indicating cross-border integration.
394
 As explained by Santipitaksakul:  
The increasing significance of Singaporean investment might be 
explained by the maturity of Singapore’s sovereign wealth funds, such 
as the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, and Temasek 
Holding.
395
 
The Singaporean company Temasek Holding purchased Shin Corporation, owned by 
former Prime Minister Thaksin’s family. This transaction raised the question as to 
whether it had breached Thai foreign ownership laws.
396
  
Current sources of FDI will be discussed in Section 4.6 of this chapter. 
4.3 The Importance of FDI on Thai Economic Growth 
Foreign investment has played a significant role in economic development
397
 in both 
developed and developing countries.
398
 The positive effect of host country economic 
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growth on FDI inflow has been confirmed by various empirical studies
399
 as it 
contributes an additional source of capital to the host country.
 
As demonstrated by 
Yussof and Ismail, FDI capital inflow generates investment in production activities 
beyond the capacity of domestic savings.
400
 In addition, research by Nunnenkamp 
shows that, among other types of capital inflow, FDI has proved to be more stable.
401
 In 
the context of developing countries, it is accepted as a major factor in achieving 
sustainable development.
402
 At the time of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, FDI 
proved its importance in developing countries, since it contributed capital inflow when 
it was most needed.
403
 In terms of GDP growth, statistical analyses by Hansen and Rand 
show that the level of GDP is positively affected by a higher ratio of FDI in gross 
capital formation.
404
 Their study argues that FDI has a significant long-term impact on 
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GDP in every region regardless of a country’s level of development.405 There is, 
however, research arguing that it can cause disadvantages to developing countries.
406
 
As stated by Brimble, FDI has long played an important role in economic 
development.
407
 Not only does the country benefit from FDI in foreign exchange 
inflow, but one study shows that foreign companies also manage capital around 50% 
more efficiently than Thai companies.
408
 The inflow of capital also ‘improves the 
internal allocation of capital, particularly if the return on capital is higher in the host 
country than in the source country.’409 Secondly, foreign investments have brought into 
the host country a large amount of technology and knowledge transfer including 
production, employment and environmental standards, as well as having an indirect 
effect on the community.
410
 A number of technological activities and innovative 
training programmes are derived from foreign enterprises,
411
 while Kasipillai and 
Nowicki also confirm that technological development provided by foreign investors has 
played a significant role in the economic growth of the country.
412
 Foreign businesses 
also generate government revenue through direct taxes on profits, local taxes and 
indirect tax, such as VAT.
413
 The transfer of technology more than outweighs the value 
of exports, because FDI enhances the skills and capabilities of the local community, 
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thereby contributing to sustainable development in the host country.
414
 According to a 
report prepared by the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) in 1999, the 
benefits of FDI are still significant because foreign firms provide long-term 
commitments to projects and, as a result, encourage local firms to fulfil their 
commitments.
415
  
Additionally, according to Kasipillai, foreign investment stimulates competition and 
innovation.
416
 Since foreign investors establish their enterprises in a domestic market in 
the form of suppliers and joint ventures, knowledge in specific sectors is transferred to 
related local firms.
417
 In addition, domestic firms may have to develop their products in 
order to compete with those foreign firms, thereby enhancing export capability to earn 
more profits.
418
 Consequently, consumers benefit from good quality products at lower 
prices.
419
 A further study shows that FDI, with its technology and management bases, 
when operated responsibly, can facilitate improvements in local environmental and 
social standards to a higher standard than domestic firms.
420
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The significance of FDI to Thailand is clear from research conducted by the Joint 
Foreign Chambers of Commerce in Thailand (JFCCT),
421
 which shows the benefits 
granted by MNEs in terms of advanced standards of employment practice.
422
 US 
investors, for example, have created technology transfer in computers and parts, 
computer software, refineries, petrochemicals, gas and oil development. These also 
include service industries such as insurance and banking.
423
 Furthermore, a number of 
joint ventures with Japanese minority shareholders have proved beneficial to Thailand, 
since their Thai employees are provided with Japanese-style training in work quality, 
organisation and efficiency.
424
 Regarding technological spill overs,
425
 policymakers 
need to be aware of the policy in assisting domestic firms to accumulate and develop 
ownership-specific advantages, as explained by Santipitaksakul.
426
 FDI enhances the 
amount of exports and trading values. Past research by the IMF has shown that, in a 
correlation between export growth and FDI inflow, rapid increases in exports of the 
ASEAN 4 countries was due to foreign capital.
427
 Investors from other ASEAN 
countries have played an important role, too, as regional trading within ASEAN 
accounted for 18% of Thailand’s total exports in 1998.428 Due to the creation of a 
regional trading group known as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), an increasing 
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volume of intermediate goods began being traded within the region,
429
 the consequence 
of which was a recovery of export volumes in the second quarter of 1998.
430
 
More specifically, FDI benefited Thailand and enabled it to recover from the 1997 
Asian financial crisis.
431
 The number of foreign investment projects approved by BOI 
fell from THB 326 billion in 1996 to THB 136 billion in 1999,432 but after the 1997 
economic crisis, FDI re-capitalised failing industries, introduced new technologies, 
generated income for employees and contributed towards social sustainability.
433
 As 
indicated by Yussof and Ismail, the ASEAN 4 need to develop a level of product 
quality, market efficiency and ability to enhance technology,
434
 and FDI is likely to 
contribute to these results. In this respect, Thailand should rely on FDI ‘as an adjunct 
rather than as an alternative’.435 
 
In 2001, the increase in foreign investment, especially in export-oriented projects, 
resulted in a total value of THB 210 billion in 2001.
436
 There has also been a movement 
from exporting mainly primary goods to exporting more manufactured goods, which 
meant a structural change from an agriculture-based to an industry-based export 
status.
437
 This change was mainly a result of the increased volume of export-oriented 
FDI. It can be concluded that FDI and private investment are crucial to the Thai 
economy,
438
 because it has helped to generate employment opportunities and has been 
proven to save many jobs by capitalising failing local industries.
439
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4.4 Thai Government Policy on Investment Promotion and the Board of 
Investment 
The preceding discussion revealed the significance of FDI to Thailand. It is therefore 
not surprising that one of the key policies of the Thai government is to welcome and 
encourage foreign investment.
440
  
Apart from measures adopted by the Thai government to encourage investment, plans 
for investment promotion are clearly set out by the BOI. Encouraging investment from 
abroad is one of the BOI’s primary objectives major goal of the BOI and the Industrial 
Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT). There are also other government agencies that 
play a role in creating an appropriate environment for investment notably the Revenue 
Department, which takes responsibility for the general tax system and specific tax 
incentives, which will be discussed in the following chapter. The next chapter will 
discuss tax incentives offered by the BOI and the Revenue Department in more detail. 
The BOI is responsible for investment projects in terms of locations, operations and 
other criteria.  
Another authority which supports investment is the IEAT, which was established under 
the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand Act B.E. 2522 (1979). Its roles and 
responsibilities of the IEAT are to develop industrial estates with an extensive 
infrastructure and range of facilities.
441
 The IEAT maintains a policy of industrial 
development through the use of zoning, including allocating land for expansion, 
improving land conditions and assisting businesses by providing facilities and 
accommodation.
442
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This thesis is concerned primarily with the role of the BOI, so there follows a detailed 
discussion of its history and functions in order to set the context for further analysis.  
The BOI was established on 21 July 1966 under the Promotion of Industrial Investment 
Act of 1965.
443
 The board, at that time, was a department under the office of the prime 
minister, with the secretary of the board acting as its head.
444
 However, the first 
investment promotion law was initiated in 1960 as the Promotion of Industrial 
Investment Act of 1960.
445
 During the 1960s and early 1970s, Thailand’s industrial 
policies were oriented in favour of import substitution,
446
 although after the 
implementation of the 1972 Investment Promotion Act, industrial promotion policy 
instead began to favour exports.
447
  
 
Currently, the BOI aims to provide investment incentives to foreign and local investors 
who invest in activities considered by the government as important and which could be 
beneficial to local residents, employment, knowledge transfer and long-term 
development. The two main objectives of the BOI are to decentralise the location of 
firms from the Bangkok area and to attract specific types of investment or priority 
activities. The main reasons for the policy on decentralisation were that Bangkok and 
the surrounding provinces had been the most popular locations for foreign investment, 
which led to pollution, congestion and shortages in skilled labour because the necessary 
supporting infrastructure could not be developed sufficiently and quickly enough.
448
 
Furthermore, the problem led to an increase in the unequal distribution of wealth and 
prosperity between Bangkok residents and those living outside of the capital.
449
 The 
BOI regularly stipulates and revises investment promotion schemes in accordance with 
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the objectives of the government at the time,
450
 in order to encourage investment from 
potential business activities that can enhance Thailand’s attractiveness as an investment 
destination. 
 
Regarding its organisation, the BOI, under the Ministry of Industry, includes the prime 
minister as Chairman and the Minister of Industry as Vice Chairman.
451
 The prime 
minister also appoints the Secretary General, the secretary to the board and advisors. At 
present, the members of the board are: the Minister of Finance, the Minister of 
Commerce, the Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Industry, the Secretary General of 
the National Economic and Social Development Board, the Chairman of the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce, the Chairman of the Federation of Thai Industries and the 
Chairman of the Thai Banker’s Association, as well as advisors and a secretary452  
 
The BOI defines priority areas for investment, identifies investment opportunities and 
ascertains the nature of incentives that are to be given to qualifying investors. The BOI 
also offers myriad investment-promotion services to businesses before, during and after 
the application process. In other words, the BOI assists companies in setting up their 
businesses and outlines investment promotion services such as its ‘matchmaking 
programme’, the so-called VMC (Vendors Meet Customers), which bring foreign and 
domestic investors together.
453
  
 
Apart from granting incentives and facilitating promoted businesses, the BOI may 
‘make an announcement designating the types and sizes of investment activity eligible 
for promotion, stipulate the condition, amend or abolish those conditions at any time.’454 
Furthermore, it may stipulate conditions with which the promoted person must 
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comply,
455
 and has the discretion to grant a reduction of only one half of the rate of 
import duties or not to grant the exemption of import duties or business taxes. It also has 
the power to withdraw rights and benefits in the case where the promoted person fails to 
provide certain mandatory information, such as the amount and source of their capital, 
the number of shareholders and their nationalities, the level of employee training and 
distribution of products.
456
 The aforementioned actions by the BOI make clear its power 
to grant, amend and withdraw any promotion at its discretion. The incentives that the 
BOI offers do not last indefinitely, nor do they apply in every situation. It can exercise 
discretion to revoke the incentives under the conditions specified. 
  
The board’s areas of responsibility include developing engineering, supporting 
industries and promoting links between foreign investment and domestic industries. 
According to Lauridsen, the BOI performs two roles. In terms of microeconomics, the 
BOI Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD) aims to act as a ‘matchmaker’, 
facilitating links between individual projects and mediating or troubleshooting when 
difficulties or disagreements arise.
457
 At the macroeconomic level, the BOI as a whole 
should ideally act as a broker between Thailand’s various bureaucracies, and promote a 
healthy investment environment, enabling links between businesses by holding a 
database of potential suppliers, and removing impediments to businesses forming links 
between themselves.
458
 It is noteworthy that the BUILD was set up in 1991 with its 
main roles (1) to act ‘as an intermediary between the manufacturers of ready-made 
products and small- and medium-sized manufacturers of parts’ and (2) to ‘provide 
information on subcontracting opportunities and offers its support to buyer firms 
seeking sourcing networks in Thailand’.459 Furthermore, it has introduced a new scheme 
whereby a company’s majority equity ownership is foreign-owned, because a number of 
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companies have changed their structure of ownership since 1997. Merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activities have been acknowledged since that time.  
The impact of the crisis led to significant changes and further liberalisation in policy 
regarding FDI.
460
 Another factor which decreased FDI inflows and investors’ 
confidence to invest in Thailand was the political unrest of the early 1990s,
461
 after the 
2005-2006 political crises, foreign investor confidence dipped even further.
462
 The 
decline in applications by foreign companies shows the downward trend of FDI.
463
 As 
supported by Svensson,
464
 Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor
465
 and Dechruk et al, the 
effects of political instability on investment levels in developing countries are both 
significant and negative
.
.
466
  
 
Likewise, FDI in Thailand has been impacted by the global economic recession since 
late 2008, resulting in a decrease in turnover for foreign investors.
467
 There were signs 
of recovery from 2009 until early 2010, as shown in the confidence index of foreign 
investors, which exceeded 50% in terms of revenue, profitability, liquidity and 
investment,
468
 but investors became concerned and some decided to slow down 
investment or to suspend expansion plans in Thailand because of violent political rallies 
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in April and May 2010.
469
 In the aftermath of the economic downturn, a World Bank 
report has made several recommendations for the Thai government to implement, 
including a reduction of the regulatory burden, enhancing working skills and clarifying 
the relaxation of the 30% reserve requirement on short-term capital inflow
470
 which was 
largely the result of the Bank of Thailand’s decision to implement an unremunerated 
reserve requirement on short-term capital inflows. According to this system, financial 
institutions are required to withhold 30% of foreign currencies bought or exchanged 
against the Thai Baht, except those related to trades in goods and services or the 
repatriation of investments abroad by residents. The purposes of holding foreign 
reserves are: ‘(1) to fulfil the monetary and exchange rate policies; (2) to store of 
nation’s wealth; (3) to give credibility to foreign investors; (4) to back the banknotes in 
use.’471 The Governor of the Bank of Thailand presented the government’s policy in a 
speech that continued to welcome genuine foreign capital flow,
472
 which affirmed that 
capital inflow in the form of FDI was exempt from the restriction of the reserve 
requirement.
473
 Some foreign investors, however, opposed this policy and expressed 
their concerns in affected sectors.
474
 
As well as domestic political unrest, worldwide economic instability and the previously 
mentioned reserve requirement, a further and more specific factor has given foreign 
investors reasons to doubt Thailand as a suitable destination. In January 2007, the 
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government also approved plans to amend the Foreign Business Act 1999 (FBA)
475
 in 
order to prevent foreign investors from using nominee shareholders or preferential 
voting rights to take control of Thai companies in restricted sectors. It is to be noted that 
foreign investment in Thailand is governed by the FBA 1999, which became effective 
on 4 March 2000, which repealed and replaced the 1972 National Executive Council 
Announcement 281 (known as the Alien Business Law).
476
 Previously, foreign investors 
had been able to exploit loopholes in tax legislation by using complicated, opaque 
nominee shareholding structures to work around legal limits on foreign ownership. 
Former Prime Minister Thaksin’s 2006 sale of Shin Corp to the Singaporean wealth 
fund Temasek brought the issue of nominee shareholding to the public attention,
477
 and 
as a consequence changes to the FBA were proposed, with the intention of making such 
shareholding structures more transparent and preventing the exploitation of 
loopholes.
478
 The Thai Ministry of Commerce believed that the amendment of the FBA 
would, 1) ‘forbid the abuse of preferential voting rights for and by foreign shareholders 
in prohibited businesses’, 2) ‘impose heavier fines on nominee shareholding in 
restricted business, which is against the law’ and 3) ‘clarify what constitutes a foreign 
business’.479  
 
The amendment of the FBA is a controversial topic.
480
 Kanissorn Navanugraha, a 
Commerce Ministry official observed that ‘the laws were being drafted to create greater 
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transparency and accountability’. In the view of Pridiyathorn Devakula, former Finance 
Minister and Central Bank Governor, however, there is a possibility of ‘fallout’ from 
the amendment of the FBA. He suggested that a number of foreign investors may move 
to neighbouring countries such as China, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, since 
these states ‘have opened up recently and liberalised their investment law’.481 One of the 
most prominent opponents of the law was Kittipong Urapeepatanapong, a lawyer, who 
argued that as a result of the amended law almost all of the companies listed on 
Thailand’s Stock Exchange would need a degree of restructuring. No other country in 
the region, he commented, had such strict laws.
482
 Another opposing view came from 
Peter van Haren, head of the Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce in Bangkok, who 
stated that ‘It’s clear these moves are going to discourage new investors’.483 He also 
claimed that ‘Our members have come to me and said this is essentially a forced 
divestiture’.484 Hence, the amendment of the FBA may affect foreign investment in 
Thailand. 
The Map Ta Phut case is another critical factor that threatens transnational capital 
inflow, as it has been criticised for lacking clarity where investment regulations are 
concerned.
485
  On 29 September 2009, the Central Administrative Court ordered the 
suspension of operating permits for new investments in the country’s largest industrial 
estate in Rayong province, after environmental groups and locals claimed that the 
permits violated Section 67
486
 of the 2007 Constitution. The Map Ta Phut case was 
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viewed to be more threatening than even political upheaval or global recession, making 
it a prime example of systematic political risk.
 
As investors ostensibly seek a predictable 
and consistent legal environment, unexpected legal skirmishes potentially deter even the 
keenest of potential investors, so the above issues have significantly affected foreign 
investors’ confidence in Thailand as a business destination. A means of regaining 
foreign investor confidence is to adopt effective tax incentives and improve tax 
administration. In addition, the sharp fall in export competitiveness has confirmed 
Thailand’s need to move from traditional industries relying on low-cost labour, low 
capital and simple technology toward upgraded skills and a higher technological base. 
Long-term plans that have already been outlined include restructuring productivity and 
improving production fundamentals such as technology and management.  
The damaging uncertainty created by the 2006 political events in Thailand caused 
concerns among investors.
487
 To counter potential damage to the Thai economy, the 
government, through the BOI, launched a policy to restore foreign investor confidence, 
and further promote foreign investment through both short- and long-term measures, as 
well as provide assistance to ensure an encouraging investment climate.
488
 Aside from 
domestic political unrest, the Minister of Industry stated that a number of negative 
factors may affect Thailand’s attractiveness as an investment destination. These 
included the fragile global economic recovery, social conflict in the country, the Thai 
Baht appreciation and an increase in interest rates.
489
 The government plans to provide 
incentives and opportunities in capital investment aiming to increase investment, 
domestic consumption and international trade.
490
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A number of projects are promoted by the BOI, which include strengthening Thailand’s 
industrial and technological capability, making use of domestic resources, developing 
basic and support industries, developing infrastructure and a well-organised transport 
system and conserving natural resources.
491
 There are also recommendations to 
contribute to the economic growth of regions outside Bangkok and to implement 
measures to reduce environmental problems.
492
 In terms of public relations, the 
government is trying to restore the confidence of foreign investors by providing 
supportive measures for investment and clarifying the political situation. Research 
conducted by Sosukpaibul, using empirical evidence, analyses the Thai government’s 
policies in detail, examining its investment strategies and the impact of government 
policies on FDI.
493
 
Furthermore, Thai government policy on foreign investment is also facilitated by trade 
liberalisation through bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, such as the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) of 1993, the ASEAN 
Investment Agreement (adopted in 1998) and the agreement on Free Trade Areas 
(FTA).
494
 
4.5 The Investment Promotion Act of 1977, amended by (No.2) 1991, amended 
by (No.3) 2001 
Thailand was the first country in Asia to introduce an investment promotion law 
providing tax and non-tax incentives to potential investors. The initial need for 
investment came after World War II, when Thailand was facing a shortage of all types 
of industrial products including medicines and essential products. The first investment 
law was the Industrial Promotion Act B.E. 2497, which was enacted in 1954 but was 
not successful because the numbers of projects established and the capital ggenerated 
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did not meet the targets established by the government at that time. In 1960, the 
Investment Promotion for Industry Act B.E. 2503 (1960) was published, with the 
intention to support private sector investment. This 1960 Act served as a model for the 
subsequent Investment Promotion Acts. To understand the objectives of investment law 
at that time, it is important to take the National Economic Development Plan (NEDP) 
into consideration.  
The first NEDP, which encompassed the years 1961-1966 and was the first to express 
Thailand’s objectives in a systematic way.495 Schneider points out that ‘the Promotion 
of Industrial Investment Act of 1965 did not state for which purpose or objective the 
law was designed’.496 It is to be noted that its name, ‘the Promotion of Industrial 
Investment Act’ was the only indication of its objective.497 According to Kosin, the 
purposes of this Act were ‘first, to give investors more privileges and benefits; and 
second, to alter legal procedure so that they will be more convenient and less 
complicated.’498 The first plan set out a 15% increase in gross capital formation as one 
of its primary targets, demonstrating that the investment laws did have an overall 
objective, although this was not particularly specific.
499
 It is not clear, however, whether 
companies and sectors promoted by the investment laws were chosen specifically as 
ones that could help to meet this target.
 500
 
The Thai government published a new investment promotion law, called the 
Notification of the Revolutionary Council No. 227, which expanded the scope of 
investment to cover exports and investment in regional areas, as well as deleting the 
words ‘for industrial promotion’ in order to cover agricultural, mining and service 
sectors in the plan for investment promotion.
501
 Between the end of 1973 and 1977, 
political, economic and social situations within the country, as well as those of 
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neighbouring countries, changed dramatically. The Thai government therefore amended 
the investment promotion law (which at that time was the Notification of the 
Revolutionary Council No. 227) by publishing the Investment Promotion Act 1977.
502
 
The essence of this Act included enhancing measures to promote investment and export, 
protect domestic industries, develop infrastructure and to resolve any problems or 
difficulties concerning investment.
503
 The legislation was reviewed over the years to 
accommodate the changing business environment, to promote investment in priority 
projects and to gain more investors’ confidence.504 The second amendment to this Act 
was made in 1991, while the third amendment, which came in 2001, is the one currently 
in use.
505
 
The Act is administered by the BOI, which has a duty to promote domestic and foreign 
investments to develop society, the economy, the environment and the security of 
Thailand as a whole.
506
 The implementation of this Act is the responsibility of the prime 
minister, who has the power to appoint competent officials for its execution.
507
 
According to this Act, foreign firms are granted incentives and income tax exemption 
for a period of time. The Act states that ‘a company which seeks to be promoted may 
file to the Office of the Board of Investment an application for promotion in accordance 
with the rules, procedure and forms prescribed by the Secretary General, describing the 
investment project for which promotion is sought’.508 
4.6 BOI Promotions and Investors 
The Thai government’s system of tax incentives is known as one of a number of ‘BOI 
promotions’, which aim to relieve the government’s fiscal burden and to promote 
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investment, both foreign and domestic.
 509
 Firstly, tax incentives are granted to projects 
that actually benefit Thailand, and the application of tax incentives is conducted with 
good governance.
510
 Currently, activities on the list attached to the BOI announcement 
No.10/2552 (2009) are eligible for investment promotion.
511
 Secondly, ‘a minimum 
level of investment capital (excluding cost of land and working capital) of one million 
baht shall be required for all types of activities eligible for promotion’.512 Thirdly, 
projects which are established in regions or areas with low income and inadequate 
investment facilities will be offered special investment promotions, i.e. maximum 
incentives on tax and duty.
513
 Fourthly, promotions are given to small and medium 
industries which have a minimum level of investment capital of THB 500,000 
(excluding the cost of land and working capital), and which conduct activities as 
specified under the BOI Announcement no. 1/2553 (2010). Finally, the BOI currently 
gives priority to ‘agricultural activities and agricultural products, projects related to 
technological and human resource development, public utilities, infrastructure and basic 
services, environmental protection and conservation and targeted industries’.514 
With regard to promoted sectors, electrical appliances had the highest value among 
foreign investment projects,
515
 followed by the machinery and transport equipment 
sector.
516
 Japanese FDI had always ranked first in terms of foreign companies receiving 
promotion certificates for both the number of projects and total investment capital. 
However, in 2010, it dropped to second place among major investors in Thailand
517
 
                                                          
509
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while the European Union ranked first.
518
 Among EU investor countries, the 
Netherlands had the highest total investment capital, followed by major investments 
from France.
519
 There was a significant change in capital flow when Singapore 
generated the most significant amount of FDI among other ASEAN countries in 2009. 
In 2010, though, the investment from Singapore decreased to THB 7,454 million, from 
THB 19,740 million in 2009, because in 2006 the Singaporean company Temasek 
Holding purchased Shin Corporation, owned by the former Prime Minister of Thailand 
Thaksin’s family as explained above. In 2010, first position went to Hong Kong, which 
started to increase its investment in Thailand through a total outlay of THB 13,975 
million.
520
 Direct investment from the Newly Industrialised Economies such as South 
Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines also shows a continuous increase.
521
 The total 
amount of FDI capital flow experienced a downward trend, from THB 248,329 million 
in 2008, to THB 154,014 million in 2009. There was a slight increase to THB 158,085 
million in 2010.
522
 
A future plan for investment promotion was thus initiated by the BOI Secretary 
General: ‘The government’s economic stimulus package, which includes investment in 
various mega infrastructure projects as well as aims to position Thailand as the 
connectivity hub for ASEAN. The BOI is moving confidently and quickly to invigorate 
the investment climate to fuel overall economic expansion’.523  
4.7 Criteria and Incentives for BOI promotion 
The BOI specifies and applies certain criteria in determining the suitability of a project 
for which investment promotion privileges are requested.
524
 Under the IPA 2001, the 
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BOI authority can ‘make an announcement designing the types and sizes of investment 
activity eligible for promotion’.525 It may also stipulate in the announcement the 
conditions under which promotion is to be granted and may amend or abolish those 
conditions at any time in order to respond to the current economic and investment 
situation.
526
 Two kinds of incentives are available for promoted projects. The first type 
is tax-based incentives, which include the exemption or reduction of import duties on 
machinery
527
 and raw materials,
528
 double deduction of transportation, electricity and 
water supply costs,
529
 an additional 25% deduction in project infrastructure installation 
costs,
530
 corporate income tax exemptions up to 8 years,
531
 fees for goodwill and 
copyright, the exemption of dividends from corporate income tax,
532
 and an additional 
50% reduction in the corporate income tax for another five years.
533
 The next chapter 
will explain the tax incentives provided by the BOI in more detail.  
 
The second type of incentives outlined in the IPA 2001 are non-tax incentives, which 
include permission for entry into Thailand ‘for the purpose of studying investment 
opportunities or performing any other act benefiting investment’,534 permission to bring 
in foreign skilled workers, experts and their spouses and dependents,
535
 the granting of 
work permits,
536
 permission to own land,
537
 and permission to take out or remit money 
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abroad in foreign currency.
538
 Moreover, the BOI gives the promoted businesses 
guarantees, including that the state shall not nationalise the promoted activity,
539
 
undertake a new activity in competition with the promoted person,
540
 or impose price 
control on the products or commodities of the promoted activity.
541
 
 
In order to achieve the goal of decentralisation from the Bangkok metropolitan area, the 
BOI has identified three investment promotional zones based on economic factors: Zone 
1: Bangkok and five surrounding provinces; Zone 2: the twelve provinces surrounding 
Zone 1; and Zone 3: the remaining fifty-eight provinces. Promoted projects located in 
Zone 1 receive the least generous tax privileges, while the most generous tax privileges 
are granted to projects in Zone 3, which are the least developed areas or are in special 
need of investment.
542
  
 
Investment and tax measures used in developing countries are generally recognised as a 
positive influence on business and are shown to attract FDI inflows.
543
 According to a 
survey on factors influencing investment decisions,
544
 investment promotion privileges 
were the most important, followed by corporate income tax rates.
545
 Furthermore, a 
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number of favourable tax measures have been made available to influence the location 
decisions of investors,
546
 so it can be concluded that tax incentives are used for 
channelling investment for the development of particular areas or regions. The 
objectives include support for rural development and locating an industrial complex 
outside major or capital cities in order to reduce pollution and over-population.
547
 Not 
only based on location, tax incentives can also be granted based on targeted activities or 
industries. The purpose of such incentives is to promote sectors of industry or activities 
which the government considers as significant to development.
548
 In the case of 
Thailand, priority projects, such as basic transportation systems, public utilities, 
technology development and environmental protection, are granted special incentives by 
the BOI.
549
  
 
As well as these incentives, some strategic industries have been offered customised 
incentives in order to promote clustering-based investment. Examples of these schemes 
are research and development collaboration between the industrial sector and academic 
institutions,
550
 skills, technology, innovation,
551
 and environmental problem-solving 
measures.
552
 According to a survey of the principal reasons influencing investment 
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expansion in Thailand, the top reason was BOI privileges together with other 
government support measures (63.8%).
553
 Therefore, there should be sufficient focus on 
these privileges and other government measures on investment especially foreign 
investment. 
 
Conclusion 
Thailand is one of Asia’s most popular investment destinations. This chapter set out to 
examine the country’s position on foreign investment, and its economic ramifications, 
in detail. It examined the laws regulating investment promotion and the governmental 
bodies responsible for implementing them. The gains derived from FDI have been 
proven to have aided Thailand’s recovery from the 1997 financial crisis in Asia, and 
FDI is seen by the government as a major means of achieving sustainable development. 
After the 1997 crisis, the Thai government realised that the economy needed fresh 
injections of capital in order to grow and prosper, and that foreign investor confidence 
needed to be restored after a period of political unrest. This became even more apparent 
following the 2006 unrest and many other incidents, leading the BOI to introduce 
additional investment promotion schemes, including tax- and non-tax-oriented 
incentives, aimed primarily at eliminating avoidable burdens that might otherwise deter 
investors, such as bureaucracy and high taxes at the start-up stage. This issue will be 
discussed further in the next chapter, but for now we can conclude that FDI continues to 
be an important means of income generation in Thailand. This chapter also examined 
the role of the BOI as a ‘one-stop’ governmental body, dealing with and supporting all 
aspects of investment legislation – foreign and domestic. In addition, this chapter 
outlined the history, importance and responsibilities of the BOI, and its authority to 
grant and revoke tax incentives, as such providing a crucial context for the discussion in 
Chapter 6 of its jurisdiction alongside that of the Revenue Department over tax 
incentives. This information is also crucial for Chapter 8 regarding recommendations 
for changes in legislation and authority, and the administration of tax incentives in order 
to create a more friendly investment environment and efficient tax administration.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 Tax Incentives in Thailand 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter examined the significance of FDI for Thailand, and also 
established that the system of tax incentives under the oversight of the Board of 
Investment (BOI) is significant part of the government’s strategy for enhancing FDI. 
This chapter will examine the substance of tax incentives overseen by the BOI. It begins 
with a general discussion on ‘tax incentives’, which is followed by analyses of a 
selection of incentives and their characteristics. Subsequently, the discussion will focus 
on tax incentives provided by the Thai Revenue Code and the IPA 2001, and will also 
briefly examine Thailand’s most significant industrial sectors and activities, along with 
the tax incentives offered to them. It will then proceed to identify the correlations 
between tax incentives and FDI, concluding that the tax environment is one of the key 
factors when deciding on an investment location. The last part of this chapter will 
outline considerations on tax incentives.  
5.1 Definitions 
The previous literature regarding the definition of ‘tax incentives’ can be compared with 
the definition of ‘tax expenditure’. According to Surrey: 
The term ‘‘tax expenditure’’ has been used to describe those special 
provisions of the federal income tax system which represent 
government expenditures made through that system to achieve various 
social and economic objectives. These special provisions provide 
deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and preferential 
rates, and serve ends similar in nature to those served by direct 
government expenditures or loan programs.
554
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According to the United Nations, tax incentives are: 
Any incentives that reduce the tax burden of enterprises in order to 
induce them to invest in particular projects or sectors. They are 
exceptions to the general tax regime.
555
 
Since the focus of this thesis is on foreign investment, it is necessary to examine the 
definition of incentives for FDI, which the OECD defines as:  
Measures designed to influence the size, location or industry of an FDI 
investment project by affecting its relative cost or by altering the risks 
attached to it through inducements that are not available to comparable 
domestic investors.
556
 
From the above definitions, tax incentives can be defined as special provisions which 
allow exemption or deduction from a general tax regime, and which are offered by the 
government to encourage specific social or economic activities.
557
 Tax incentives and 
relief schemes are designed to encourage companies to invest in productive assets and 
capacity. They also enable start-up or growing companies to reinvest in capital assets 
and business development. There are two main types of tax incentives ─ general, and 
targeted. The former are offered to every business, i.e. domestic and foreign 
investors,
558
 whereas targeted incentives are created for particular groups, especially 
foreign investors. The objectives of tax incentives tend to be to boost regional 
investment and sectoral investment, performance enhancement and the transfer of 
technology. Many countries employ tax incentives with a view to aiding the economic 
development of particular regions, to support rural development, locating industrial 
centres outside the capital and reducing environmental problems and over-population.
559
 
Tax incentives are also a tool for promoting crucial industries or activities, e.g. mining, 
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industrial parks, export-led activities, the film industry and businesses which use 
advanced technologies.
560
 The discussion that follows examines a selection of common 
forms of tax incentive.
561
  
5.2 Types of Tax Incentives 
5.2.1 CIT Exemptions and Tax Holidays 
A tax holiday entails a reduction of the corporate income tax (CIT) rate, ranging from 
complete exemption to a slightly lower rate than usual. It is the most popular form of 
tax incentive in developing countries and in those with economies in transition, which 
are aiming to attract FDI. Currently they are rarely found in economically developed 
countries.
562
 According to UNCTAD’s 2000 survey, approximately 85% of the 
countries surveyed used either full or partial tax holidays or a tax rate deduction for 
specific types of activities.
563
  
Under a tax holiday regime, ‘qualifying newly-established firms’ are exempt from 
paying CIT for a specified time period. Tax holidays eliminate tax liability on net 
revenues from investment projects occurring over the holiday period, thereby 
encouraging investment.
564
 Their provisions impose certain tax-related obligations (e.g. 
withholding personal tax from wages or filing income tax returns); in particular, 
companies that invest in long-term projects are obliged to keep records of expenditure, 
as well as other expenses for periods before and during the tax exemption period, 
because after the holiday period, these companies have to comply with the regular tax 
duties.
565
 
Both Morisset and Zee et al’s research indicate that tax holidays are among the most 
widely used incentives, especially in developing countries, since companies taking 
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advantage of them can enjoy the benefits as soon as they start to earn income.
566
 
Likewise, Holland & Vann have noted that ‘most of the beneficiaries of tax holidays 
have been small firms, for example, real estate businesses, restaurants, and firms 
designed for short-term market exploitation, such as trade and woodcutting’.567 
Furthermore, tax holidays are favoured by export-oriented industries because low-cost 
assembly plants that are highly mobile have the most to gain from such incentives.
568
 In 
a number of countries, plants have been established to take advantage of tax holidays; 
when the holiday expires, the plant is disassembled and moved to an adjacent 
jurisdiction to take advantage of a holiday offered in another country.
569
 Hence, the 
factor that makes the project responsive to the incentive also limits the benefit to the 
country from the investment.
570
  
 
Tax holidays are viewed as a simple incentive imposing a relatively low compliance 
burden on foreign investors,
571
 e.g. there is no need to calculate income tax over the 
holiday period. Zee et al identify three main benefits of tax holidays.
572
 First, they are 
simple to administer because businesses and governments do not have to worry about 
maintaining financial records to support tax returns over the holiday period.
573
 Second, 
they allow qualifying investors to avoid complex tax laws, onerous regulations and 
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corrupt administrations.
574
 Finally, they are neutral in their impact on the relative factor 
(capital and labour) intensities of qualified projects.
575
  
 
However, as mentioned earlier, tax holidays primarily benefit short-term investments 
typical of ‘footloose’ industries. Companies which enjoy tax holidays tend to move 
quickly from one jurisdiction to another.
576
 Short-term investments do not have such a 
positive economic impact as longer-term ones. As Zee et al have observed, ‘long-term 
projects can make little use of such holidays even if losses can be carried forward 
beyond the holiday period’.577 If losses cannot be carried over beyond the end of the 
holiday, such incentives could paradoxically actually hinder investment,
578
 so they are 
not necessarily beneficial for long-term investors, since the tax treatment after the 
holiday’s end is the same as the treatment during the holiday in determining after-tax 
profit.
579
 In the interests of effective administration and the avoidance of corruption, it is 
also necessary to calculate any expenditure made before and during the holiday period, 
‘so that appropriate records will be available for the calculation of depreciation when 
the holiday ends’.580 
For large projects in particular, losses are usually generated in the early years of 
production, when the highest capital costs are incurred.
581
 For such projects, a tax 
holiday that starts when production commences may actually increase the taxes paid 
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over the life of the project, and so act as a disincentive to investment.
582
 If losses are 
experienced during the holiday period, they may not be allowed to be carried forward 
beyond this time, so the holiday may occur when no taxes would have been paid in any 
event, and taxes may be increased following this period because no losses are available 
to offset profits.
583
  
Tax holidays can impose a burden on tax authorities, as tax laws usually state that the 
exemption period starts when profits first accrue. One example from Thailand can be 
found in Section 31 Paragraph 1 of the IPA 2001. The term ‘when profits first accrue’ 
leave a degree of uncertainty as to whether this means ‘the first year that is in itself 
profitable’, or ‘the first year that the business records cumulative net profits’.584 As 
explained earlier, tax holidays and partial profit exemptions are typically targeted at 
newly-established companies, so as a result it is hard for tax administrators to determine 
if a company is actually financed by new capital or by capital already invested in the 
host country.
585
   
Much of the new capital may, in fact, be previously existing capital that has been re-
characterised as new (e.g. through liquidation of an existing company, then re-invested 
in the host country under the guise of new investment by an offshore company).
586
 It is 
perfectly possible for investors to establish entirely new companies in order to purchase 
an existing operation, thereby qualifying for the tax holiday despite no new activity 
taking place. Holland & Vann have described the prevalence of this practice in the 
construction industry, in which a new firm can be established for each project.
587
 In this 
respect, tax holidays are extremely open to manipulation through tax avoidance, thereby 
depleting public revenues.  
                                                          
582
 Goyal and Chai (n 571) 25. 
583
 Holland & Vann (n 567) 991. 
584
 Easson (n 8). 
585
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Policy Framework for Investment: A 
Review of Good Practices (OECD Publishing 2006) 118. 
586
 Clark (n 572) 257. 
587
 Holland & Vann (n 567) 13. 
109 
 
Provisions providing for a partial or full profit exemption also open up opportunities to 
shift artificially the taxable income of non-qualifying businesses to qualifying ones.  
Aggressive transfer pricing techniques essentially involve the use of non-arm’s length 
prices
588
 on intra-group transactions, and non-arm’s length interest rates on intra-group 
loans to shift taxable income to low- or non-taxed entities.
589
 The shifting of the tax 
base in such cases is artificial in the sense that it simply manipulates prices to shift 
taxable income associated with business activities in order to obtain the most tax 
efficient outcome.
590
 Guarding against such abuse of the tax system is becoming 
increasingly difficult thanks to the increased trade in intangibles with no easily 
established arm’s length price.591 Likewise, it is becoming ‘increasingly difficult to 
guard against excessive revenue losses stemming from incentives which provide a full 
or partial profit exemption’.592 
The vulnerability of tax holidays to tax planning can lead to considerable revenue 
leakage, even exceeding the revenue foregone by offering incentives to legitimate 
activities.
593
 This outcome further reduces the cost-effectiveness of tax incentives.
594
 
Tax avoidance strategies, which are often used in combination with tax planning, 
include fictive foreign investment. Tax holidays in a number of countries have been 
directed at firms with a high percentage of foreign ownership. Considerable tax revenue 
                                                          
588
 ‘Arm’s length range’, according to OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Annex 3 
Glossary, means ‘a range of figures that are acceptable for establishing whether the conditions of 
a controlled transaction are arm's length and that are derived either from applying the same transfer 
pricing method to multiple comparable data or from applying different transfer pricing methods.’ 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_2649_33753_37685737_1_1_1_1,00.html> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
589
 Easson (n 8) 141. 
590
 See Phyllis Lai Lan Mo Tax avoidance and anti-avoidance measures in major developing economies 
(Greenwood Publishing Group 2003) 81-82. 
591
 United States General Accounting Office, International Taxation: Problems Persist In Determining 
Tax Effects Of Intercompany Transfer Prices (DIANE Publishing 1992) 63. 
592
 Clark (n 572) 258. 
593
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Corporate tax incentives for foreign direct 
investment (OECD Publishing 2001) 26. 
594
 For ‘cost-effective of tax incentives’ in general, see Alexander Klemm Causes, Benefits, and Risks of 
Business Tax Incentives (International Monetary Fund 2009). 
 
110 
 
seems to have been lost from the creation of fictive foreign-owned companies that 
conduct what is, in fact, a domestically owned business.
595
 A company may transfer 
funds for a domestic enterprise to a company incorporated offshore, which in turn 
reinvests in the home country as if it were a foreign-owned company; consequently, the 
investment qualifies for the incentive, which depending on the country’s legal 
terminology, is considered either tax ‘avoidance’ or ‘evasion’.596 As observed by 
Holland & Vann, the use of audits to detect such activity is difficult, since many of the 
investments are relayed through tax havens with strict secrecy laws.
597
 Therefore, tax 
holidays provide strong incentives for tax avoidance, as taxed enterprises could enter 
into economic relationships with exempt ones to shift their profits to the latter through 
transfer pricing.
598
 
Where countries in a state of economic transition have introduced tax holidays to 
stimulate growth, many have actually experienced a shortfall as tax revenue decreases 
and tax holidays are administered.
599
 Tax holidays can also have detrimental effects on 
the revenues of neighbouring jurisdictions; for instance, exporting firms would 
ordinarily pay tax in the country where they are based. However, the phenomenon of 
transhipment makes even overseas tax holidays liable to exploitation.
600
 This scenario is 
described succinctly by Holland & Vann, who state that, essentially, it involves a 
company establishing a base in a country that offers tax holidays, ‘selling’ their goods 
to it at cost price and then exporting them on to the intended destination.
601
 The revenue 
costs are seldom transparent, unless enterprises enjoying the holidays are still required 
to file proper tax returns, in which case administrative resources must be devoted to 
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activities that yield no revenue, and the alleged benefit of CIT holidays allowing 
investors to dispense with their dealings with tax authorities is rendered redundant.  
In fact, a tax holiday may actually work against its intended function as a simplifying 
measure and add to administration costs and complexity. Clarke observes that ‘in order 
for firms to claim tax deductions (e.g. business loss carryovers) following the holiday 
period, a full record of revenues and costs over the holiday period would normally be 
required’.602 Once the tax holiday is over, processing this data may actually prove more 
complicated than if ongoing records had been maintained. Because separate accounting 
is susceptible to corruption, a formula approach provides an alternative method of 
ascertaining how much of a company’s profit qualifies for a tax holiday. According to 
Holland & Vann, ‘this proportion can be based on some overall figure, such as wages 
and salaries employed, total revenues, or assets’.603 Likewise, tax holidays are open to 
manipulation by investors, particularly large-scale and powerful ones, who can petition 
for holidays that most suit their interests.
604
 The system of tax holidays is therefore 
particularly open to corruption and exploitation.
605
  
The benefits of investment in terms of regional development, employment creation, 
technology transfer and export promotion are questionable. As noted above, many of 
the enterprises attracted tend to move on to a new destination as soon as tax holidays 
expire, meaning that there tend to be few links to domestic firms created, little transfer 
of technology and little sourcing of local raw materials.
606
 Moreover, the success of 
such operations depends to a large extent on the reaction of the countries that provide 
the sources of capital and the markets for the exports.  
The value of tax holidays is contingent upon the amount of profit accrued by the 
promoted company. It is possible to argue that the highest-earning companies that 
benefit the most are, in fact, those that need it the least.
607
 Thus, the bulk of the revenue 
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foregone is likely to have had no beneficial impact on investment, and so the ratio of 
benefits to costs is likely to be low. 
The following information will describe CIT exemptions and tax holidays in Thailand. 
As described in Chapter 4, the BOI is a primary authority which is responsible for 
granting BOI-promoted persons tax and non-tax incentives such as guarantees,
608
 
permission,
609
 and support services. In addition, it sets the number of incentives granted 
according to the level of development of particular regions.
610
 Seven types of activities 
are given priority: agriculture and agricultural products; mining, ceramics and basic 
metals; light industry; metal products, machinery and transport equipment; electronic 
industry and electric appliances; chemicals, paper and plastics and services and public 
utilities.
611
 Projects within these fields will receive CIT exemptions for eight years, 
regardless of location. In addition to the privileges available to each zone, research and 
development projects are identified as priority activities entitled to full privileges. 
Furthermore, a prioritised company is entitled to a tax holiday on the net profit derived 
from its activity, excluding the cost of land and working capital, for a period of not 
more than eight years from the date that income is first derived from such activity.
612
  
5.2.2 Reduced Corporate Income Tax Rates 
Governments may seek to attract FDI into specific sectors or regions, by lowering the 
CIT rate. Countries such as Hong Kong,
613
 Ireland,
614
 Laos,
615
 Cambodia
616
 and 
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Estonia
617
 have all used this incentive. As UNCTAD’s 2000 report observed, ‘It may be 
targeted at the income of foreign investors who meet specified criteria, or it may be used 
to attract additional FDI’.618 Indeed, Malaysia introduced reduced CIT in the mid-1980s 
to attract extra overseas investment.
619
 
 
Tax rates generally have a greater effect on the investment decisions of export-oriented 
companies than those seeking domestic market or location-specific advantage, because 
such firms are not only mobile, but also operate in competitive markets with very slim 
margins.
620
 It is often possible to offer a general reduction in CIT to firms satisfying 
certain criteria, for example small-scale manufacturing or agriculture, and a low CIT 
rate can have a positive psychological effect on the markets – it indicates to possible 
investors that the government wishes to give the market freedom to determine the most 
profitable investments. As Morisset has noted, this approach can, in the short-term, 
reduce tax revenue. Over the long-term, however, ‘the simplicity of the tax system may 
attract more investors, increasing the tax base, and thus compensating for the initial 
reduction’.621 The benefits of a lower corporate tax rate accrue slowly and over a long 
time. 
 
Unlike tax holidays, according to this system the firms remain liable for tax and the 
benefit is applied to both new and existing investments. According to Holland & Vann, 
the key issue at stake here is the identification of qualifying income. Regulations 
defining eligible taxpayers are needed if the benefit is to achieve its aim of promoting 
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only certain types of project, such as manufacturing or small businesses.
622
 As incomes 
from both new and existing operations are eligible for the incentive, rate reductions are 
less likely to be as cost-effective as incentives related to the amount of new 
investment.
623
 States with corporate tax systems that differ significantly from those of 
other countries may experience difficulty in bringing their systems more in line with 
prevailing international trends,
624
 but multinational corporations can exploit differences 
in tax bases and rates, and have the resources and expertise to do so for maximum 
gain.
625
 A company could, for example, issue debt in a country with high tax rates in 
order to finance investment in one where rates are lower.  
 
The other disadvantage of tax rate reduction is that unlike the revenue impact of tax 
holidays, which grows over time as more firms become eligible, a general tax rate 
reduction has significant up-front revenue costs because it applies to income from 
existing operations as well.
626
 Also, if only certain types of income are to qualify, then 
rules must be defined to measure the income, which inevitably bring with them 
loopholes ripe for exploitation. The alternative is to use a formula approach, which will 
be less accurate in directing the benefit. With either approach, the rules are often 
‘complex and subject to manipulation’.627 Therefore, regimes applying reduced tax rates 
to certain activities or enterprises require a number of rules to minimise tax avoidance. 
Furthermore, under some circumstances, a reduction in the CIT rate could be a 
disincentive if the project is already enjoying other preferential tax treatments, such as 
accelerated depreciation
628. 
With respect to CIT reduction in Thailand, the Thai government has launched a tax 
incentives programme to encourage individuals and businesses to pursue commercial 
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activity, and to stimulate the economy, the growth of which through FDI is promoted by 
a series of corporate tax reductions. 
The first example of a CIT incentive is tax exemption for research and development 
(R&D) projects as stipulated in Royal Decree B.E. 2539 (1996) No. 297. Under this 
regulation, companies are 100% exempt from CIT for the costs they pay for research 
and development to government and private authorities. The aim of this regulation is to 
encourage private sectors to support research and development programmes, and it is 
believed to increase expenditure on R&D by international groups and to improve 
Thailand’s integration into R&D value chains.  
The second CIT incentive concerns tax incentives for regional operating headquarters 
(ROH). Thailand’s strategic location in South-East Asia means that it serves as an 
administrative centre for many multinational businesses. However, they typically do not 
utilise Thailand as a regional profit centre, largely because of its relatively high 
corporate income tax and withholding tax rates.
629
 The Thai government hopes to 
change this situation with its implementation of the ROH scheme. Essentially, an ROH 
is ‘a company incorporated under Thai law in order to provide managerial, technical or 
supporting services to its associated enterprise or its domestic or foreign branches’.630 
On 16 August 2002, the Thai government established regulations covering ROHs as 
stated in the Royal Decree issued under the Revenue Code regarding Reduction and 
Exemption from Revenue Taxes No. 405 B.E. 2545 (2002). By giving tax exemptions, 
the Thai government intended to encourage multinationals to perform specific activities 
including business management and administration, the sourcing of raw materials, parts 
and finished products and research and development work. Additionally, technical 
assistance, marketing and sales promotion, human resources training, business advisory 
services, investment feasibility studies and analyses and credit management are believed 
to be transferred to Thailand through ROH operation. 
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Tax incentives included in the ROH scheme are available to both Thai and foreign-held 
companies, and they extend to companies qualifying as an ROH, as well as their 
expatriate employees. Under this scheme, ROHs must be incorporated under Thai law 
and have paid-up minimum capital of at least THB 10 million
631
 on the last day of any 
accounting period. They must also provide services to branches or affiliates located in 
three or more countries. Income must come from managerial, administrative, technical 
or other prescribed supporting services for branches/associated companies. In addition, 
income from services provided must form at least 50% of ROH income (reduced to one-
third for the first three years).
632
 Businesses in Thailand which receive a substantial 
portion of their total income as service fees and/or royalties received from specific kinds 
of parties offshore may qualify to receive these ROH tax incentives. The tax advantages 
of companies with their headquarters in Thailand include a flat 30% tax rate for active 
business profits; a tax-efficient holding company regime; effective exemption on 
foreign dividends and branch profits through a foreign tax credit regime; the availability 
of various tax-efficient investment platforms; an attractive R&D tax credit regime; 
access to an extensive tax treaty network; generally, no outbound withholding taxes 
under domestic (as opposed to treaty) provisions and typically no exit costs on the 
disposal or restructuring of Thai investments.
633
 The Thai government expects an 
increase in ROH establishments, as a result of both tax and non-tax incentives, to bring 
increased capital flows into the country. It is believed that these measures will not cause 
a decline in the government’s revenue as a result of a decrease in tax collections; on the 
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contrary, they will help to increase long-term tax collections as more ROHs are 
established in the country.
634
 
According to Royal Decree No.471 B.E.2551 (2008), the third example of a CIT 
incentive is given to a company which has a fixed asset value (excluding land) of less 
than THB 200 million
635
 and has fewer than 200 employees, or is known as a small and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME). Moreover, a Thai company with paid-up capital of 
THB 5 million
636
 and below is entitled to a reduced CIT rate of 15% on net profit over 
THB 150,001
637
 up to THB 1 million
638
, a CIT rate of 25% on net profit over THB 1 
million up to THB 3 million
639
 and a CIT rate of 30% on net profit over THB 3 
million.
640
 Furthermore, a full corporate income tax exemption is granted to a qualified 
venture capital (VC) company on a dividend income and capital gain from the sale of 
stock received from investing in Thai SMEs. A dividend or income from sales of 
securities received from the VC’s exempt income is also tax exempt.641 
 
Furthermore, following Royal Decree No. 467 B.E. 2550 (2007), as amended by Royal 
Decree No. 475 B.E. 2551 (2008), a reduction of the tax rate to 20% is granted to a 
company listed on the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) and 25% to a company 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). Finally, Royal Decree No. 426 B.E. 
2547 (2004) provides incentives to petroleum companies. Companies engaged in the 
petroleum business, which are licensed for the purchase and sale of petroleum products 
in duty exempt areas shall be liable for 10% of CIT, provided that their income is more 
than THB 2,000 million
642
 per year. Companies engaged in the petroleum business that 
                                                          
634
 News from the Ministry of Finance (unofficial translation by the Board of Investment of Thailand), 
No. 86/2544 on 11 December 2001 <http://www.boi.go.th/english/download/law_regulations/60/roh.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
635
 GBP 4,029,820. 
636
 GBP 100745. 
637
 GBP 3061. 
638
 GBP 20,149.10. 
639
 GBP 60,447.31. 
640
 Profit exceeding THB 3 million is subject to CIT ordinary rate of 30%. 
 
641
 Royal Decree 396 B.E.2545 (2002), Ministerial Regulation no.126 clause 2(58). 
 
642
 GBP 40,298,206. 
118 
 
hold concessions from the Department of Mineral Resources are subject to the 
Petroleum Income Tax Act B.E. 2514 (1971) rather than to the provisions of the 
Revenue Code. Currently, the rate of taxation under the Petroleum Income Tax Act is 
50%, and is not higher than 60% of the net profit.
643
 
5.2.3 Accounting Rules that Allow Accelerated Depreciation and Loss Carry- 
Forwards for Tax Purposes 
The timing of recognising income and expenses is crucial to the calculation of taxable 
income.
644
 Burns and Krever specify the distinction between cash and accrual based 
accounting systems,
645
 Under which, the rules specifying when receipts and expenses 
are recognised have major effects on how taxable income is measured. When 
establishing a business in a host country, FDIs tend to consider such factors as the 
applicable accounting method, inclusions in income, allowable deductions, depreciation 
rules and treatment of losses. As Easson argues:  
Foreign investors may find, for example, that the host country rules 
governing the deduction of interest on loans are more restrictive than 
usual, especially where the interest is paid to a foreign parent company. 
Rules permitting the carry-forward of losses are especially important, 
since most new FDI ventures take several years to show a profit.
646
  
Governments that employ a low corporate profit tax rate often use two other 
mechanisms to lower the effective tax rate. One allows investors to carry losses forward 
(or backward) for a specified number of years (usually three to five), for tax accounting 
purposes. In most cases, only a fixed ratio of the loss with an upper limit is allowed to 
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be carried forward (or backward).
647
 This measure is popular with investors who expect 
to make losses in their first few years of business.
648
  
Accelerated depreciation offers another means of introducing tax incentives to stimulate 
economic growth,
649
 although the pattern of revenue costs of accelerated depreciation 
can prove more complicated than those of tax holidays.  The government actually incurs 
a higher level of initial expenditure to achieve the same effect. The revenue costs also 
actually fall over time, as the tax benefits offered to new investments are offset by the 
increased revenue from tax on the old investments.
650
 As a tax incentive, accelerated 
depreciation does not encourage the potentially detrimental creation of short-lived 
businesses, as do tax holidays, since ‘merely accelerating the depreciation of an asset 
does not increase [its] total allowable nominal depreciation beyond its original cost.’651  
Accelerated depreciation also allows investment costs to be deducted quickly, reducing 
the distortion that an income-based tax would typically produce against investment.
652
. 
Furthermore, the main benefit to the investor of accelerated depreciation is the time 
value of delayed tax payments. In such a case, investment expenses would be nothing 
more than an interest subsidy on the investment’s full cost.653 Lastly, it is proven to be 
more cost-effective than the reducing the CIT rate.
654
  However, its sole pitfall is the 
fact that its revenue cost is not as readily ascertainable, since it requires present value 
comparisons between the stream of depreciation allowances under accelerated 
depreciation rates and under regular depreciation rates.
655
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In Thailand, accelerated depreciation is available under the Royal Decree regarding 
Reduction and Exemption from Revenue Taxes No. 405 B.E. 2545 (2002), an ‘ROH 
scheme’. Under this scheme, a company is provided with ‘an initial depreciation rate of 
25% of asset value for the acquisition and installation of buildings and offices which the 
ROH purchases for its own commercial activities’. With respect to the loss carry 
forward benefit, this is available to those BOI-promoted companies that have been 
granted a tax holiday. General companies benefits from section 65 (3) (12) of the 
Revenue Code, which allows losses to be carried forward for five accounting periods 
and to be offset against future profits from all sources. Net losses can be deducted 
against net profits on a year-by-year basis. The Board of Taxation Ruling No. 35/2540 
(1997) and the Departmental Notification dated 5 February B.E. 2535 (1987) specified 
the tax treatment of the use of a BOI company tax losses carried forward. The use of 
losses carried forward will be discussed by examining two scenarios: a company 
operating BOI-promoted business only and one operating both BOI and non-BOI- 
promoted businesses. 
Where a BOI-promoted company carries on only BOI-promoted businesses, under 
Clause 4.1 of the Notification:
656
 
It is entitled to deduct annual net losses arising during the tax holiday 
period from net profits arising within 5 years from the end of tax 
holiday period, without having to offset such losses against net profits 
generated from BOI-promoted business during the tax holiday period. 
Moreover, the company may select the year in which the deduction of 
net losses from net profits will occur.  
Where a company carries on both BOI and non-BOI-promoted business, Clause 4.2 of 
the Notification
657
 provides: 
The company can offset an annual net loss of the BOI-promoted business 
against the net profit of the non-BOI-promoted business arising during 
the tax holiday period. However, if the BOI-promoted company has also 
accumulated losses from the non-BOI-promoted business brought 
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forward from previous years, the annual profit of the non-BOI-promoted 
business must prior be deducted using the accumulated loss brought 
forward from the non-BOI-promoted business. If there remains a balance 
of net profit from the non-BOI-promoted business, the annual net loss 
incurred by the BOI-promoted business can be deducted in the tax 
calculation. The remaining loss of the BOI-promoted business incurred 
during the promotion period can be carried forward to offset against the 
net profit within 5 years, after the end of the promotion period and the 
remaining loss of the BOI-promoted business can be applied to offset 
against the net profit of any one or more years similar to the earlier 
scenario. 
However, according to Section 31 of the IPA 1977, as amended by the IPA 2001 
(No.3), promoted persons are entitled to offset ‘annual losses’ incurred during a tax 
exemption period from net profits after the end of the tax exemption period. The BOI 
set up the calculation method in cases where promoted companies operate more than 
one promoted project. The promoted companies do not have to offset losses against 
profits among the BOI-promoted projects. However, the Revenue Department disagreed 
with this rule and instead relied on the Departmental Notification dated 5 February B.E. 
2535 (1987), which states that the net profit and loss of BOI and non-BOI business shall 
be calculated separately. 
It can be noticed that tax holidays offered by the BOI can lead to uncertain 
interpretations which require clarification of, for example, the time at which the revenue 
was first derived, or the profit/loss calculation. These problems will be analysed in the 
next chapter 
5.2.4 Investment Tax Allowances 
Klemm defines an investment allowance as the ‘deduction of a certain fraction of an 
investment from taxable profits (in addition to depreciation)’.658 Such allowances tend 
to lower the effective price of acquiring capital. They are given as a specified 
percentage of qualifying investment expenditures and are deducted against the tax 
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base.
659
 Their value, however, also depends on the value of the CIT rate applicable to 
the tax base. The amount of tax relief on a given amount of investment allowance is 
variable according to the tax rate.
660
 
UNCTAD’s report observes that: 
Under an investment allowance scheme, firms are provided with faster or 
more generous write-offs for qualifying capital costs. Two types of 
investment allowances can be distinguished. With accelerated depreciation, 
firms are allowed to write off capital costs in a shorter time period than is 
dictated by the capital’s useful economic life, which generally is the 
accounting basis for depreciating capital costs.
661
 
Although such a policy does not alter the total amount of capital cost to be depreciated, 
it does increase the claim’s value, which is greatest when the full cost of the capital 
asset can be deducted in the year in which the expenditure is made. In the case of 
enhanced deduction, firms can claim deductions for a multiple of the actual cost of the 
qualifying capital (UNCTAD’s report specifies one-and–a-half times or twice the price). 
Investment allowances generally specify certain percentages of a business’s start-up 
costs, such as those incurred by purchasing plant and equipment. Such expenses can 
also ‘be written off immediately as expenses in the current period, in addition to the 
normal allowable depreciation on the full costs of such investments’.662 The value of 
investment allowances will differ depending on whether or not they must be claimed in 
the year they were earned. In most countries, unused depreciable capital costs can be 
carried forward, in some cases indefinitely, to offset future tax liabilities.
663
 As is often 
the case during the early stages of an investment project involving high capital 
expenditure, deductions provide benefits only if they can be carried forward to offset 
future tax liabilities.
664
 Provided that a carry-forward of the incentive is allowed, an 
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investment allowance can operate in a manner similar to a tax holiday, in that it can 
eliminate the tax liability of the firm in the early years of operation. The key difference 
is that a tax holiday is usually time-limited. In addition, existing firms, rather than start-
up firms, that stand to gain the most from tax allowances, as the latter cannot actually 
benefit from the allowances until they start to turn a profit and are paying taxes.
665
  
Furthermore, investment tax allowances ‘promote new investment rather than giving 
windfall gains to owners of old capital, as a reduction in the corporate tax rates does’.666 
The so-called ‘accelerated allowances’ are generally directed towards investment, 
industrial buildings or equipment, training or research and development.
667
 Ideally, they 
‘enhance the capacity of the community and the business environment’ 668 and tend to 
be less costly than an outright tax holiday. Zee et al make the important point that, 
investment allowances facilitate both transparency in administration and the effective 
targeting of incentives.
669
 The drawbacks of investment tax allowances become most 
apparent when investment projects have long gestation periods or are located in areas of 
political and/or macroeconomic instability.
670
 They also tend to distort the choice of 
capital assets in favour of short-lived ones, and require a well-developed accounting 
system with potentially high administrative costs. Furthermore, the carry-forward of 
deductions by firms that cannot fully use them can considerably raise the revenue cost 
over time.  
Because investment allowances are aimed primarily at capital investment, their impact 
on public revenue is limited by the amount of capital that the firm is willing to risk, 
placing them in contrast to tax holidays, which appeal primarily to quick-profit, short- 
term investments.
671
 There is also an issue of tax avoidance at stake where investment 
allowances are concerned. Attempts to target the incentives either too specifically or too 
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vaguely are counterproductive because they introduce complexity and uncertainty for 
both the company and the administrator, and therefore if the company cannot ‘be certain 
of the eligibility of expenditure for the incentive, its effect on behaviour is reduced 
significantly or even eliminated’.672 
5.2.5 Investment Tax Credits 
As outlined by Clark, investment tax credits may be flat or incremental. A flat 
investment tax credit is a fixed percentage of investment expenditure, whereas an 
incremental investment tax credit amounts to a fixed percentage of qualifying 
expenditures and applies to yearly expenditure in excess of a (usually) moving-average 
base, i.e. the taxpayer’s average investment expenditure over the previous three years.673 
Incremental tax credits aim to better target tax relief towards companies’ incremental 
expenditures. 
As Zee et al have observed, investment tax credits provide stipulated percentages of 
investment costs that can be deducted from CIT liabilities. If the CIT rate is uniform, 
investment tax credits function in essentially the same way as investment allowances, 
sharing their positive and negative implications.
674
 In comparison to CIT reduction, 
investment tax credits benefit only new investment.
675
 They provide a larger reduction 
in the effective tax rate on investment at a lower cost, taking into account the impact of 
taxation on both marginal revenues and costs.
676
 Investment tax credits, as well as 
investment allowances are more cost-effective than those involving reduction of or 
exemption from the CIT rate.
677
 In addition, investment allowances are far more 
effective than CIT holidays in promoting  specific investments, as noted earlier, and 
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their revenue costs are both more transparent and, if shared with CIT rate reductions, 
easier to administer and control.
 678
 
An example of a tax credit can be seen in the United States Research and 
Experimentation (R&E) Tax Credit which is codified in Section 41 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Atkinson summarises that essentially it is ‘an important tool for 
boosting innovation and competitiveness and creating higher wage jobs’.679 Companies 
can choose from three versions of the credit, although Atkinson describes only one, in 
which a taxpayer’s current-year qualified research expenses in excess of a specified 
base amount are eligible for a 20% tax credit. In practice, however, the effective rate is 
13%.
680
 The research and experimentation tax credit has long been a subject of 
criticism. The early research, along with anecdotal evidence, suggested that the credit is 
not effective, since it simply rewards companies for what they would have done even 
without the incentive.
681
 A survey conducted in 1996 cited that 55% of responding 
companies deemed the tax credit ‘not at all influential’ on their investment.682 However, 
a number of scholars including Hall,
683
 Bloom & Griffith,
 684
 and Coopers & Lybrand
685
 
have found that a tax credit is an effective tool and on average produces USD 1.10 of 
research for every tax dollar forgone.
686
 Research from Australia,
687
 France
688
 and 
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Canada
689
 has also found that a similar result and proved that a tax credit has a positive 
impact on sales and the number of product innovations.  
5.2.6 Personal Income Tax Reduction 
Personal income tax can involve expatriate employees of foreign companies. When 
expatriates do not become resident in the country to which they are sent, are taxed only 
on the portion of their income that has a source in that country. Usually, that means only 
income derived from employment performed in the country. They may even escape tax 
on that income by virtue of a tax treaty, i.e. if they are present in Thailand for fewer 
than 183 days and their salary is paid by their original employer, it is exempted from 
Thailand’s tax by virtue of treaty provision.690 Nonetheless, if employees become 
resident in Thailand whether temporarily or ordinarily they are liable to personal income 
tax on their worldwide income.
691
 
 
ROH expatriate workers can claim a 15% reduction in the rate of personal income tax 
for up to eight years.
692
 Under the ROH scheme, foreign employees usually based in 
Thailand, who are assigned to work outside of the country for a certain period are 
entitled to tax exemption on income earned during their time away. This is under the 
condition that their employers do not claim the expenses paid to the absent employee 
for tax purposes in Thailand.
693
 This ROH scheme with a personal income tax incentive 
is considered by tax professionals as ‘very attractive’.694 
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Apart from the incentive provided under the ROH scheme, other tax allowances, 
deductions and exemptions are granted to individuals, with the main purpose of 
encouraging private consumption. They include, first, a personal income tax 
exemption
695
 for an income base from THB 100,000
696
 to THB 150,000
697
 per year,
698
 
which aims to support low income earners and the aged; second, a deductible allowance 
for life insurance premiums paid from THB 50,000
699
 to 100,000
700
 per year;
701
 third, a 
deductible allowance for the contributions to provident funds, government pension 
funds, welfare funds under the private school provision and retirement mutual funds 
(RMF) from THB 300,000
702
 to 500,000
703
 per year;
704
 and lastly, a deductible 
allowance for personal investment in long-term equity (LTE) from THB 300,000 to 
500,000 per year.
705
  
5.2.7 Value Added Tax Reduction 
Exemptions from VAT are specified under Section 81 of the Revenue Code. In addition, 
which effect from 1 April 2005 onwards, the value of the tax base of a small business 
under Section 81/1 of the Revenue Code is increased from THB 1.2 million
706
 to THB 
1.8 million
707
 per year. This was pursuant to the Royal Decree issued under the Revenue 
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Code regarding the prescription for the value of the tax base of a small business 
exempted from value added tax (No. 432) B.E. 2548 (2005). This is the government’s 
attempt to implement a tax measure supporting its policy of enhancing economic 
growth by relieving the tax burden of small-scale businesses. The small business 
operator who is not VAT registered has the advantage of not having to shift the tax 
burden to his customers and, as a result, is able to charge a cheaper price for the goods, 
competing with other business operators. Moreover, the VAT rate reduction period was 
extended to comply with the economic recovery plan, which relies on domestic 
spending, so the VAT rate was reduced to 6.3% for the sale of goods, services and 
imports from 1 October 2008 to 30 September 2010, and changed to 9% for the sales 
and imports incurred from 1 October 2010.
708
 Consumption taxes such as VAT are 
generally irrelevant to FDI, because their burden is passed on to consumers via retailers 
rather than being borne by producers.
 709
  
5.2.8 Specific Business Tax Reduction 
A number of businesses are exempt from SBT, as stated in Section 91/3 of the Revenue 
Code. In addition, a reduction of the SBT rate from 3% to 0.01% on gross receipts is 
granted to banking business, finance business, securities business and credit foncier
710
 
business.
711
 Moreover, a reduction in the SBT rate for the sale of immovable property 
from 3% to 0.1% on gross receipts was applied to transactions occurring between 29 
March 2008 and 30 March 2009.
712
 In accordance with the Thai government’s aim to 
support the growth of the property market, there was an SBT reduction of 0.1% (or 
0.11% inclusive of the 10% municipality tax) provided for property transfer fees and 
mortgage fees provided for land, buildings (including single houses, townhouses, 
terraced houses and commercial buildings) or land with buildings under the Land 
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Allocation law and condominium units under the Condominium Act (No.4) 2008.
713
 
This reduction period was extended to 28 March 2010, as prescribed by Royal Decree 
No. 488 dated 17
 
May 2009.  
5.2.9 Stamp Duty 
An example of stamp duty exemption can be seen in Royal Decree No. 516, B.E. 2554 
(2011), under which a limited or public limited company is entitled to an exemption 
from stamp duty, VAT and SBT, on partial business transfers (PBTs), if the PBT is 
made to an associated company.
714
 This exemption is granted to support business 
restructuring and to enhance performance and business competitiveness, with the aim of 
creating a more sustainable economy.
715
 
5.2.10 Withholding Tax Relief 
Dividends derived from a promoted activity are exempt from income tax in the hands of 
the recipient for a period equal to the period for which a promoted person is exempt 
from CIT.
716
 
5.2.11 Import Duties Exemption 
Initial outlays of capital for machinery and equipment required to start up a business can 
be high. In addition, high import taxes and customs duties on the import of such 
equipment can prove a disincentive to FDI.
717
 An exemption from paying import duties 
on machinery is granted to an approved project, provided that machinery of the same 
quality is not already being made in Thailand, at least in the same quantity.
718
 The BOI 
may, at its discretion, grant a reduction of only one-half of the rate of import duties, or 
not grant the exemption of import duties on the machinery to such activity provided that 
                                                          
713
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it follows the condition.
719
 They may also grant a promoted person a reduction of import 
duties not exceeding 90% of the normal rates imposed on raw or essential materials 
which are imported into Thailand for producing, mixing or assembling in the promoted 
activity, each time for a period of not more than one year from the date stated by the 
BOI.
720
 
The conditions set by the BOI regarding import duties exemption are as follows. Any 
project in Zone 1 receives an exemption of import duty on machinery to be used in a 
new project, provided that the project exports more than 80% of its total sales and 
locates its factories in industrial estates or promoted industrial zones. In addition, it can 
receive an exemption of import duty on raw materials used in the export products for a 
period of one year, provided that 30% of sales are exported. 
5.2.12 Deduction of Transportation, Electricity and Water Costs, Deduction of the 
Project Infrastructure Installation Construction Costs  
Apart from the rights and benefits which are offered by the BOI, the BOI also has the 
power to grant companies operating promoted activities one or more special benefits. 
BOI-promoted companies can receive a double tax deduction on the costs of 
transportation, electricity and water supply incurred in the course of their operation. 
There is also an additional 25% deduction for costs associated with developing certain 
infrastructure facilities. The BOI-promoted companies can choose to make deductions 
from the net profit of any one year or several years from the date income is first derived 
from the promoted activity.
721
 The procedures and periods of time are at the board’s 
discretion.  
5.2.13  Relief from Double Taxation 
Double taxation occurs when the income tax equation (taxable income × tax rate = tax 
results) is applied twice to the same income.
722
 Double taxation relief must apply to at 
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least one element of the equation.
723
 Where international double taxation is concerned, 
there are two equations, one from the residence and one from the source country. Either 
country may provide relief, or can between them come to an agreement to share the 
burden. 
724
  
Various double tax agreements apply to income created in one country but wholly or 
partially exempt from taxation there.
725
 The relief from double taxation applies to the 
incomes earned from or by pensions, temporary employment, students and trainees, 
teachers, transport, shipping, athletes and entertainers supported by a governmental 
entity and directors’ fees. Another benefit of a double tax agreement is a ‘tax credit’, 
whereby treaties make provisions for cases where taxation on one income is due to more 
than one country. In this case, the second country must usually provide a tax credit for 
taxes paid in the first country.
726
 For instance, if a company from Malaysia owns shares 
in a Thai company and receives dividends, the Malaysian company would have to pay 
Malaysian income taxes on the dividend but would receive a credit for the 10% 
withholding tax paid to Thailand. If the Malaysian company owns not less than 25% of 
the Thai company, then the credit includes income taxes paid by the Thai company on 
its income in addition to the taxes paid on the dividend. However, in any event, the 
credit may not exceed the Malaysian tax rate.  
5.3 The Link between Tax Incentives and FDI 
There is evidence of the link between tax incentives and FDI.
727
 Both have been proven 
to be an integral part of a government’s strategy to attract overseas investors. The recent 
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evidence of the effect of tax incentives can be seen from the influence of the tax rate on 
investors within regional economic groupings, i.e. the North American Free Trade Area, 
the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Foreign 
companies’ initial capital outlay and operating costs can be reduced through tax 
incentive provisions.
728
 Foreign firms often seek to maximise their global profits by 
saving most of their costs, while governments aim to achieve economic development 
and to acquire the maximum possible revenue. The challenge is to find effective 
incentives in a compromise between the government and foreign investors.  
Early literature by the Ruding Committee Report,
729
 based mostly on cases from the 
United States, suggests that a company’s tax burdens highly influence its decision to 
invest abroad.
730
 High taxation is considered a significant barrier for foreign 
businesses.
731
 An empirical analysis by Onyeiwu and Shrestha
732
 indicates that low 
corporate income tax rates have a positive effect on FDI flow, because such rates attract 
new investment or even encourage reinvestment by the existing investors.
733
  
Furthermore, there are proposals in European countries to amend tax rates in order to 
attract foreign investment,
734
 the European Union has itself suggested tax reform and 
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harmonisation.
735
 Likewise, in Hines’s report, a higher tax rate leads to decreased 
FDI.
736
 Further support on this point can be seen from Gorter and De Mooij whose 
study, based primarily on European countries, concludes that ‘tax rate differentials are 
more influential on European investment flows than continental flows’.737 The next 
relationship between tax and FDI can be seen in double taxation, particularly in the case 
of foreign subsidiaries, which are liable to pay CIT in both the host and home countries. 
Credit and exemption systems are therefore necessary to avoid this problem. 
Tax credits for research and development have come under significant criticism, 
particularly with reference to FDI. Atkinson argues that the credit is ineffective, 
particularly because of its incremental nature and that a neutral tax code is preferable.
738
 
He also believes that indirect incentives are the most effective way to promote 
innovation and competition in the global market. It has been proven that different types 
of investment have diverse effects on taxes.
739
 Investors’ strategic decisions, once they 
have selected a country as a possible location for investment, rely in a large part on tax 
consequences. However, Morisset has argued that the factors influencing initial location 
selection tend to be more fundamental, with infrastructure, political stability and labour 
costs the main considerations.
740
  
The fact that specific businesses such as banks, insurance companies and internet-
related businesses can make the most of tax incentives across countries
741
 proves the 
success of these incentives in attracting foreign subsidiaries of major global businesses. 
In terms of politics, tax incentives are popular measures amongst many politicians in 
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developing countries, which may simply be attributable to the fact that they face 
tremendous pressure to increase investment and create jobs through FDI, and tax 
incentives are a highly visible and relatively flexible means of concrete action toward 
achieving these goals.
742
 According to Heady, ‘tax incentives can have a noticeable 
effect on the location of investment, especially between locations that are similar in 
other respects’.743 Despite the many proven benefits, though, there is some evidence that 
the effects of tax incentives on FDI can be small and relatively redundant.
744
 
Regarding the links between tax incentives and FDI in Thailand, one can consider a 
series of World Bank
745
 (an international financial institution which provides financial 
and technical assistance to developing countries) surveys recording subjective 
investment climate. Thai firms were asked to rank (on a scale of 1-5) the perceived 
severity of 22 obstacles to doing business. ‘tax rates’ were perceived as a major or 
severe obstacle by 28% of firms in 2004 and by 19% in 2007.
746
 They were the fifth 
highest obstacle both in 2004 and 2007, and ‘tax administration’ came sixth and eight in 
2004 and 2007, respectively.
747
 Companies, notably electronics and textile 
manufacturers,
748
 expressed their concern over bureaucratic burden including tax 
regulations. The research also found that business sectors such as garment, machinery 
and equipment and auto-parts industries expressed concerns about tax regulations and 
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high taxes.
749
 Clearly, the policy on general taxation, tax incentives and tax 
administration should be taken into consideration if the Thai government wishes to 
boost FDI. Moreover, tax administration issues in Thailand as a host country are 
relevant for FDI because in many cases they affect investors’ decisions more than high 
rates of tax. Currently, there is a problem with the overlapping of tax jurisdictions 
between the BOI and the Revenue Department, a central tax authority, creating  a 
variety of administrative problems.
750
   
 
5.4 General Comments on Tax Incentives 
As explained in this chapter, tax incentives are a means of improving social progress 
and encouraging economic activity, leading to greater prosperity. This thesis focuses on 
the latter factor, the encouragement of economic activity, particularly investment. Tax 
incentives have been used in both developed and developing countries with the aim of 
encouraging certain types of activities, which are, at the time, essential for the nation’s 
economic growth. This is also a result of globalisation-induced change. Dunning and 
Kokko identified a number of factors related to globalisation, including the integration 
of markets, liberal economic policies, and lower transportation and communication 
costs.
751
 Under the influence of these factors, FDI in developing countries could move 
away from being focused around market- and research-seeking, and move towards an 
efficiency-seeking model.
752
 Investment incentives would, they argue, thrive as a result, 
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so tax incentives and administration would be of key importance in improving an 
investment destination’s attractiveness.753  
However, research has shown a number of drawbacks to these tax incentives,
754
 as they 
erode the tax base because they can be misused by subjectively ineligible investments 
through the exploitation of legal loopholes by officials and/or investors.
755
 Furthermore, 
many investments, especially highly profitable ones, would have taken place even 
without tax incentives. Also, these investments can distort resource allocation, since 
they encourage certain activities at the expense of others, not necessarily because they 
generate more revenue, but only because they have been granted a tax advantage. Tax 
incentives also tend to attract opacity, corruption and ‘socially unproductive rent-
seeking activities’.756   
Zee et al identify four specific costs involved in the allocation of tax incentives, which 
can further illuminate the analysis in this thesis. The first is the fact of distortions 
between investments granted incentives and those without incentives; secondly, there is 
a problem with forgone revenue on the assumption that the government operates under a 
revenue constraint, so that any lost revenue would have to be compensated from 
alternative distortive taxes; thirdly, they require necessary administrative resources and 
fourthly, there can be significant social costs from corruption or rent-seeking activities 
connected with the abuse of tax incentive provisions. As a result of these, the cost-
effectiveness of tax incentives is ‘often questionable’.757 
FDI investment incentives can only be justified if foreign firms can actually benefit 
local companies by sharing skills or creating new markets. As Blomstrom has argued, 
‘In that case, the foreign investor’s private benefits are lower than the social benefits, 
and total foreign investment will fall short of the optimal amount unless various 
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investment incentives compensate the foreign investor’.758 Furthermore, competition 
among governments, at both national and local levels, to attract FDI may create 
problems because when governments go through this process, there is a tendency to 
overbid and the subsidies may very well surpass the level of the spill-over benefits, with 
welfare losses as a result.
759
 Spill-over is not automatic, but depends crucially on the 
conditions for local firms. Its potential is unlikely to be realised unless local firms have 
the ability and motivation to learn from foreign multinational companies (MNCs) and to 
invest in new technology, which implies that investment incentives aiming to increase 
the potential for spill over may be inefficient unless they are complemented with 
measures to improve local learning capability and to maintain a competitive local 
business environment.
760
 
There is no guarantee that tax incentives will actually achieve their stated aims, and in 
some cases they may even contravene WTO obligations, which happened in the case of 
the New Zealand and Spanish film industries, in which tax incentives were offered to 
domestic production companies to encourage competition with their foreign 
counterparts. These incentives were actually considered by the national reporters of both 
countries to be potential breaches of the GATS obligations,
761
 as they enabled the 
domestic companies to claim more favourable tax treatments than the foreign ones 
through the deductibility of costs (in New Zealand) or investment deductions (in 
Spain).
762 Both of these incentives could be seen to violate the national treatment 
provision of GATT, art III, as well as, infringe on the provisions of GATS, art XVII.
763
  
Furthermore, there is little evidence that discriminatory tax incentives do a better job of 
promoting investment than simple, uniform regimes with low to moderate rates of 
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taxation; indeed, the evidence indicates that the latter is preferable.
764
 The benefits of 
tax incentive measures as indicated in this chapter are on occasion questionable and can 
increase the disposable income of both individuals and companies. As pointed out by 
Bird, ‘anyone trying to discern the effects of incentives on investment must feel as 
though he has wandered into the Tower of Babel,
765
 because some academics argue that 
incentives significantly increase investment, while others believe that they have a slight 
or zero effect.
766
 This chapter has pulled together many of the diverse advantages and 
disadvantages of using tax incentives, but it should be noted that most of the studies 
have not been carried out in Thailand. Additionally, the methods and times of these 
studies can affect the link between tax incentives and FDI.  
This chapter examined the link between tax incentives and FDI in the case of Thailand 
and concludes that the Thai government should still adopt tax incentive schemes to 
promote foreign investment. The regulating authority must maintain an awareness of the 
possible disadvantages of tax incentives so as to design, carefully assess and administer 
tax incentive measures. The reasons that the government may lose revenue which 
should have been collected without tax incentives must be taken into consideration. A 
study by the OECD suggests that ‘transparency, simplicity, stability and certainty in the 
application of the tax law and in tax administration are often ranked by investors ahead 
of special tax incentives’.767 This research further recommends that financial control by 
the government is identified as a crucial factor in establishing the stability of tax laws, 
as it would give a greater level of certainty in the administration and execution of tax 
laws and lead to greater stability and increased taxpayer confidence.
768
 
As explained earlier in this chapter, tax incentive schemes, namely CIT exemption, tax 
holidays, import duties exemption and deduction of the cost of project infrastructure, 
currently fall under BOI administration, as a result of the IPA 2001. However, other 
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types of tax incentives are given under the provisions of the Revenue Code and other 
secondary legislation, which are administered by the Revenue Department. A diverse 
range of agencies dealing with tax incentives causes inconvenience to investors, but 
were they to deal with one agency only, investors could estimate the overall cost of tax 
incentives and all of the costs entailed at the initial stage of business operation.
769
 In 
addition, as explained in Chapter 4, the BOI’s main responsibility is to promote 
investment, not to collect revenue through taxation because it is part of the Ministry of 
Industry and is not a revenue authority. Due to the fact that the administration of tax 
incentives involves designing, granting, implementing and following up compliance 
with companies that are entitled to tax incentives, tax incentives administered by a non-
revenue authority can create a bureaucratic burden and cause confusion among 
investors.
770
  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to establish the types of tax incentives both in general, and those 
which are offered in particular by the Thai Revenue Department and the BOI. Tax 
incentives provided for BOI businesses are examined in view of the importance of such 
industrial sectors or activities. This chapter also provided a background to the following 
discussions of conflicting tax jurisdictions. Furthermore, the disadvantages in each type 
of tax incentive discussed in this chapter, together with a critique on the use of tax 
incentives and the possibility of revenue loss, emphasise the necessity for tax incentives 
to be administered by a tax authority, and not by a non-tax authority such as the BOI. 
The problem of overlapping responsibilities of two or more government agencies will 
be discussed further in the following chapter. It is evident from this chapter, though, that 
tax incentives influence the decisions of foreign investors to invest in a country; 
nonetheless, other non-tax factors in the investment climate should not be overlooked. It 
may be suggested that tax incentives should be used primarily as a signposting device 
for specially needed activities and in targeted areas. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 Jurisdictional Problems 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter has shown that tax incentives in Thailand fall under both the Thai 
Revenue Department and the Thai Board of Investment (BOI). While this may not be a 
problem in relation to many incentives, there is one major area of concern in relation to 
BOI-promoted companies, and most importantly foreign investing companies. This 
chapter therefore examines issues arising from the overlapping jurisdictions of the 
Revenue Department and the BOI concerning the provisions of tax incentives for BOI-
promoted companies. It begins by examining tax incentive provisions in the Investment 
Promotion Act of 2001 (IPA 2001). The fact that these provisions do not clearly define 
some of their terms or specify methods of tax calculation is problematic. The problem 
raised by this chapter is of significant interest and to both current and prospective 
investors in Thailand, since a heavy tax burden and obscure regulations can constitute 
significant obstacles to investment.
771
  
 
6.1 Incidences of Problem Areas 
As explained in Chapter 4, the Board of Investment of Thailand (BOI), through the IPA 
2001, has the authority to grant certain privileges to eligible businesses or projects. 
These privileges include land ownership rights, visa facilitation, work permits, tax 
holidays, exemptions from duties and tax deductions for construction and utility costs, 
as specified in the IPA 2001. While the BOI is responsible for tax incentives for BOI-
promoted projects, the Revenue Department is responsible for the administration of 
personal income tax, corporate income tax (CIT) and value added tax (VAT). The 
BOI’s power regarding tax incentives, as specified under the IPA 2001, can overlap 
with the jurisdiction of the Revenue Department, since some of its areas of oversight 
involve relief from taxes that are administered by the Revenue Department. 
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Furthermore, the IPA 2001 does not, or does not clearly specify its terms and the 
methods of tax calculation in the areas in which it gives jurisdiction to the BOI, which 
leads to the question as to whether or not the Revenue Department, as a main revenue 
authority, should have tax jurisdiction over questionable income. Specific examples of 
these overlapping jurisdictions are discussed below. An analysis of the problems will 
follow a summary of the issues. 
6.1.1 Interpreting terms under the IPA 2001, s. 31 
The first problematic issue is jurisdiction over the interpretation of the term ‘the date 
income is first derived from a promoted project’ in Section 31 paragraph one of the IPA 
2001. According to this section: 
 
A BOI-promoted person shall be granted exemption of CIT on the net 
profit derived from the BOI-promoted project as prescribed by an 
announcement of the Board, of which the proportion to the investment 
capital excluding cost of land and working capital shall be taken into 
consideration by the Board, for a period of not more than eight years 
from the date income is first derived from such project. 
 
From this provision, it is unclear what date is deemed ‘the date income is first derived 
from the project’. In addition, the IPA 2001 does not explain which authority is in 
charge of interpretation, which can cause difficulties, especially when finished products 
are intended for export.
772
 The date could be deemed either the date of a sale agreement 
or the date the product leaves the factory.
773
 According to the BOI’s practice and 
opinion, ‘the date income is first derived from the project’ is the first day of the BOI tax 
exemption period, so when a business starts to receive income, the tax exemption period 
should start immediately. The BOI issued a guideline in Memorandum No. Nor Ror
774
 
1301/2523 dated 14 March 1991, stating that ‘the date income is first derived from a 
promoted project’ is not the date on which the promoted project is partly or fully 
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started. According to this guideline, the promoted project start date is merely the date 
when the BOI approves that the company meets all the requirements and conditions as 
stated in a certificate.
775
  
 
The first example of the Revenue Department’s interpretation of ‘the date income is 
first derived from a project’ is in Rev. Dept.Rul776 No. Gor Kor 0811/16548 dated 1 
December 1998. In this ruling, the date the promoted company was entitled for a 
payment from an export constituted the date in question, even though the company did 
not receive the money. The next ruling regarding the same matter is Rev.Dept. Rul No. 
Gor Kor 0706/1918 dated 7 March 2006. In this ruling, the BOI-promoted company, 
operating an electricity generation plant, was granted tax exemption for eight years. It 
started its business on 4 September 2000. On 1 October 1999, the company tested an 
electricity generating system by sending electricity to a buyer and charged fees only for 
the portion of energy that met the standard set by the buyer. In December 1999, the 
buyer paid the fees, which were entered into the accounts of the company as variable 
operating expenses, as stated in the contract. According to this ruling, ‘the date income 
was first derived from a project’ was the day on which the company first received a fee 
from generating electricity. Consequently, the BOI-promoted company started to earn 
income from the BOI-promoted project on the day it received the electric fee from the 
buyer, namely 1 October 1999.  
 
The second major problem area is the difference in methods of profit/loss calculations, 
under Section 31 Paragraph one of the IPA 2001, by the BOI and the Revenue 
Department. This matter is complicated further by the fact that there is no one official 
interpretation by the BOI, whose current practice is to allow each promoted company to 
request a letter of clarification on any issue relating to its projects.
777
 The Minebea case, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter, is the only case on profit/loss calculation to 
have reached the courts; as such, it is the only case for which the BOI’s interpretation is 
                                                          
775
 BOI Memorandum No. Nor Ror 1301/2523 dated 14 March 1991. 
776
 Revenue Department Ruling. 
777
 The Board of Investment Memoranda Aor Gor 0901/NorTor/000820 dated 12 November 2007, 
AorGor/NorTor/000821 dated 12 November 2007 and AorGor0901/000888 dated 14 November 2006 (in 
Thai). 
143 
 
publically available. In contrast, the Revenue Department has issued a large number of 
notices interpreting the ambiguous provision of the IPA 2001 on this matter.  
 
Revenue Department Notification dated 5 February 1987, regarding the calculation of 
net profit/loss for BOI-promoted companies and juristic partnerships, defined the term 
‘income which shall be entitled to tax exemption’ thus: 
 
Firstly, income from the sale of products and services of BOI-promoted 
projects
778
, and secondly, sale of semi-finished products in accordance 
with types and quantity as specified in promoted certificates.
779
 Next, 
‘income’ means income from the sale of obsolete machines, parts, tools 
and appliances, for operating promoted projects. This also includes 
machines, parts, tools and appliances which are used in non-BOI-
promoted projects; however, income will be divided between the BOI-
promoted project and non-BOI-promoted project according to their 
quantity produced.
780
 Finally, ‘income’ is defined as income from 
interest or income which derives from regularly operating a business 
provided that such income is approved by the BOI and the Revenue 
Department. In the case where a BOI-promoted business is conducting a 
BOI-promoted project and a non-BOI-promoted project, income under 
this category has to be divided according to quantity produced between 
the BOI-promoted project and the non-BOI-promoted project.
781
  
 
The Revenue Department has ruled on this issue as specified in the several Revenue 
Department Rulings. In Rev.Dept.Rul No. Gor Kor 0706/2622 dated 28 March 2006, 
the Revenue Department took the view that the transfer of gas through a pipeline was 
one of a number of processes involved in delivering a product to the customer, and 
therefore was part of a product cost. Accordingly, the company’s income from 
transferring gas via a pipeline was not tax-exempt because the ownership of the gas was 
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transferred to the buyer when the gas was delivered and measured at the delivery point, 
which is the end of the pipeline in front of the buyer’s plant. The Revenue Department 
has stated that the company in this case has to combine the remaining profit/loss with 
those of non-tax-exempt business operations for the purpose of tax calculation.
782
 
Regarding income to be calculated for net profit, the Revenue Code Section 65
783
 and 
65 (2)
784
 specify the principles for determining the calculation of taxable net profit.  
 
Where a cylinder head manufacturing company which was promoted by the BOI used 
their cylinder heads as a part of engine production (which was a non-BOI-promoted 
project), only income from the sale of the cylinder heads (provided that they and the 
engine were clearly separable) was tax-exempt.
785
 Another example of the Revenue 
Department’s interpretation concerns losses on currency exchange rates. Under this 
ruling, a company’s loss on currency exchange rates in the accounting period of 1997 
was deemed expenditure of a non-BOI-promoted project, provided that the loss was 
incurred before the company started to receive income from a BOI-promoted project.
786
 
Furthermore, the Revenue Department ruled that in the case where a BOI-promoted 
company (an electricity and steam generator) received compensation from an insurance 
company for loss of income due to a mechanical failure or accident, so such 
compensation was not income derived from operating a BOI-promoted business. 
Accordingly, this income was not exempt from CIT.
787
 
 
The third issue can be seen in the interpretation of ‘expenses to be calculated for net 
profit under Section 31 paragraph one of the IPA 2001. Following the Departmental 
Notification dated 5 February 1987, an example of the Revenue Department’s practice 
can be seen in Rev.Dept.Rul No: GorKor 0706/2935 dated 10 April 2006, which ruled 
on a calculation of net profit/loss. The Revenue Department explained that the company 
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which was granted a BOI promotion to produce ethanol was also selling benzene 91, but 
it was not granted a BOI promotion for the sale of this product.  Although the cost of 
purchasing benzene 91 is an expense which evidently belongs to a non-BOI business, 
income from selling  and the expense of purchasing benzene 91 have to be combined 
together in a profit/loss calculation for a non-BOI business. The Revenue Department 
also ruled in Rev.Dept.Rul No: GorKor 0706/648 dated 25 January 2005 that a 
company operating both BOI and non-BOI-promoted businesses had to share expenses 
incurred from paying interest according to the proportion of the BOI-promoted business 
and non-BOI-promoted business.
788
  
 
The fact that the IPA 2001’s provisions regarding tax incentives for BOI-promoted 
companies are unclear has led to cases of serious uncertainty particularly when they 
were interpreted by the BOI. However, in practice, the Revenue Department can claim 
to have the power to interpret unclear provisions by maintaining that they follow 
Departmental Notification dated 5 February 1987. This issue will be discussed in more 
detail in the Minebea case analysis. 
 
The following summarised issues are presented to explain the relevant provisions 
regarding tax incentives offered under the IPA 2001 and their interpretation by the 
Revenue Department. The difficulties created by this issue will be analysed in the 
section 6.2, entitled ‘Problem Analyses’. 
6.1.2 Interpretation of ‘a CIT exemption on dividends’ under the IPA 2001, s.34 
According to Section 34 of the IPA 2001:  
 
Dividends derived from a BOI-promoted project, which is granted an 
exemption of CIT, shall be exempted from computation of taxable 
income throughout the period the BOI-promoted person receives the 
exemption of CIT. 
 
The tax calculation regarding this issue is also prescribed in the Departmental 
Notification dated 5 February 1987, which states that dividends that are granted a tax 
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exemption have to be paid and received within the exemption period before they would 
qualify for exemption. In addition, dividends have to be paid from the net profit of the 
BOI-promoted company. Where dividends are paid or received after the tax exemption 
period has expired, the dividend receiver is not entitled to the tax exemption. 
Concerning this matter, the Revenue Department ruled that the BOI-promoted 
company, entitled to a tax exemption for eight years, which ended on 2 September 
2004, paid two dividends, in November 2004 and June 2005, and the shareholders 
whom the dividends were paid were not entitled to tax exemption,
789
 because the 
dividends were paid after the end of the tax exemption period. It is evident that there are 
two different laws relating to the issue of tax exemption on dividends. The primary law, 
namely the IPA 2001, does not specify that the dividend which will be tax-exempt must 
be paid within the tax exemption period, which means that BOI-promoted companies 
have had to take the precaution of studying many laws and regulations in order to 
receive the benefits offered by the BOI. 
6.1.3 Interpretation of ‘a corporation tax rate reduction’ under the IPA 2001, 
s.35. 
According to Section 35 of the IPA 2001:  
 
The BOI has the power to grant a BOI-promoted person operating their 
project in locations or zones specified by the BOI a 50% reduction of 
the normal CIT rate on the net profit derived from the BOI-promoted 
project for a period of up to five years after the end of the exemption 
period. 
 
An example of the Revenue Department’s ruling on this issue is Rev.Dept.Rul. No: Gor 
Kor 0706/1357 dated 17 February 2006.  The BOI-promoted person in this ruling 
conducted both BOI-promoted and non-BOI-promoted activities. All of their BOI-
promoted activities had been granted tax exemption at different times. To be entitled to 
a 50% CIT reduction under section 31(1) of the IPA 2001, the BOI-promoted person 
has to calculate the net profit/loss of each project individually. However, the net 
profits/losses of both the BOI-promoted business and non-BOI-promoted business must 
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be combined together for tax purposes. After that, the tax reduction of 50% had to be 
applied. Another case regarding tax reduction is Rev.Dept.Rul. No. Gor Kor 0706/627, 
dated 12 July 2004. The Revenue Department commented that the ‘normal rate’ in this 
case meant the normal CIT rate which the company had to pay during a promoted 
period according to Section 35 (1), the IPA 2001. The company in this instance was 
entitled to a reduction rate of 25% of the net profit, and therefore, the ‘normal rate’ was 
this 25%. As a result, the company had to pay CIT at a rate of 12.5% of the net profit. 
 
The next issue is an interpretation of ‘expense deduction in excess of the correct rate’ 
under Section 35 of the IPA 2001. This provision provides that ‘the BOI can grant a 
BOI-promoted person operating the promoted project in certain locations or zones 
permission to deduct, for the purpose of CIT, an amount double the costs of 
transportation, electricity and water supply incurred in the operation of the project.’ The 
issue was raised by the BOI-promoted company that was uncertain as to whether the 
double deduction could be applied to expenses incurred in both the production plant and 
in the office. The Revenue Department ruled in Rev.Dept.Rul. No. Gor Kor 0706/1849 
dated 6 March 2006 that a BOI-promoted company producing electrical parts and 
appliances was able to deduct double expenses paid for electricity and water supplies 
incurred in both of these places.  
6.1.4 Interpretation of ‘a deduction of an amount equal to 5% of the increased 
income’ under the IPA 2001, 36 (4). 
Section 36 (4) of the IPA 2001 empowers the BOI to grant the BOI-promoted person 
permission to deduct from the income assessable for payment of CIT an amount equal 
to 5% of the increased income over the previous year. This is provided that the increase 
is derived from the export of products or commodities produced or assembled by the 
promoted person. The Revenue Department ruled on this issue, in Rev.Dept.Rul. No. 
Gor Kor 0802/12550 dated 20 July 1994, as follows: 
 
 A BOI-promoted person shall receive a promotion for a period 
specified in the certificate of BOI promotion and deem export income 
in the first accounting year to be a base year even if there was no export 
in any accounting year. The company cannot claim any deduction in the 
first or the base year, since there is no increased income over the 
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previous year. In the second and third years, the company has to 
compare export income with increased income over the previous year. 
From the fourth year to the tenth year, income for each year must not be 
less than the average of the previous three years. Only a deduction in 
accordance with this specific method can be taken from assessable 
income during a promoted period.  
 
It is evident that the provision of the IPA 2001 does not clearly state the method used to 
calculate ‘increased income’, which left the BOI-promoted companies in doubt and led 
to them seeking clarification from the Revenue Department. In addition, the Revenue 
Department Ruling is not, in fact, legally binding. 
6.1.5 Interpretation of ‘a withdrawal of the rights and benefits of CIT’ under the 
IPA 2001, s. 55/1. 
As specified under Section 55/1 of the IPA 2001, in cases where the BOI has withdrawn 
the rights and benefits of CIT, the BOI-promoted person should be treated as though 
they had not been entitled to the rights on the exemption or reduction of CIT for the 
accounting year in which such rights and benefits were withdrawn. Further, the BOI 
may withdraw rights and benefits concerning CIT and make the withdrawal retroactive 
to the financial year that the BOI-promoted person violated or failed to comply with the 
conditions stipulated by the BOI.  
 
In one ruling on this issue, the Revenue Department viewed that the BOI-promoted 
company’s right on CIT exemption ceased after the company transferred its business, 
including all the rights and licences, to another company. In this case, the BOI withdrew 
the certificate of promotion. However, the rights and benefits which were received 
before the certificate of BOI promotion was withdrawn were not affected.
790
 This also 
suggests that the IPA 2001’s provision specifying ‘the rights and benefits that the BOI-
promoted companies are entitled to be valid until the certificate of BOI promotion is 
withdrawn’ is unclear. 
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6.2 Problem Analyses  
Taking into account the above rulings of the Revenue Department, it is possible to 
conclude that potential ambiguity exists in the interpretation of tax incentive provisions 
under the IPA 2001, as there is uncertainty in interpretating the terms ‘income’, 
‘expenses’ and ‘the date income is first derived from a promoted project’, as well as the 
method of tax calculation, particularly where the calculation of net profit and loss is 
concerned. The problem becomes apparent when the scope of businesses exempt from 
taxation under the BOI promotion is examined. These businesses may be selling 
manufactured or semi-finished products, and under the BOI certificate are exempt from 
CIT.  
 
The fact that companies may operate BOI-promoted and non-BOI-promoted activities 
simultaneously, and that they may also operate more than one BOI-promoted activity at 
any one time, can also lead to difficulties in interpreting the legislation. Confusion 
arises because the BOI grants tax incentives and is in charge of establishing promotion 
criteria and approving promoted projects, whereas the Revenue Department takes 
charge of tax assessment for all businesses in the country, including the BOI-promoted 
businesses. The current situation can lead to confusion over which particular body holds 
authority over tax incentives. 
 
In practice, BOI-promoted businesses have to consult the BOI or the Revenue 
Department or both authorities regarding unclear terms or tax calculation under the 
provisions of the IPA 2001. This system is confusing because on the one hand the BOI 
is acting as an investment-promotion agent and grants incentives, both tax and non-tax 
oriented, as we learned from Chapters 4 and 5. On the other hand, the Revenue 
Department is the country’s primary revenue authority, and has claimed that they are 
following the guidelines set up by the Departmental Notification, dated 5 February 
1987. Adding to the problem is the issue of hierarchy of legislation, namely whether, in 
this case, the Departmental Notification dated 5 February 1987, issued through the 
Revenue Code, should be considered as secondary legislation. Where this is the case, it 
would rank below the IPA 2001 under the rule of hierarchy of law. This will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
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The next problem concerns the extended and complicated procedure involved in 
clarifying the law and in seeking an authority which has jurisdiction over tax incentives. 
The power of the BOI over tax incentive issues is, in practice, unclear, leaving many 
promoted companies in doubt whether to follow the instructions of the BOI as an 
authority which grants certificates of BOI promotion and fiscal and non-fiscal 
incentives through the IPA 2001, or the Revenue Department, as the authority which 
has power over taxation, including tax assessment and tax collection. It can be seen 
from the above mentioned cases that BOI-promoted companies often need to spend a 
good deal of time and money consulting both bodies, as well as employing legal or tax 
specialists to ensure that they are complying with all the laws and will not face fines 
from the Revenue Department at a later stage. However, memoranda provided by the 
BOI to BOI-promoted companies, and the Revenue Department rulings are not legally 
binding. Therefore, if taxpayers disagree with the Revenue Department’s ruling on a 
particular problem, they can go to court. This uncertainty, if left unchecked, could lead 
to both bodies losing credibility in the eyes of investors and could worsen Thailand’s 
investment climate, particularly as viewed by foreign investors. 
 
The possible differences between the two bodies in interpretation of profit/loss 
calculation may be rooted in the fact that they have different objectives. As explained 
previously in Chapter 4, the BOI aims to give incentives and promote investment, 
especially FDI, so it is not primarily concerned with the collection of tax revenue, as 
this is the Revenue Department’s responsibility. Interpreting tax provisions by the BOI 
therefore tends to be in favour of BOI-promoted companies, particularly with regard to 
a reduced tax burden as evident in the following section regarding the Minebea case. 
This problem can be considered a regulatory and bureaucratic impediment to 
investment. Adding to the problem is the issue of the unclear provisions of law. Under 
the current system, whereby tax incentives are provided by the BOI under the IPA 2001, 
problems have arisen because the wording of the Act omits certain details and 
explanations, most notably the definition of ‘income’ and calculations of profit/loss and 
expenses, as explained above.  
 
The problems discussed above were at the level of Revenue Rulings and did not reach 
the court. Nevertheless, there has been litigation in the famous Minebea case. 
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6.3 The Minebea Case 
6.3.1 Background to the Minebea case 
The dispute between the plaintiff NMB-Minebea Thai Ltd (‘Minebea’), and the 
defendant, the Revenue Department, is of significant importance.
791
 Minebea was 
founded in Thailand in 1980 as ‘NMB Thai Ltd’, a Japanese-owned manufacturer of 
miniature instrument ball bearings (used in information and telecommunication 
equipment such as personal computers, and household electrical appliances, such as 
videocassette recorders, video cameras and air conditioners, all of which have become 
essential to modern-day living). After an amalgamation of seven companies in 2008, the 
company became known as NMB-Minebea Thai Limited.
792
 The following is a 
summary of the case which will be followed by detailed case analysis.  
 
Minebea, a leading global supplier of high-precision mechanical and electronic 
components,
793
 had been granted a tax exemption by the BOI on many of its projects. 
The main issue of the case is that Minebea generated losses on some projects and profits 
on others, raising the question, which was taken by Minebea to the Central Tax Court, 
as to whether losses on one BOI-promoted project must be offset against profits on 
another BOI-promoted project in the same company. The Central Tax Court ruled, on 
13 October 2010, in favour of Minebea, with no requirement to offset losses against 
other BOI-promoted projects in the same company, as the Revenue Department 
claimed. The Revenue Department has since appealed to the Supreme Court, which has 
yet to reach a decision (as of 15 November 2011). The Revenue Department stands by 
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 See Thavorn Rujivanarom and Siripong Suppakijjanusorn, ‘State Council rules in favour of BOI?’ 
Bangkok Post Business (Bangkok, 21 April 2009) 
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 NMB Minebea Thailand, ‘History’ <http://www.minebea.co.th/history.html> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
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 NMB Minebea Thailand, ‘Profile of Minebea’ <http://www.minebea.co.th/profile.html> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
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its interpretation that a loss on one BOI-promoted project must be offset against the 
profit on another BOI-promoted project. 
 
In Thailand, unless the application is limited or specific treatment is required under the 
Revenue Code, the computation of a company’s net profits relies fundamentally on 
generally accepted accounting principles.
794
 According to Urapeepatanapong and 
Prasongprasit, what is recognised in the profit and loss account
795
 as income is likely 
also to be recognised as such for tax purposes. In addition, with the exception of certain 
specified types of businesses, a corporation is required to apply the accruals basis in 
order to recognise income for tax purposes.
796
 CIT is computed by taking into account 
all revenue arising from or in consequence of business carried on in an accounting 
period, and then deducting this revenue from all expenses, in accordance with 
conditions prescribed in Sections 65 (2) and 65 (3) of the Revenue Code. Companies are 
allowed to deduct any losses that they make from future profits from all sources for tax 
purposes. This so-called ‘loss carry forward’ is, in Thai tax law, limited to the next five 
tax years of the company.
797
 As one of the privileges under the IPA 2001, a BOI-
promoted company is entitled to deduct annual losses from the net profit accrued after 
its tax holiday has finished for a period of not more than five years from the expiry date 
of such period.
798
  
 
The problem arises when the promoted company operates more than one BOI-promoted 
project. The BOI, which is in charge of investment promotion and granting incentives 
according to the IPA 2001, is of the view that profits and losses from one BOI-
promoted project should not be offset against the other BOI-promoted projects for CIT 
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 Kitipong Urapeepatanapong and Rachanee Prasongprasit, ‘Relationship between Accounting and 
Taxation Principles’ (2002) Thailand, ASIA-PACIFIC Tax Bulletin, IBFD, May/June, 171.  
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purposes.
799
 Each BOI-promoted project is entitled to a privilege of ‘loss carried 
forward’, and therefore should be entitled to offset its own loss/profit. In this way, if the 
BOI-promoted project incurs significant loss, it is allowed to be carried forward for five 
years after the end of its tax holiday, without having been offset against other BOI-
promoted project(s) within the same BOI-promoted companies.  
This is, however, contrary to the opinion of the Revenue Department, which is 
continuing to review and assess the BOI-promoted companies by using another method 
of calculation, i.e. to offset one BOI project’s loss against another BOI project’s profit. 
Consequently, the BOI tax privilege on ‘loss carry forward’ did not apply as the BOI 
and investors, whom the BOI sought to encourage, had envisaged. In other words, the 
BOI-promoted companies cannot fully enjoy the privilege of ‘loss carry forward’.  
As noted in Chapter 5, many governments, including the Thai government, adopt a tax 
mechanism to allow investors who are making losses to carry forward these losses as 
thus minimise the effective tax rate. An interpretation of the calculation of net 
profits/losses by the Revenue Department would affect the tax status of the BOI-
promoted companies for both past and future transactions, and could result in many of 
these enterprises incurring penalties and surcharges, because companies with similar 
circumstances to Minebea’s, which either fail to file their tax returns or file returns 
containing inaccurate, false or inadequate information, are currently subject to 
penalties.
800
 Additionally, where companies do not comply with an order to pay the tax 
assessed, they are required to pay a penalty equal to twice the amount of tax due, as 
specified under Section 71 (2) of the Revenue Code.
801
 In addition to paying the fine, if 
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 The Board of Investment Memoranda Aor Gor 0901/Nor Tor/000820 dated 12 November 2007, Aor 
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 RC, s 71 States: In the case where: 
(1) a company or juristic partnership does not file particulars necessary for tax calculation under 
the provisions of this Part or does not keep a book of account or does not follow requirements prescribed 
under Sections 17 and 68 (2) or does not bring books of account, documents or other evidence to an 
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official shall have the power to assess by comparing with the gross amount of the previous accounting 
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the companies fail to pay tax within the time limit, they have to ‘pay a surcharge of 
1.5% per month or part of a month of an amount of tax payable’.802 Thus, legal 
challenges against the Revenue Department’s stance are currently under way. The BOI 
has also decided to begin an investigation into the problem in order to find a solution 
and to regain investor confidence.
 803
  
6.3.2 The Board of Investment Perspective 
According to Section 31 of the IPA 1977, as amended by the IPA 2001 (No.3), 
promoted persons are entitled to offset an annual loss incurred during a tax exemption 
period against net profits after the end of the tax exemption period. The BOI set up this 
calculation method for cases where BOI-promoted companies carry on more than one 
BOI-promoted project. The BOI issued corresponding memoranda in order to answer 
queries from BOI-promoted companies, and to set guidelines for companies operating 
several promoted activities to comply with accordingly. Examples of these memoranda 
are Aor Gor 0901/Nor Tor/000820 dated 12 November 2007, Aor Gor/Nor Tor/000821 
dated 12 November 2007 and Aor Gor 0901/000888 dated 14 November 2006. 
According to these memoranda, if one project has a net profit and another project has a 
net loss in the same year, it is not necessary for the BOI-promoted company to offset the 
net loss of one BOI project against the net profit of the other. The BOI is of the view 
that the net profit of a BOI-promoted project which is entitled to tax exemption should 
be exempt without having to be first deducted from the losses of promoted activities.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
period. If the amount of the previous accounting period cannot be determined, he shall assess as he deems 
appropriate. 
(2) If any company or juristic partnership does not record particulars or records incompletely or 
does not record accurately within an account as prescribed under Sections 17 and 68 (2) resulting in 
paying no tax or less tax, an assessment official shall have the power to assess missing tax at the rate 
specified in Section 67 and may order that person to pay surcharge of two times of the amount of missing 
tax. 
 
802
 RC, s 27. 
803
 See Thailand Board of Investment, ‘BOI Policies’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/about/boi_policies.asp> accessed 10 November 2011. 
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The BOI’s interpretation can be illustrated as follows: promoted activities that are 
located in Zone 3
804
 are granted tax exemption for eight years starting from the date 
income is first derived from such activities, and annual losses incurred during year 1 
through to year 8 can be deducted from net profits between year 9 and year 13. The 
promoted business may choose to deduct such losses from the net profit of any one year 
or of several years. In practice, the decision is based on annual losses incurred from year 
1 to year 8, which are carried forward to year 9, and net profits accumulated from year 
9. If a net loss is greater than a net profit, the net loss will be carried forward to year 10. 
Accordingly, the privilege of loss carry forward to be utilised after the end of the tax 
exemption period under the IPA 2001 Section 31 circumvents the general rule specified 
by Section 65 (3) (12) of the Revenue Code, which states that:  
The following items shall not be allowed as expenses in the calculation 
of net profits… 
(12) Damages claimable from an insurance or other protection contracts 
or loss from previous accounting periods except net loss carried 
forward for five years up to the present accounting period… 
As a result, it is not compulsory for the BOI-promoted companies to offset losses 
against profits, as one BOI-promoted project may use the privilege of loss carry forward 
for a longer period than another BOI-promoted project’s period. This is possible 
because each BOI-promoted project may be entitled to different amounts of tax-exempt 
years (such as three or five years). Another reason is that offsetting losses against every 
project, each year, can reduce the benefit of the loss carry forward as an incentive. The 
policy of granting incentives to each project is also supported by BOI Announcements 
Nos. 1/2526 (1983), 1/2536 (1993), Subject: Policies and Criteria for BOI Promotion
805
, 
and 1/2543 (2000), Subject: Type, Size and Condition for Promotion, which indicate 
that the BOI has authority to approve each project in accordance with the specified 
criteria. 
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The BOI has taken the view (as can be seen from the legal opinion of the Council of 
State Aor Gor 0901/Gor Mor/000026 dated 19 January 2009) that the IPA 2001 is 
applicable to this issue regarding profit/loss calculation, because the IPA 2001 is a 
special law while the Revenue Code is a general one.
806
 Therefore, the criteria and 
enforcement stipulated in the IPA 2001 should be construed to maintain the spirit of the 
special law. Consequently, the BOI views that there is no requirement to consolidate the 
loss and profit of the BOI-promoted projects for the loss carry forward rule.
807
 
6.3.3 The Revenue Department and the Board of Taxation Perspective  
In practice, the Revenue Department applies Section 65 of the Revenue Code in 
calculating net taxable profits. This provision, as a general rule, considers one taxpayer 
as one tax unit. However, the Revenue Department issued an essential notification, 
Departmental Notification dated 5 February 1987, regarding the calculation of net 
profit/loss for BOI-promoted companies and juristic partnerships Clause 4.1 (a) 
‘‘Annual Loss’, according to the Departmental Notification means annual loss without 
deducting from annual profit accruing during a tax-exempt period, as specified by 
Section 65 (3) (12) of the Revenue Code.’ Department Notification dated 5 February of 
1987 also provided broad guidelines for BOI taxpayers to calculate their net profit/loss 
for CIT purposes. Clause 4.2 (a) of the Notification provides that ‘if a BOI-promoted 
project shows net losses and a non-BOI-promoted project shows net profit, the BOI-
promoted person is entitled to deduct the net loss of BOI-promoted projects from the net 
profit of non-BOI-promoted projects.’ This was supported by Rev.Dept.Rul. No. Gor 
Kor 0802/13731 dated 27 July 1993 in which the Revenue Department stated that the 
net profits/losses of a BOI-promoted project should be calculated individually. 
 
In addition, if a tax-exempt BOI-promoted project suffers a net loss, such a loss could 
be offset against the net profit of a non BOI-promoted business without having to first 
offset the net profit against a tax-exempt BOI-promoted project. The same practice was 
confirmed in the Board of Taxation ruling No. 35/2540 (1997) regarding the calculation 
of net loss from BOI-promoted businesses dated 9 June 1997. This board, as explained 
in Chapter 3, is a tax review body made up of officials from the Ministries of Finance, 
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Revenue, Customs, Excise, Fiscal Policy and Council of State. The Board of Taxation 
in this ruling held the view that annual loss should be deducted from net profit within 
five years from the expiration of the tax holiday period, and it was not necessary to 
deduct from annual net profit accrued during the tax exemption period.
808
 
It is important to note that in 2005, the Revenue Department started to change its 
interpretation and method regarding the calculation of net losses from BOI-promoted 
businesses. It published Rev.Dept.Rul. No. GorKor 0706/ (GorMor.03) /408 dated 17
 
May 2005, a ruling which changed the calculation method of net losses for BOI-
promoted businesses with CIT exemption, overriding the Departmental Notification 
dated 5 February 1987. The 2005 ruling viewed all tax-exempt BOI projects as a single 
project and required a BOI-promoted company with two or more tax-exempt projects to 
offset the net profit/loss among different BOI-promoted projects of the same BOI-
promoted companies. As such, only net loss from all projects would be allowed to be 
offset against net profit from non BOI-promoted projects.  
 
Nonetheless, this contradicted its previous ruling from 1993, which provided that the 
net loss of a tax-exempt BOI-promoted project can immediately be offset against net 
profits from a non-BOI-promoted business.
809
 To confirm its position, the Revenue 
Department also issued a response letter to the BOI: No. GorKor 0725/12101, dated 11 
December 2007, regarding a calculation of annual losses of businesses that have more 
than one BOI-promoted project. The Revenue Department set the rule that businesses 
with more than one BOI-promoted project have to calculate annual loss by offsetting 
losses during an exemption period against the net profit of every BOI-promoted project 
in the same accounting period. In a case where there is any remaining annual loss, it can 
be offset against net profits accruing within five years after expiration of the tax 
exemption.
810
  
 
In 2009, the Board of Taxation issued a Ruling No. 38/2552 dated 13 February 2009 
concerning corporation tax and the offsetting of losses against a net profit after 
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expiration of the tax exemption period. In this Ruling, the Board of Taxation agreed 
with the Revenue Department’s interpretation of the one entity concept for all BOI-
promoted projects. Where the business operated more than one BOI-promoted project, 
the company had to combine the net profit and net loss incurred under all projects into 
one amount of profit or loss. If the net amount was a loss, the company could carry 
forward any net loss incurred during the tax exempt period for it to be deducted as 
expenditure from net profit incurred for five years after the tax exemption expired. BOI-
promoted business could choose to offset such loss against net profit of any one or 
several years.
811
  
6.3.4 The Opinion of the Council of State 
The BOI sought the legal opinion of the Council of State on this matter. (Aor Gor 
0901/Gor Mor/000026 dated 19
 
January 2009). Previously, the Council of State had 
commented, based on the precedent of a decision made in 1987
812
 (Council of State No. 
197/2530, (1987), that the BOI-promoted persons are eligible to offset not only net loss 
which exceeds net profit, but also annual loss (during the exemption period) against net 
profit (after the expiry of the exemption period). This interpretation is in line with 
Section 31, paragraph four of the IPA 2001, which states that a loss which has been 
incurred during a tax exemption period can be deducted from the net profits accrued 
after the expiration of the tax exemption period.  
 
In Opinion of the Council of State No. 158/2552 (2009), the Council of State 
(Legislative Committee 5) considered the issue with a representative of the Ministry of 
Finance (the Revenue Department) and a representative of the Ministry of Industry (the 
Board of Investment), who presented facts and supporting documents. In this case, 
when businesses have more than one promoted project, tax exemption for each project 
can last for a different period of time. In addition, a tax exemption period will start from 
the day the business receives its first income from a promoted project. BOI-promoted 
businesses are required to prepare profit and loss accounts separately from other 
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activities for the purpose of profit and loss calculation under Section 31 of the IPA 
2001.  
 
The Council of State considered two issues which were raised by the BOI. The first 
concerned the meaning of the term ‘annual losses’ as well as the calculation of the loss. 
The second issue concerned the question of which authority has the power to interpret 
the IPA 2001. The Council of State offered the opinion that the IPA 2001, being a 
special law on tax incentives, should prevail over the Revenue Code, a general law on 
taxation.
813
 
 
In addition, paragraphs one and two of Section 31 of the IPA 2001 specify that a BOI-
promoted person shall be granted CIT exemption on the net profit derived from the 
BOI-promoted project for a period of time. Paragraph four of Section 31 of the IPA 
2001 states that where a loss has been incurred while receiving tax exemption (referred 
to in paragraphs one and two), the board may grant permission to BOI-promoted person 
to carry over the loss and offset it against the net profit accruing after the exemption 
period, for a period of five years. This provision is designed to give tax exemption for 
the net profit or to deduct annual losses from the net profit once the tax exemption 
expires, because BOI-promoted persons operate businesses that are considered by the 
BOI as significant activities for Thailand. The IPA 2001, as a special law, therefore 
prevails over the Revenue Code. This idea is also supported by the opinions of the 
Council of State (the general meeting) Nos. 403/2544 (2001) and 209/2551 (2008). 
According to which, in a case where special law stipulates special taxation methods, the 
Customs Tariff Act B.E. 2530 (1987), as a general law, shall not be applicable. If we 
apply the same reasoning, the Revenue Code, as a general tax law, should not be 
applicable in this case. In order for someone to gain BOI-promoted status, the BOI 
considers the application as prescribed in Section 17 under the IPA 2001.  
 
Furthermore, the BOI has to consider whether investment projects are economically and 
technologically sound, in accordance with Sections 18 and 20 under the IPA 2001. The 
tax exemption period of each project can be different. Moreover, paragraph four of 
Section 31 under the IPA 2001 allows the setting-off of an annual loss during the tax 
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exemption period against net profit within five years after expiration of the tax 
exemption period. The BOI-promoted person may choose to offset such a loss against 
the net profit of any one year or several years, which demonstrates the spirit of the IPA 
2001 in calculating the annual loss on individual projects. The Council of State, 
therefore, was of the view that the annual loss calculation method proffered by the BOI 
should be applicable. It is evident from the opinion of the Council of State that a BOI-
promoted company’s annual loss should be calculated according to BOI practices. In 
light of this, the problem of an authority of interpretation is solved; inasmuch that the 
BOI’s interpretation of the IPA 2001 should prevail. 
 
6.4 The Central Tax Court Judgment: Red- Number Case No. 190/2553 NMB-
Minebea Thai Ltd v the Thai Revenue Department 
The following are the claims of the plaintiff and the defendant in the Minebea case.
814
 
6.4.1 The Plaintiff’s Claims 
The plaintiff disagreed with the assessment by the Revenue Department and the Board 
of Appeal’s decision. The plaintiff was granted an investment promotion certificate and 
incentives by the BOI in accordance with the IPA 2001, which is a special law 
specifying that the BOI can consider, under its own criteria, whether to grant a 
promotion to a specific company. Therefore, the company should be, by law, entitled to 
the privilege of loss carry forward. 
 
The plaintiff argued that the Revenue Department had changed its opinion and practice 
regarding the meaning of ‘annual loss’ and its calculation under Section 31 of the IPA 
2001. Therefore, in the view of the plaintiff, the Revenue Department‘s practice and 
opinion were uncertain and had been changed over the time 
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The plaintiff also argued that the profits and losses of each project should not be offset 
because each project was promoted separately by the BOI and was entitled to different 
incentives with different periods of promotion. In addition, the plaintiff was required to 
prepare a separate financial statement for each project. In the opinion of the Revenue 
Department, the calculation, which combined the net profits/losses of every project, 
could lead to a mix-up of all profits and losses, making it impossible to distinguish 
which net profit belonged to which project. 
 
The plaintiff offered the following table of the respondent’s calculations, claiming them 
to be invalid. 
Table 1 Plaintiff illustration of the profit/loss calculation by the Revenue 
Department. 
Year 
Project 
Total 
Deduct loss 
(S. 31 Para 4) 
Remarks 
A B C 
Years of Tax Exemption 
5 3 3 
1 - 400 - 300 + 200 - 500   
2 + 100 + 200 + 400 + 700 - 
Entitled for tax exemption for profit 
of Project A,B,C 
3 + 100 + 100 + 200 + 400 - 
Entitled for tax exemption for profit 
Project A,B,C 
4 - 200 + 100 + 200 + 100 - 100 Loss - 400 
5 + 100 + 200 - 200 + 100 - 
Entitled for tax exemption for profit 
of Project A 
6 + 500 - 200 - 300 0 -  
7 + 300 - 100 - 150 + 50 - 50 Loss - 350 
8 + 300 - 100 - 100 + 100 - 100 Loss - 350 
9 + 300 - 100 + 50 + 250 - 250 
Impossible to identify to which 
project loss belongs. 
Note: Values are not true. They are created by the plaintiff for illustrative purposes. 
Source: Adapted from The Central Tax Court Judgment: Red- Number Case No. 190/2553 NMB-Minebea 
Thai Ltd v the Thai Revenue Department rendered on13 October 2010. 
 
 
From this table, it becomes apparent that the company lost 500 in year 1, which was 
used in years 4, 7 and 8, without it being clear which amount belonged to which project. 
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In year 1, Project A actually lost 400, and Project B lost 300. The defendant’s 
interpretation calculated the loss at only 500, making it impossible to identify which 
losses belonged to Project A or Project B, or how much.  
 
In year 9, it is unclear whether the loss of 250 belongs to Project A or B. If it belongs to 
Project B, the company cannot use it in accordance with Section 31, Paragraph 4 of the 
IPA 2001 because the project was granted exemption from CIT for only three years. By 
the ninth year, the five-year period after the expiry of the exemption, within which the 
loss could be used, had itself expired. If the loss belonged to Project A, the company 
could use it in accordance with the terms of the IPA 2001. From the above illustration, 
Project A was granted five years’ CIT exemption and could use the benefit of loss 
carry-forward until year 10.  
 
This illustration presents an objective of the IPA 2001 – to consider each project and 
grant tax incentives individually according to the company’s circumstances. As such, a 
project making profit benefits from tax exemption, whilst one incurring a loss has the 
benefit of loss carry-forward. From this, we can deduce that the BOI’s interpretation of 
the provisions of law takes precedent over that of the Revenue Department.  
 
The plaintiff also requested the court to order the Revenue Department to refund VAT 
that was wrongfully offset against the tax liability under the assessment, together with 
interest of 1% per month since the date of the offset. This matter, however, is not the 
focus of this thesis, and this part of the claim will not be discussed further. 
6.4.2 The Revenue Department (respondent)’s claims 
The Revenue Department had calculated the loss to be carried forward and claimed that 
Minebea should pay the CIT together with an accounting surcharge for the years 1997, 
1998 and 1999. Minebea had been granted two or more BOI promotion certificates, so 
was required to combine the net profit and loss incurred under both into one amount. If 
this combined amount resulted in a net profit, the company would have been exempt 
from CIT; if it resulted in a loss, though, they could carry it forward and deduct it from 
net profit at any point during the five years after the expiry of the tax-exempt period.  
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However, if a company had been granted two or more certificates of BOI promotion, 
with one certificate valid for total exemption from income tax and another certificate 
only for a 50% reduction (for not more than five years from the expiry of the exemption 
period), then it could use any net loss incurred from exempt business operations as 
deductible expenditure from net profit under the 50% reduction of income tax privilege. 
Should there be any remaining net loss, it would be used as a deduction against net 
profit of non-tax-exempt business operations. 
 
The Revenue Department applied Section 65 of the Revenue Code in calculating the 
taxpayer’s net taxable profit. Section 65 considers one taxpayer as one tax unit, so the 
net taxable profit or loss derived by one taxpayer from more than one BOI-promoted 
project must be combined first, before it is offset against taxable profit from any non-
BOI-promoted activity and taxed as one tax unit. The Revenue Department claimed that 
Section 31, Paragraph one of the IPA specifies that ‘the promoted person shall be 
granted exemption of the CIT on the net profit derived from the promoted project’. The 
Revenue Department further viewed that the terms ‘net profit’ and ‘net loss’, however, 
are not defined under the IPA, and so they have to be defined in accordance with 
Section 65.
815
  
The Revenue Department also used its Notification dated 5 February 1987 (regarding 
the calculation of net profit and loss for BOI-promoted and non-BOI-promoted projects) 
to state that the profits and losses of such projects should be calculated separately. On 
13 February 2009, the Board of Taxation issued Ruling No.38, which agreed with the 
Revenue Department’s interpretation. According to the Board of Taxation’s view, 
Section 31 of the IPA 2001 grants exemption from CIT on the net profit derived from 
any BOI-promoted project. In their view, this law is applicable to every separate BOI-
promoted project that a company might have. Therefore, the ‘one entity’ concept for all 
BOI-promoted projects has to be applied when companies operate more than one BOI-
promoted project.  
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For example, a company can combine the profit from BOI-promoted and non-BOI-
promoted projects to calculate the net profit for the payment of CIT, which suggests that 
the net profit and loss of all BOI-promoted projects must be combined first, before they 
are combined again, with the profits and losses from non-BOI-promoted projects.  
6.4.3 The Central Tax Court’s Decision 
On 13 October 2010 the Central Tax Court passed judgment on the issue of whether the 
loss from one or more BOI-promoted projects has to be offset against the profits of 
other BOI-promoted projects.  
 
The court, agreeing with the BOI’s opinion, ruled that the IPA 2001 is a special law and 
is applicable only to taxpayers who are granted BOI privileges, hence overriding the 
Revenue Code, which is a general law and is applicable to all taxpayers. The court also 
ruled that the profit calculation, as prescribed in Revenue Code Section 65 paragraph 
one, stating the obligation of a company to combine all net profit/loss of all activities, is 
for a general situation, where there are no laws providing specific rules. This was the 
opinion of The Central Tax Court Decision: Red- Number Case No. 190/2553 NMB-
Minebea Thai Ltd) v the Thai Revenue Department. 
 
The important question to be considered is whether Section 31 of the IPA 2001 provides 
a specific rule in profit/loss calculation which differs from the rules set in Revenue 
Code, Section 65 paragraph one. In addition, the IPA 2001 was drafted with the aim of 
meeting Thailand’s specific requirements, such as investment stimulation, increased 
employment, increased income and more even income distribution, through the offer of 
incentives to specific investments, as described in Chapter 4. The BOI was set up as a 
government agency to support investment and provide an increased level of 
convenience in operating businesses in Thailand, and it has the power to decide on 
incentives, including tax incentives, in accordance with Section 31 of the IPA 2001.  
 
The court in this judgment referred to Sections 16
816
 and 19
817
 of the IPA 2001, which 
empower the BOI to consider the type and size of the entity to be granted for privileges 
                                                          
816
IPA 2001, s16, ‘The activities which are eligible for investment promotion by the Board are ‘those 
which are important and beneficial to the economic and social development, and security of the country, 
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and conditions. It indicated that the BOI has the power over whether or not to grant the 
privileges, including tax incentives. In addition, the court ruled that the IPA 2001 is 
intended to exempt the promoted person from CIT on a project by project basis, as 
opposed to combining the projects, because each promotion certificate is granted by the 
BOI under different conditions and periods of time.  
 
Consequently, the court decided that the Revenue Department’s assessment (that a BOI-
promoted business must offset one project’s loss against the profits of other projects in 
the same accounting period for the purposes of tax calculations) was not legally valid. 
In other words, a company which was granted BOI tax privileges for more than one 
project is eligible to calculate taxable profit and loss on each individual project 
separately.  
 
The court was of the opinion that Section 31 of the IPA 2001 is not clear on the 
direction and method of calculating profits for BOI-promoted projects that are eligible 
for tax exception. The Central Tax Court in this case adopted the concept of ‘intention 
of legislature’, which conveys the concept of purpose and objective (or spirit) of the 
IPA 2001, in order to give tax exemption to promote investment. The court also held 
that if there appears to be any doubt or ambiguity, the case will be resolved in favour of 
the party who would be liable to the penalty,
818
 as outlined in Section 11 of the Civil 
and Commercial Code, in order to prevent potentially innocent parties from being fined 
                                                                                                                                                                          
activities which involve production for export, activities which have high content of capital, labour or 
service or activities which utilise agricultural produce or natural resources as raw materials, provided that 
in the opinion of the Board, they are non-existent in the Kingdom, or existent but inadequate, or use out-
of-date production processes.  
The Board shall make an announcement designating the types and sizes of investment project 
eligible for promotion and may stipulate there in the conditions under which promotion is to be granted 
and may amend or abolish those conditions at any time. 
In the case where the Board is of the opinion that any project announced to be eligible for 
promotion under paragraph two no longer requires to be promoted, it may announce a temporary or 
permanent cancellation of promotion for that project’ 
 
817
 IPA 2001, s 19: ‘The investment project to which the Board may grant promotion shall be one which 
incorporates appropriate measures for the prevention and control of harmful effects to the quality of the 
environment in the interest of the common good of the general living of the public and for the 
perpetuation of mankind and nature’. 
818
 This can be compared with the Thai Supreme Court Decision No. 1908/2538 (1995) where the court 
held that ‘the Revenue Code is public law which stipulates duties and relationships between individuals 
and the state and organs of state. The Revenue Code affects individual rights and property rights, hence, it 
has to be strictly constructed in the way not increase burdens or affect the rights of the taxpayers’ (in 
Thai).  
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unfairly when there is an element of uncertainty. Accordingly, the tax provision in this 
case favoured Minebea. The interpretation of tax law will be discussed further in the 
next chapter. 
 
In addition, the view of the court was that paying tax is a citizen’s duty. With respect to 
tax obligations, the taxpayer is deemed to be a debtor and the state a creditor. Although 
tax legislation is categorised as a public law which regulates the relationships between 
individuals (and organisations) and the state and its organs, under some circumstances 
the principle and provision of private law must be used in order to interpret specific 
cases.
819
 Consequently, the power of public finance belongs to the government, and tax 
legislation is therefore a public law. The court in this case held the application of 
Section 11 of the Civil and Commercial Code, which is a private law, in order to rule 
that the interpretation should be made in favour of Minebea – the party that would be 
liable to the penalty. The Revenue Department was ordered to return the offset amount 
to Minebea.  
 
In addition, despite the fact that it ruled in favour of Minebea, the court suggested that, 
since the granting of tax incentives entails the loss of public revenue, it should be 
considered a ‘tax expenditure’ according to Article 167 paragraph 1 of the Constitution 
of Thailand
820
. It is necessary, therefore, for the BOI, when assessing the allocation of 
tax incentives, to consider whether or not the project’s anticipated benefits to the 
economy and society are worth the loss of public revenue. 
 
The court held that the provisions on tax incentives should be specified in the body of 
revenue law, since the IPA 2001 itself is not a revenue law, and is not administered by 
the revenue authorities. The BOI’s practice of granting tax incentives independently 
from the Ministry of Finance is flawed, since the BOI tends not to take into account the 
                                                          
819
 John F. McEldowney, Public Law (3
rd
 edn Sweet & Maxwell Limited 2001) 6.  
820Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 167: ‘The submission of annual appropriations bill for the fiscal year 
shall, for the sake of consideration, clearly contain accompanying documents which shall include the 
details of the estimated revenues, objectives, activities, plans, projects of each item of expenditure as well 
as shall demonstrate the monetary and financial status of the country relating to the overall of economic 
circumstance resulting from expenditure and the provisions of income, interest and missing income out of 
individual exclusion of various taxes, the necessity of the submission of binding budget for the next fiscal 
year, debt burden and debt incurred by State and financial status of State enterprise in the year such 
budget is to be approved and the last fiscal year.’ 
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potential loss of revenue, which is otherwise an important consideration for the Ministry 
of Finance.  
6.5 Analysis of the Minebea Case  
Section 31 of the IPA 2001 gave the BOI the authority to allow BOI-promoted persons 
the right to deduct an annual loss, provided that it had been incurred during the period 
of promotion (for valid activities), against net profits accrued for no more than five 
years after the end of tax exemption. This differs from the provisions of Section 65 (3) 
(12) of the Revenue Code (see Appendix 4), according to which losses from the 
previous accounting periods may be carried forward for five accounting periods to be 
offset against future profits from all sources.
821
  
 
Section 65 (3) (12) of the Revenue Code is a general rule of loss carry forward which 
applies to all companies and partnerships. As stated by Siriwan, this section allows net 
losses brought forward from accounting periods no longer than five years preceding the 
current accounting period for the purpose of computing the net profits of general 
companies that are not promoted by the BOI.
822
 According to this rule (a) a net loss has 
to be calculated in accordance with Section 65 (2) and 65 (3); (b) a net loss must be 
brought forward from accounting periods no longer than five years preceding the 
current accounting period and (c) a net loss from the preceding accounting period must 
be carried forward to offset against the net profit of the first profitable accounting 
period. After that, a net loss (if any) can be used to offset against the net profits of the 
following accounting periods for no more than five years.
823
  
 
Company A., after beginning business, has net loss/profit after complying with the 
Revenue Code Sections 65(2) and 65(3) as follows.  
 
                                                          
821
 RC, s 65 (3) (12) :‘For the purpose of computing net profits, none of the following items shall be 
allowed as expenses:(12) Any damage recoverable under an insurance or contract of indemnity or the net 
losses incurred in preceding accounting periods except the net losses brought forward from accounting 
periods no longer than five years preceding the current accounting period.’ 
 
822
 Yupadee Siriwan,Tax Accounting (Champa Printing 2009) 8-11, 8-12 (in Thai). 
823
 Paijitr Rojanavanij, Choomporn Sansai and Saroch Thongprakam, Taxation (Sayamcharoenpanich Ltd 
2006) 2-162 (in Thai) and Siriwan (n 822). 
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Table 2. Illustration explaining the loss carry forward rule according to the 
Revenue Code, s 65 (3) (12).  
 
 
 
Note: Values (in thousand GBP) are for illustrative purposes only. The accounting years have been 
changed by the researcher. 
Source: Adapted from Rojanavanij, Sansai & Thongprakam, Taxation, Sayamcharoenpanich Ltd, 
Bangkok, 2006, p.2/163 (in Thai). 
(1) The net loss of 200 for the year 2001 can be considered for offsetting during five 
consecutive accounting periods (2002-2006). During the periods of 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005 and 2006, we see profits of 50, 20, 50, and 30, respectively. The total is 150. 
Therefore, the net loss of 200 in 2001 can be offset against the net profit of 150, leaving 
no profit on which Company A must pay tax (in 2006). The remaining loss of 50, 
however, cannot be carried forward in 2007, since this is more than five years since the 
expiry of the incentive as allowed by Section 65 (3) (12). 
 
(2) The net loss of 180 for the 2004 can be carried forward to 2007 since it is not more 
than five years from the expiry of the incentive. There is no need to offset this loss of 
180 against the net loss from 2005 and 2006 because those net profits were offset 
against 2001. Hence, the net loss of 2004 can be offset against the net profit of 200 in 
2007, so the company has to pay tax on this net profit of 20 in 2007. 
 
Accounting 
Period 
Profit 
Net 
Loss 
2001 - 200 
2002 50 - 
2003 20 - 
2004 - 180 
2005 50 - 
2006 30 - 
2007 200 - 
2008 - 60 
2009 40 - 
2010 - 70 
2011 130 - 
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(3) The net loss of 60 in 2008 can be carried forward to be offset against the net profit 
of 40 in 2009. There is no tax payment for 2009, and the net loss of 20 can be carried 
forward in the following accounting periods. 
 
(4) The net loss of 70 in 2010 can be offset against the net profit of 130 in 2011. Also, 
the net loss of 20 in 2008 can be deducted, in addition to the net loss of 70. Hence, there 
is a net profit of 40 left in 2011 and Company A has to pay CIT on this amount. 
Loss carry forward and offsetting have to be in sequence with the first profitable 
accounting period. The Supreme Court Decision 3185/2522 (1979) held that ‘loss 
carried forward’ no more than five years preceding the current accounting period means 
carried forward according to accounting standard every year until the year which first 
shows a net profit. The remaining losses can be carried forward to offset against the 
following years (if there is any profit). This is in contrast with Section 31, Paragraph 
four of the IPA 2001, according to which the promoted companies may choose to 
deduct losses from the net profits of any one year or several years. This contradiction 
makes it evident that the IPA 2001’s provision on tax incentives is unclear and must be 
amended to specify the method of calculations.  
 
The first issue to be determined is which law should be applicable in this dispute – the 
IPA 2001 or the Revenue Code, Section 65 plus the Notification of the Revenue 
Department (5 February B.E. 2530 (1987). The principles relating to the resolution of 
such conflicts (lex superior, lex priori and lex specialis) will be discussed in the 
following chapter. In order to establish that the IPA is a specific law, as is the view of 
the BOI and Council of State, a comparison can be drawn with the opinion of the 
Council of State No. 209/2551 (2008) Re: Value Added Tax on shipments from one 
export processing zone
824
 to another export processing zone. In this case, the Council of 
State stated that the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand Act of 1979 is a special law 
which specifies special tax collection; the Revenue Code, as a general law, is therefore 
                                                          
824
 ‘Export Processing Zone’ means ‘an area designated for industrial activities, trading or services or 
other activities beneficial to or connected with industrial activities, trading or services for the purpose of 
exporting products’. The Customs Department of the Kingdom of Thailand 
<http://www.customs.go.th/Customs-Eng/EPZ/EPZ.jsp?menuNme=FreeZone> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
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not superseded. This issue is considered in the next chapter regarding ‘Norm Conflict 
Resolutions’. 
The recommendation of this thesis is that where there is uncertainty in the interpretation 
or implementation of the IPA 2001, the BOI should be entitled to give a preliminary 
elucidation. This is aimed at achieving a uniformity of understanding and avoiding 
doubts among potential investors who consider the BOI as an investment agency 
responsible for all aspects of investment. In practice, the BOI has written to promoted 
companies to clarify the procedures regarding investment. With regard to the Minebea 
case, the BOI received complaints from BOI-promoted companies that the Revenue 
Department had interpreted and issued its rule regarding a calculation of the ‘annual 
losses’ for BOI-promoted persons who have more than one BOI-promoted project. 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the appropriate authority on tax incentives is evident from 
the confused response and relationship between both the BOI and Revenue Department 
and investors. Letters and memoranda written by the BOI to investors provide 
information that contradicts the Revenue Department’s position, whereby the BOI 
argues that tax assessment should be separated for two or more BOI-promoted projects, 
and the BOI-promoted persons should be entitled to the benefit of ‘loss carry forward’ 
over several years up to a maximum of five years. However, the Revenue Department 
still holds the view that the tax authority, rather than the investment promotion 
authority, should hold authority over tax privileges, which in this case means that profits 
and losses occurring in the same accounting period should be consolidated. This 
incident shows the ambiguity of tax administration. Investors can be granted tax 
incentives by the BOI under the IPA 2001, but will be assessed to pay taxes by the 
Revenue Department. Under this system, it is not necessarily clear whether investors 
will receive the incentives guaranteed by the BOI, so they may have to consider extra 
tax planning to guarantee their entitlement to tax incentives, which consequently could 
increase the overall cost of operating businesses in Thailand.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, investors may be discouraged from investment if the cost of 
law, administrative procedures, competent legal and tax advice and the cost of 
enforcement, through litigation or other forms of dispute resolution, are significant and 
unpredictable. The worst case scenario is the loss of current or prospective investors’ 
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confidence in doing business in Thailand, as well as their consideration of other better 
administrated countries as investment destinations. A number of companies have 
attracted the attention of the Revenue Department for their calculations of net profit and 
loss.
825
 For instance, an American food producing company was suddenly assessed by 
the Revenue Deprtment and made to pay tax of approximately GBP 20 million. The 
company, however, did not appeal to the court but rather expressed its consideration to 
relocate its business to another country.
826
  
It is evident from the Minebea Case, in which a value added tax refund was retained by 
the Revenue Department as a means of guarantee for the tax payment during the appeal 
procedure, that companies are not then able to receive the cash refunded from the 
Revenue Department in order to operate their businesses. Regarding the appeal process, 
where the appellant has the approval of the Director-General to defer payment pending 
the judgement of the Court, the payment must be made within the period of 30 days 
from the result of the court’s final decision.827 In the Minebea case, the assessment 
official initially refused to refund VAT to Minebea for the period of the appeal 
procedure. The Central Tax Court stated that the Revenue Code does not contain a 
provision allowing the Revenue Department to offset the VAT that was due to be 
refunded to Minebea against the amount of CIT that the company was claimed to be 
paid. The court applied Section 344 of the Civil and Commercial Code
828
 and ruled that, 
as this case was still under appeal and the VAT was not to be offset against the tax 
liability under the assessment in this case, the Revenue Department must return the 
offset amount to Minebea, together with interest of 1% per month since the date of the 
offset.
829
 
                                                          
825
 Prachachat Online News, ‘Prime minister decides the conflict between the BOI and the Revenue 
Department, requesting an opinion of the Council of State on double tax collections’ 19 November 2009, 
Year 33, vol. 4159 
<www.prachachat.net/view_news.php?newsid=02p0102191152&sectionid=0201~&day=2009-11-19> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
826
 Ibid. 
827
 RC, s 31. 
828
 CCC, s 344. A claim against which there is a defence may not be set-off. Prescription does not exclude 
set-off, if the claim barred by prescription was not barred at the time at which it could have been set-off 
against the other claim. 
829
 The Central Tax Court Judgment: Red- Number Case No. 190/2553 NMB-Minebea Thai Ltd v the 
Thai Revenue Department. 
172 
 
 
It should be noted that this dispute occurred during the period of global economic crisis, 
as a consequence of which many multinational companies suffered, and are still 
suffering, losses. The problem of unclear jurisdiction can cause a number of BOI-
promoted companies to be assessed and fined by the Revenue Department if they 
refused to comply with a notice of tax assessment. Moreover, the BOI-promoted 
companies that disagree with the Revenue Department’s practice may have to hire 
expensive lawyers and experts in order to proceed with any appeal and/or lawsuit. 
Considering the importance of FDI in Thailand, the government needs to eliminate 
obstacles to doing business as much as possible, beginning with the ambiguous 
legislation regarding investment. From the aforementioned facts, this problem needs to 
be resolved. 
 
A strong case can be made for Minebea’s claim that, since it was approved and granted 
a BOI promotion certificate, together with incentives, it should be entitled to the 
privilege of loss carry forward. This researcher also agrees with Judge Kongiead, who 
decided the Minebea case, that the process of promotion approval that relates to taxes 
should be considered by the relevant tax authorities, namely the Revenue 
Department.
830
 A careful study into the loss of revenue from granting tax incentives 
should be conducted. These two issues will be further discussed and recommendations 
for the future will be offered in the following chapter.  
Both the BOI and the Central Tax Court agreed that any privilege for loss carry forward 
should be applicable to the BOI-promoted project, or projects, on an individual basis, 
and that there is no requirement to consolidate the loss and profit of the BOI-promoted 
projects for loss carried forward. Following the BOI’s interpretation on tax calculation 
could be beneficial to foreign and Thai investors under the BOI-promoted project rules. 
The problematic interpretation of tax incentives for the BOI-promoted businesses, 
however, especially in the Minebea case, demonstrates the uncertainty regarding the 
issue of tax jurisdiction, i.e. which government agency should have authority over the 
BOI tax incentives, and under which law? The problem occurs because different 
government agencies exercise jurisdiction over the same tax issue. It is evident that the 
                                                          
830
 Central Tax Court Judgment Red-Number Case No. 190/2553. 
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scope of the power of the BOI or the Revenue Department over BOI tax privileges is 
problematic. The IPA 2001 enables the BOI to grant tax incentives in accordance with 
its provisions, with the aim of exempting BOI-promoted persons from general tax 
provisions under the Revenue Code. In addition, the first priority of the Revenue 
Department and the Board of Taxation is to collect as much tax as possible in order to 
meet the national revenue target.  
 
Where the profit/loss calculation is concerned, the Revenue Department’s practices 
during the past two decades demonstrate administrative inconsistency. Since 2005, the 
Revenue Department has started to rule that companies have to combine all 
profits/losses for every BOI-promoted project, which has resulted in BOI-promoted 
companies receiving incomplete or even incorrect incentives, and not what the BOI 
aimed to grant. Following an interpretation by the Revenue Department, if a loss of the 
second BOI-promoted project has to be offset against a profit of the first BOI-promoted 
project, the loss of the BOI-promoted company is then less than the amount that the 
company should be entitled to be carried forward after the end of the tax holiday. 
 
To illustrate this point, imagine  a hypothetical case in which Company ABC has two 
BOI-promoted projects: Project A and Project B. Project A has a net profit of GBP 
10,000 which will be exempt from CIT. Project B has a net loss of GBP 20,000. This 
GBP 20,000 loss of profit is carried forward to offset net profit (if any) after the tax 
exempt period. After the exemption period expires for both projects, calculations by the 
BOI and the Revenue Department lead to different outcomes. The BOI-promoted 
company incurs a net profit of GBP 200,000 after the tax exempt period. 
 
The calculation, according to the BOI is: 
CIT (rate of 30%) = [200,000 - 20,000] × 30% = 54,000 
 
The calculation, according to the Revenue Department is: 
CIT (rate of 30%) = [200,000 - (20,000 - 10,000)] × 30% = 57,000 
 
It is clear from the above illustration that the calculation according to the Revenue 
Department, which requires offsetting the profit/loss of Projects A and B, increases the 
tax burden on the BOI-promoted businesses. 
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Another issue of concern is that the Revenue Department’s aim is to administer the tax 
system fairly and efficiently. In addition, it has to be aware of all kinds of possible tax 
abuse by taxpayers as demonstrated by the discussion of tax incentives in Chapter 5. As 
regards the Minebea case, the Revenue Department has to comply with the Board of 
Taxation Ruling No. 38/2552 which became effective in 2009, because government 
officials must act in compliance with the law, as stated under Article 74 of the 2007 
Constitution of Thailand.
831
 In addition, the status of the Board of Taxation Ruling is 
finalised in accordance with the Revenue Code, Section 13 (7) paragraph three, and thus 
tax officials must comply with it at all time. 
 
Had Minebea not initiated court proceedings, they would have been subject to the same 
treatment as any company that did not comply with the Revenue Department’s 
instructions whereby would have sent them a summons, and continued tax assessment 
in line with those BOI-promoted companies that do not comply with official 
instructions. In cases where companies disagree with the tax assessment officers or the 
Board of Taxation, they are able to appeal to the Central Tax Court and subsequently 
can appeal to the Supreme Court, whose decision will apply only to the parties in that 
case. This essentially causes a costly and extended procedure for both the investors and 
the Revenue Department. Satit Rungkasiri, Director-General at the Revenue 
Department, gave his opinion that ‘the entire problem comes as a result of differences 
between the Revenue Department and the BOI in interpreting the law. Both agencies 
will have to discuss this issue further.’832 
As pointed out earlier, the problematic jurisdiction does not only affect Minebea but 
also extends to other BOI-promoted companies, which under similar conditions to 
Minebea may be affected by the Supreme Court’s judgment, which is unpredictable and 
may take a long time. At present, BOI-promoted companies may decide whether to 
comply with the Revenue Department’s current practice or with the Central Tax Court’s 
                                                          
831
 Constitution of Thailand 2007, art 71 states ‘every person shall have a duty to defend the country, 
maintain the national interests and obey the law’. 
832
 Wichit Chantanusornsiri, ‘Minebea Ruling May Open Door for More Refund Bids’, Bangkok Post 
(Bangkok 26 October 2010) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/203077/minebea-ruling-
may-open-door-for-more-refund-bids> accessed 10 November 2011. 
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judgment. The language of the IPA 2001, as exemplified in the Minebea case, is not 
clearly worded and does not state about the profit/loss calculation. As such, it cannot be 
interpreted according to its literal meaning as a solid rule, which is why the Central Tax 
Court adopted the ‘intention of legislature’ rule, incorporating the principle that in cases 
of doubt the ruling should be made in favour of the party who bears the obligation. This 
latter principle, however, is controversial, with certain academic research, as well as 
cases, deciding in favour of the revenue collector.  
 
The Minebea case is noteworthy for the fact that the BOI had sought an opinion from 
the Council of State to interpret the IPA 2001. The current practice in which 
government agencies are recommended to seek legal opinions from the Council of State 
can instead extend the conflict resolution procedure. As explained in Chapter 2, 
subsection 2.6.2, entitled Organisation and Functions, the Council of State’s function is 
as a consultative body and provides advice to governmental bodies. However, its 
opinions, which are ‘usually conservative advice’,833 are not legally binding on either 
the government agency or individuals. This is demonstrated by the Minebea case, where 
the court did not mention the opinion of the Council of State. It is important to 
emphasise that were the Council of State to play a greater role as a legislation-drafting 
body, such ambiguity as exists in the IPA 2001 would be lessened. As it stands, the fact 
that the Council of State can advise, but lacks a legally binding opinion, leads to 
confusion in the resolution of disputes and prolongs procedures concerning both the 
relevant government agencies and any individual affected. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the problem of overlapping powers over tax privileges for BOI-
promoted companies under the IPA 2001. The provisions of the law itself are also 
unclear, which is evident through a number of rulings issued by the Revenue 
Department and memoranda issued by the BOI to investors on unclear provisions under 
the IPA 2001. The problem regarding profit/loss calculation for BOI-promoted 
companies, particularly, the Minebea case was selected as an example of this problem 
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 Glen Lewis, Virtual Thailand: the media and cultural politics in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore 
(Taylor & Francis, 2006) 102. 
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because a number of BOI-promoted companies are in similar situations as that of 
Minebea and the fact that this is the only case of its kind to be filed to the court. In this 
case, the plaintiff, a Japanese-owned company has been engaged in businesses in 
Thailand for a number of years, and one of the major contributors of FDI. These factors 
all contribute to the significance of the case. The incidences raised in this chapter 
established that there are differing opinions and practices on tax incentives between the 
two relevant government agencies, namely the Revenue Department and the BOI, which 
subsequently result in uncertain and extended administrative procedures. This chapter 
also questioned the current function of the Council of State (as noted in the Minebea 
case) as to whether its action prolongs and causes more complicated procedure. This 
issue will be discussed, and a solution suggested in Chapter 8. We have learned from 
Chapter 4 that foreign investment is crucial to the continued growth of Thailand’s 
economy. Hence, the major problem of conflicting and ambiguous jurisdiction, as 
discussed in this chapter, needs to be addressed in order to eliminate a potentially 
significant disincentive to FDI in Thailand, and to enhance the country’s attractiveness 
for investors, particularly in the context of the current global economic slump. It is 
therefore necessary for the Thai government to find a solution to this problem, and 
establish a consistent administration and body of policy on tax incentives. One possible 
method would be through an amendment of the current legislation and an incorporation 
of tax incentives in the Revenue Code. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
8.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 Norm Conflict Resolution and Legal Certainty 
 
Introduction 
The current problems regarding tax incentives, of which the Minebea Case is the most 
prominent example, are due to overlapping jurisdiction on tax incentives, divided 
between the Revenue Department and the Board of Investment. With respect to the 
Minebea case, the Central Tax Court was confronted choosing between two laws. In this 
case, both the IPA 2001 and the Revenue Code were applicable laws, but they clearly 
conflict with one another. This chapter, which will examine this problem is divided into 
two sections and aims to answer the following questions:  
1: Which law should be applicable in this case in light of the current legislation?  
2: What are the consequences of applying the law to the current problem?   
The first question involves a general discussion on the principles of norm
834
 conflict 
resolution, and on their occurrence and applicability in Thailand. The outcome of this 
analysis is to apply the principle to resolve the conflict under current laws. The second 
question concerns the following issues. Firstly, what are the possible consequences of 
applying the law? Secondly, what is the root of the problem? Is it that both the BOI and 
the Revenue Department have authority over tax incentives? Lastly, which authority 
should ideally have jurisdiction over tax incentives, and from which law is this authority 
acquired? 
 
                                                          
834
 This research defines ‘norms’ as a mandatory rule of social behaviour established by the state, such as 
laws and regulations. For definition of norms, see Jack P. Gibbs, ‘Norms: The Problem of Definition and 
Classification’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 5 (Mar, 1965) 586-594 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2774978> accessed 10 November 2011. 
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7.1 Which law should be applicable in this case with respect to current 
legislation? 
As Lindroos noted, ‘It is accepted that every legal system must address the question of 
the relationship between its norms’.835 In an ideal normative world, it is always possible 
to determine the relationship between two or more norms by either establishing the 
superiority of a higher norm over a lower norm or by giving priority on other grounds, 
such as lex posterior or lex specialis.  
7.2 General Conceptual Framework of Norm Conflict and Legal Reasoning 
Pauwelyn’s book and Kelsen’s post-1960 writings will be drawn upon significantly, due 
to their sustained focus on the notion of conflict of norms. Kelsen’s definition, typical 
and similar to many others, is thus: 
 A conflict between two norms occurs when there is an incompatibility 
between what one ought to do under the first norm and what one ought to 
do under the second norm, and therefore obeying or applying one norm 
necessarily or  potentially involves violating the other.
836
 
According to Pauwelyn, ‘it is crucial to know what the law is, where it can be found and 
how the judge will apply it in case there is, for example, a conflict of norms’.837 In most 
conflicts, when faced with what are known as ‘conflicts in the applicable law’ both 
norms will continue to exist.
838
 Courts can apply priorities in applying the law, in which 
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event, both norms survive the conflict and are considered ‘valid’ and ‘legal’.839 The 
conflict is then resolved in favour of one of the two rules because that rule has been, or 
can be, labelled as the more ‘prominent’ or ‘relevant’ one. The result of these ‘priority 
rules’ is that only one of the two rules applies to the particular situation.840 
 
In determining the issue of which norm, between two norms, is to be applied, one has to 
consider applicability rather than validity. In this sense, ‘conflict in the applicable law’ 
is a question of which law to choose, not one of the validity or legality of one norm or 
the other.
841
 The fact that a rule is considered valid does not necessarily mean that it is 
always to be considered applicable.
842
  
 
In states that fall under EC law, for example, a national competition law may be 
discounted because, as national law, it takes second place to Council Regulations.
 843
 
Pauwelyn defines conflict broadly, in contrast with the narrow and more traditional 
view of conflict as ‘a collision of mutually exclusive obligations in two norms’.844 As 
part of his wide angle on conflict, Pauwelyn discusses comprehensive conflict-
avoidance
845
 and resolution techniques.
846
 He also discusses a broad range of problems 
and offers an equally broad range of answers. A norm with a narrower scope or validity 
is felt to be more effective than one with a more general scope, and thus is said to 
‘prevail’.847 As Lindroos noted, ‘if two provisions cannot be applied to the same 
circumstances at the same time, no questions of conflict or parallel application can be 
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raised’.848 This discussion addresses only situations of genuine conflict between legal 
norms within the parameters of Lindroos’s strict definition. Its main question is, 
therefore, when there is a conflict between two norms, which of the two should be 
applied?
849
  
 
Norm conflict resolution theories are found in both international and domestic legal 
systems. Regarding conflict of norms in international public law, Lasok and Stone 
explain that conflict of laws problems arise in cases involving ‘foreign elements’850, i.e. 
matters which by their nature cannot be disposed of conveniently simply by reference to 
a ‘domestic’ rule of law of the forum.851 Jenks is of the view that a ‘conflict in the strict 
sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two treaties cannot 
simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties.’852  
 
According to Lasok and Stone, the worldwide existence of a variety of legal systems 
implies the choice of several possible solutions to the problem in hand.
853 
That is not to 
say that an individual state has recourse to all of the possible solutions, since some may 
be impossible under its legal system, but simply that no conflict problem has a cut-and-
dried answer.
854
 A question on how a state could be expected to react in a given 
situation cannot be answered by purely analysing the norms that would follow from 
article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ,
855
 but must instead embrace norms set forth by 
history, self-interest and potential political impacts.
856
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What is the precise definition of ‘conflict’? In many instances, what may seem like a 
conflict is only a ‘divergence’ which can be resolved by means of, for example, treaty 
interpretation.
857
 The necessity to identify when exactly two norms are ‘in conflict’ 
means that this study cannot be limited to setting out a number of rules of priority in 
international law.
858
 In addition, it is important to address the definition of conflict and 
the different avenues that may lead to convergence of norms.
859
 
 
Conflicts in an international legal context arise because of an increase of treaty-based 
subsystems such as that of the WTO, the Framework Convention on Climate Change or 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation.
860
 These bodies have their own sector-
specific ‘international law’, law-makers and law-enforcement mechanisms. In this 
context, an alternative term to ‘conflict of norms’ could be ‘conflict of obligations’.861 It 
is important to note that international law involves both obligations and rights,
862
 so a 
conflict may therefore arise not only between two different obligations, but also 
between an obligation and an explicit right.  
 
Norm conflict resolution theories presume the resolution of conflict and the importance 
of the treaty interpretation process in so doing.
863
 Under the British legal system, 
questions of jurisdiction tend to be accorded more prominence than those of choice of 
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law when conflicts are being addressed.
864
 Often, if the question of jurisdiction (in both 
English and other countries’ courts) is answered, the question of the choice of law does 
not need to be asked.
865
   
 
Before moving on to discuss norm conflict resolution principles, the differences 
between international and domestic legal systems must be taken into account, because, 
although some norm conflict resolution rules are used in both legal systems, some may 
not apply or may have limitations. There are five criteria differentiating the international 
legal system from domestic legal systems. First of all, the international legal system is 
decentralised and fragmented, in which under it the creation, applications, and 
implications of norms are built on structure and logic which differ from domestic 
law,
866
 there is no centralised legislator in the international legal system.
867
 Norms are 
created by the subjects of international law in a variety of forms, many of which are 
disconnected and independent from each other, creating a system different from the 
domestic legal order.
868
  
 
Secondly, the normative order
869
 in an international legal context can be considered 
from ‘the perspective of bilateral state relations, something that does not easily lend 
itself to the establishment of systemic relations between norms’,870 which is in contrast 
to domestic law based on ‘hierarchy and institutional structures’.871 
 
Thirdly, for countries with heavily institutionalised governmental structures, 
international law and its norms may be viewed as a means of regulating bilateral 
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relationships between states,
872
 which does not encourage a systematic understanding of 
the relationships between norms.
 873
 This lack of structured relationships between the 
bodies of law and of a centralised law-making process is the essential difference 
between domestic and international legal order.
874
 
 
Fourthly, international law may change over time. Any later norm can, in principle, 
overrule an earlier one, in other words states can change their mind at any point in time, 
subject to jus cogens
875
 and the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
876
.
877
 
Hence, the potential for conflict to arise must be multiplied by a time factor whereby an 
earlier norm may conflict with a later one, the same way an older norm may need to be 
interpreted and applied against the background of a newer norm.
878
  
 
Lastly, states, although considered under international law to constitute one single 
entity, are represented in the international law-making process by a multitude of 
agents.
879
 Even if, for most treaties, Parliament’s approval may be required, the fact 
remains that treaties are not normally negotiated by Members of Parliament but by 
diplomats or civil servants.
880
 Likewise, the delegates representing a state in the WTO 
context are mostly not the same as those representing the same state in the United 
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Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Health Organisation (WHO) or 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO).
881
  
Problems related to the interplay between different treaty regimes relate to treaties and 
custom or general principles of law, and do not only surface in the WTO. Given the 
overlap between different regimes of international law – be it the UN Security Council 
dealing with human rights and war crimes, the World Bank addressing environmental 
sustainability or the WHO negotiating a treaty to regulate the sale of tobacco products – 
the question of how different norms of international law interact is omnipresent.
882
  
In domestic law, the hierarchy of norms is determined by whom and how the norm was 
enacted, for example by constitutional procedure, a federal or central legislature or local 
government.
883
 The situation is different under international law because in this instance 
the crucial factor is not so much by whom or how the norm was created, but rather what 
it is about, what it itself says about its hierarchical status and when it was established. 
This thesis does not examine specific cases of interplay or conflict rules of international 
law; rather, it attempts to provide a conceptual framework within which the interplay 
between domestic norms can be examined. Although domestic legal systems and the 
international legal system share some fundamental concepts relating to the conflict of 
norms, one must keep in mind the aforementioned differences.  
 
In Thailand, the terms ‘conflict of laws’ or ‘conflict of jurisdictions’ are used in private 
international law. However, the country’s legal system has only just begun to address 
this matter ‘international law has no direct application in the municipal legal system in 
Thailand’.884 With respect to conflict in domestic law, Thai courts generally apply 
principle of norm conflict resolution when deciding which law should be applicable to a 
specific dispute. Where there is only one clearly stipulated law applying to an issue, it 
should be applicable to the dispute; however, the Thai courts also adopt the following 
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norm conflict resolution principles when there are two or more laws that apply to the 
same issue. 
 
Owing to the existing jurisdictional problem examined in the previous chapter, and as 
noted by Kammerhofer:  
 
Conflicts of norms are a cause for uncertainty because if more than one 
norm refers to the same type of behaviour, the danger is very real that the 
subject of law which is confronted by this phenomenon will be 
physically unable to behave in conformity with both applicable norms.
885
  
 
He further suggests that the problem arises as a result of adopting the means for 
resolving a conflict of norms without thoroughly studying their theoretical bases.
886
 
With this in mind, the next part of this chapter will consider each of the relevant norm 
conflict resolution principles in order to decide which should properly solve the current 
conflict between two types of laws. 
It is important to consider whether the norm among two conflicting norms is unclear 
before applying norm conflict resolution. As pointed out by Sadat-Akhavi, the use of 
interpretation to resolve the ambiguity of norms is a common practice.
887
 The removal 
of such ambiguity is fundamentally important, as it is impossible to ascertain a conflict 
between norms unless their exact meanings are known.
888
 Furthermore, any vagueness 
existing in norms can actually give the mistaken impression that they conflict, when in 
reality they only need clarification in order for their separateness to become clear.
889
 
The issue of whether the provisions of the IPA 2001 are ambiguous and need 
interpreting before norm conflict resolutions can be applied will be discussed below.    
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7.3 Norm Conflict Resolution Maxims in General and in Thailand 
The maxims of norm conflict resolution are traditionally accepted, to some extent, as 
logical; likewise, they are assumed to be in accordance with the ‘universal character of 
legal reasoning’.890 This research focuses on the three most commonly used and widely 
accepted resolving devices, the lex posterior, lex specialis and lex superior maxims. The 
problem with these devices is that they are so universally accepted that no one questions 
their legitimacy as a means of resolving conflicts of norms.
891
 
7.3.1 Lex superior legi inferiori derogat  
According to Eiter, Faber and Truszczynski, the principle of lex superior means that 
‘the rule issued by a higher hierarchical authority overrides the one issued by a lower 
one’.892 Essentially, it lays the foundations for a ‘complex, hierarchical legal system’,893 
with the hierarchy built into the fundamental structure of the legal system.
894
 The 
principle of lex superior was intentionally designed, unlike other doctrines such as lex 
specialis and lex posterior, which were established to choose the applicable norms from 
two conflicting norms.
895
 
It remains a well-known fact that there is no single normative hierarchy in the 
international legal system (see above).
896
 The disputed notion of jus cogens and Article 
103 of the UN Charter did attempt to establish some hierarchical relations in 
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international law by establishing a priority of norms,
897
 but in practice, the lex superior 
maxim does not always provide an easy solution.
898
 The privileged status of the 
constitution depends on the ability of the courts to judge the constitutionality of laws. 
Where this is the case, the courts still need to take care to record conflicts and 
invalidities in laws, which likewise they do not necessarily do. It is also possible that 
courts may refuse to admit to a conflict that they had previously overlooked.
899
 Added 
to this is the fact that superior legislation may actually allow an inferior one to issue 
rules ‘with derogatory force relative to the norms on an immediately higher level’.900 A 
statute might, for example, allow an executive body to issue decrees which can repeal or 
deviate from existing statues.  
The privileged status of the lex superior doctrine is the key to the concept of norms. 
Normative systems come about because norms and only norms can generate further 
norms. Unlike the other maxims discussed in this chapter, the lex superior maxim has to 
be taken very seriously if one is to properly understand the idea of norms as formal 
ordering of ideals. The primacy of lex superior also includes the primacy of lex 
posterior and lex specialis,
901
 which do not prevail because they are newer or have a 
special status but because their primacy is prescribed and those prescriptions themselves 
prevail.
902
 
Moreover, a norm that occupies a superior position may not actually be the preferable 
one because there are certain circumstances in which a superior norm, such as the 
constitution, conflicts with but does not invalidate an inferior norm, such as a statute.  
This occurs in the legal system of the Netherlands, according to which the highest norm 
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is the constitution. Judges are not permitted to review the constitutionality of statutes.
 903
 
In this case, the superiority of the norm is assured at a political level and requires the 
legislature to be vigilant about conforming thereto.
 904
  
The lex superior maxim is clearly a design feature whereby sources of law are explicitly 
stratified.
905
 The legislator may sometimes immediately regulate reasoning, explanation 
and communication strategy,
906
 but must do so in his own words, and the representation 
of these constraints on reasoning activity can be left to the organisation representing 
their interpretation of those words.
907
 
The doctrine of lex superior is known in Thailand as ‘rules of hierarchy of laws’, 
whereby the provisions of any law, rule or regulation, which are contrary to or 
inconsistent with the constitution, are rendered unenforceable.
908
 The notion of a super 
statute – a fundamental law superior to ordinary law – is curbed by declaring those laws 
unenforceable if they are contrary to the constitution,
909
 which holds the supreme 
hierarchy of laws because it is a piece of law that every member of society agrees to 
respect.
910
 The Thai legal system has adopted this rule to make it clear that an Act of 
Parliament cannot be contrary to the constitution, which thus takes priority.
911
 The 
absolute supremacy of the constitution over other laws, as is the case in Thailand, is not 
the case in other countries, though, because as discussed earlier supremacy in the United 
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Kingdom lies with Parliament, the supreme law-making body,
912
 and legislation is the 
supreme source of law.
913
 The United Kingdom and New Zealand do not have written 
constitutions against which primary legislation can be compared to review whether its 
constitutionality and validity.
914
  
 
In contrast, Thailand has a formal, written constitution that restricts the legislature’s 
power to enact law by delineating particular legal rights as constitutional. This system is 
constitutional, rather than parliamentary supremacy, which means that they are mutually 
exclusive, since the former principle can render action or laws enacted by the latter 
invalid.
915
 The concept of constitutional supremacy results in a rigid constitution under 
which special procedures for amendment are required.
916
 Regarding the concept of 
supremacy under Thai Constitution law, coups d’états were used for many years as an 
unconstitutional means of achieving the desired constitutional changes.
917
  
Consequently, constitutional supremacy ‘has instead undermined the sanctity of the 
very concept it purported to promote’.918 Taken to its eventual conclusion, constitutional 
supremacy may be perceived as undemocratic, taking power away from the most 
recently elected representatives of the people.
919
 Parliamentary supremacy provides the 
counterpoint to this,
920
 as Parliament, unlike a constitution, can be held to account and 
changed should elements of it be deemed to be working against the will or needs of the 
people.
921
 
 
                                                          
912
 Leslie W. White and. William D. Hussey, Government in Great Britain, the Empire, and the 
Commonwealth  (CUP Archive, 1961) 31. 
913
 Irving Stevens, Constitutional & Administrative Law (3
rd
 edn Pearson Professional Limited 1996) 39. 
914
 Alex Carroll, Constitutional and Administrative Law (6
th
 edition, Pearson Education Limited 2011) 18; 
Anthony Lester, A British Bill of Rights (Institute for Public Policy Research, 1990) 7. Hilaire Barnett, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law (5
th
 edn Cavendish 2005) 9. Stevens (n 913) 39. 
915
Douglas M. Johnston and Gerry A. Ferguson, Asia-Pacific Legal Development (UBC Press 1998) 156. 
916
 Wing Cheong Chan, Support for Victims of Crime in Asia (Taylor & Francis 2007) 194. 
917
 Ibid. 
918
 Ibid 195. 
919
 Johnston and Ferguson (n 915) 158. 
920
Ibid 158. 
921
 Ibid. 
190 
 
The concept of hierarchy of law is that an authority of a lower law is inferior and cannot 
violate a higher law (see Chapter 2). In other words, the hierarchy of laws establishes 
relationships of inferiority and superiority between levels of laws. In this hierarchy, 
primary legislation is higher than or superior to secondary legislation. In Thailand, 
constitutional supremacy can be seen from the established hierarchy of laws, i.e. 
supreme law, primary legislation and secondary legislation. Primary (or ‘parent’) 
legislation consists of an Act of Parliament, the legal code and Emergency Decrees. The 
Act is passed by Parliament.  
 
In considering a bill for an Act, the House of Representatives and the Senate must 
provide the elected representatives of the people with the right to vote on the passing of 
the bill.
922
 Codes are dealt with in much the same way as Acts and are promulgated by 
the legislative branch. These codes include the Civil and the Commercial Code, the 
Penal Code, the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes and the Revenue Code. As 
explained in Chapter 2, an Emergency Decree is enacted by the executive branch, 
through the cabinet, although it is subject to subsequent confirmation by Parliament.
923
 
It also has the same force as an Act. The conclusion which can be drawn from the 
principle of constitutional supremacy is that the constitution is the highest law. As such, 
when any laws are in conflict with the constitution or constitutional laws, they will be 
null and void. Regarding a law and regulation, the same rule is applied: ‘A regulation 
that contradicts a law is invalid’.924 
It is worth making note of a special legal hierarchy of norms in the United Kingdom. 
According to AV Dicey, a late nineteenth-century British constitutional expert, the 
principle of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’925 (or interchangeably ‘parliamentary 
supremacy’) means: 
Neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined 
has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any 
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law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the 
law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation 
of Parliament.
926
 
Since these words were written in 1885, the nature of parliamentary sovereignty in the 
UK has changed.
927
 The power of the House of Lords, which is for the most part 
hereditary, and can be deemed undemocratic, was reduced through the Parliament Acts 
of 1911 and 1949,
928
 which led to the balance of power shifting even further towards the 
fully-elected House of Commons. It is that house that now effectively holds 
sovereignty, as opposed to Parliament as a whole (that is, both houses as a single 
entity).
929
 The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy upholds the notion that statute 
possesses legal supremacy. An Act of Parliament is the highest and most authoritative 
source of law,
930
 as it can make, repeal or override any other law, including one that 
contravenes international law. It is obligatory for courts to enforce and uphold such an 
Act. 
931
 
In the United Kingdom, Parliament’s legislative supremacy serves in place of a written 
constitution, and includes the power to legislate on constitutional matters.
932
 This means 
that, effectively, any Act passed by British Parliament can repeal or amend any other 
Act.
933
 The key premise of British jurisprudence and legislation is the supremacy of 
Parliament
934
 whereby the enactments of the elected body are considered by definition 
constitutional, and their constitutionality cannot be challenged. In effect, they are the 
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constitution
 935
 because the state’s lack of a written constitution ensures that Parliament 
can exercise supremacy in all cases.
936
 
The sovereignty of Parliament gives the UK legislative system two main 
characteristics.
937
 The first is that any statute enacted is valid and is not in contradiction 
of any existing national or international law.
938
 The second is that any statute may, 
either explicitly or implicitly, be repealed or amended by a later statute: Parliament 
cannot bind its successors ‘and no Parliament is bound by Acts of its predecessors’.939 
The United Kingdom’s joining of the European Community (EC) in 1973 posed the 
most significant challenge to sovereignty in Parliament’s history. By joining the EC, the 
United Kingdom accepted that a supranational organisation could make decisions which 
would directly affect British society.
940
 The country’s signing of the Treaty of Rome 
effectively gave European law superior status to the law of the country, and required 
that British law fell in line with European law.
941
 Likewise, it gave European courts the 
power of judicial review over British Acts of Parliament, so Europe can scrutinise 
British Acts of Parliament, refer them to the European Court of Justice and even, in 
extreme cases, suspend them.
942
 
The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy can be challenged on several grounds.
943
 The 
first is that it is an anachronism, a product of historical circumstances that are no longer 
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relevant
944
 because it was introduced in the mid-nineteenth century, when Britain was 
enjoying industrialisation, expanding overseas interests and experiencing relative 
stability and prosperity.
945
 In this context, coupled with the Victorian belief in 
hierarchy, the notion that Parliament could single-handedly deliver ongoing prosperity 
seemed reasonable.
946
 Since then, forces both domestic and international (such as the 
EC, UN and NATO) have made parliamentary supremacy seem out of date and, at 
worst, undemocratic.
947
  
Alder argues that there is no longer a consensus on Parliament’s total supremacy, and 
there is no compelling legal reason why it should be the case. Since there exists no 
written constitution, the doctrine relies on nothing but its general acceptance by the 
courts.
948
 According to Allan, the courts have a responsibility to uphold the principle 
that they are concerned not with the statute generally but with its application to each 
individual case.
949
 Jones and Berrington note that the British public does not 
unequivocally support the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
950
 so as supranational 
institutions gain more power, it is likely to weaken further. It amounts to, they argue, ‘a 
doctrine of lawyers, textbooks and government propagandists, not a doctrine of the 
people.
951
 
The principle of lex superior does not resolve the conflict highlighted with regard to 
jurisdiction over tax incentives in Thailand. The IPA 2001 and the Revenue Code are 
both Acts of the Thai Parliament, and as such, they are of equal standing. Thus, recourse 
must be made to other norm conflict resolution principles. 
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7.3.2 Lex specialis derogate legi generali 
The maxim lex specialis derogate legi generali refers to the principle of lex specialis as 
a rule to resolve a genuine conflict between two norms. According to this principle, the 
special norm prevails over the general norm in the event of conflict.
952
 Based on the 
references to lex specialis maxim in the writings of Grotius, de Vattel and Pufendorf, 
there are two reasons for letting a specific norm prevail over a general one: (1) the 
specific norm is the more effective or precise norm, allowing for fewer exceptions (the 
lex specialis, if it prevails, is indeed already an exception to the lex generalis) and (2) as 
a consequence, the special norm reflects most closely, precisely and strongly the 
consent or expression of will of the states in question.
953
  
In the event of conflict between two laws, the lex specialis doctrine prevails, and where 
the lex specialis doctrine gives no indication of how to proceed, the principle of lex 
generalis alone shall govern.
954
 It is possible, in theory, for general and more specific 
pieces of legislation to coexist without challenging either’s validity or applicability.955 
In the case of a conflict between two treaties, the more specific one would prevail;
956
 
however, as Pauwelyn has noted where there are two rules to solve the conflict– the lex 
specialis and the lex posterior – on these grounds it is difficult to conclude that the lex 
specialis principle prevails over its counterpart.
957
  
As mentioned above, and as pointed out by Milanovic, international law lacks one 
central legislator and a definite hierarchy of its rules (other than jus cogens).
958
 It also 
lacks a unified international judiciary to which all pertinent disputes could be referred. 
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For these and other reasons, in international law the lex specialis maxim is at best a 
fairly limited tool of norm conflict avoidance.
959
 
In a domestic legal context, the maxim of lex specialis has its origin in Roman law and 
its descendants, common law systems.
960
 The ancient Roman Corpus Juris Civilis,
961
 
for instance, contains a notation by Aemilius Papinianus that ‘in the entirety of law, the 
special takes precedence over genus, and anything that relates species is regarded as 
most important’,962 making it clear that the ‘specific prevails over the general’.963 Also, 
‘there is no specific legislative intention of the lex specialis maxim, highlighting its role 
as an informal part of legal reasoning, that is of the pragmatic process through which 
lawyers go about interpreting and applying formal law’.964 According to Moens and 
Spyns, it is possible to discover lex specialis ordering between two legal provisions by 
comparing their logical content.
 965
  
The limitations of the principle of lex specialis can be seen when a norm conflict in the 
domestic legal system becomes apparent. In such a case, the decision-maker is guided 
by the hierarchical and institutional structure of the legal order which provides 
predetermined norm relations.
966
 In this way, such a conflict can be solved by recourse 
to the hierarchy of laws and the primacy of norms. Where two norms are of equal status, 
the principles of lex posterior and lex specialis may be used.
967
 Furthermore, there are a 
variety of rules of interpretation and other maxims that may be applied in conflict 
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resolution, such as lex prior, lex posterior, autonomous operation,
968
 legislative intent, a 
contrario,
969
 acquiescence,
970
 contra proferentem,
971
 ejusdem generis
972
 and expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius
973
.
974
 As Jenks points out, ‘no particular principle or rule can 
be regarded as of absolute validity’.975 In other words, these other principles may take 
precedence over the principle of lex specialis or they may be applied concurrently.
976
 
 
The application of lex specialis doctrine faces difficulties when it is necessary to 
determine the relationship between two different normative orders or rules deriving 
from different areas of law, such as environmental norms and trade norms. Such a 
situation gives rise to three main problems.
977
 Firstly, the lex specialis maxim does not 
provide for a solution when two norms are regarded as special.
978
 An environmental 
norm and a trade norm, for example, can each be regarded special in a particular case.
979
 
Secondly, as the maxim is a mechanical principle without clear content it does not 
provide guidance in determining what is general and what is special.
980
 Giving priority 
to special norms within the system of unclear norm relations in which a decision cannot 
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rely on such relations means that the decision actually relies on political or other 
considerations.
981
 In addition, applying the lex specialis maxim raises the more difficult 
question of the relationship between the two norms, and the most difficult issue, 
accordingly, remains: How should one ultimately determine what is more special and 
what is more general?
982
 Any such determination always remains relative and has to be 
performed in casu,
983
 as no guidelines with clearly delineated requirements are provided 
in scholarly literature.
984
  
 
It has been argued that the convention whereby the special norm prevails over the 
general norm is a principle of legal logic, or legal reasoning,
985
 which can be defined, 
according to Shytov, as ‘a kind of reasoning which through finding relevant facts, 
appropriate legal rules, and good reasons for the application of these rules to the case, 
leads to a legal decision’.986 However, as Gehring noted, ‘special’ does not necessarily 
equate to ‘true’ or ‘better’,987 and so the logicality of this maxim can be doubted  – a 
narrower norm is not always more effective than a wide one, and a general norm does 
not lose its validity because of the existence of a special one.
988
 
 
Thai courts also adopt the rule of lex specialis. The following laws were considered as 
special laws and passed by Thailand’s Supreme Court: (1) the Land Code of 1954; (2) 
Securities Exchange of Thailand Act of 1974); (3) the Announcement of the National 
Executive Council No. 337 dated 13 December 1972; (4) the Thailand Buddhist Order 
Act of 1954; (5) Social Security Act of 1990; (6) the Interest for Loan of Financial 
Institution Act of 1980 and (7) Customs Act of 1926. 
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In Supreme Court Decision No. 2959/2536 (1993), concerning the transfer of the 
ownership of land with a Nor Sor 3 Gor document,
989
 which is complete only upon 
registration with the competent officials, the court ruled that Section 4 (2) of the 
Thailand Land Code B.E. 2497 (1954)
990
 is a special law in this case. The transfer of 
land possession according to Section 1378 of the CCC
991
 is not applicable. In the case 
of securities exchange, the Supreme Court ruled that transactions must follow the 
Securities Exchange of Thailand Act, B.E. 2517 (1974). This Act is a special law, and 
the role of the defendant in this case is trading in the securities market, rather than the 
transfer of real shares. Therefore, the defendant is not required to comply with the 
procedure specified in Section 1129 of the CCC.
992
 Further, the securities transfer by the 
defendant is not void, despite the fact that it was not set out in writing and was not 
signed by the transferor and receiver.
993
 Next, the Supreme Court held in Supreme 
Court Decision No. 2228 - 2229/2531 (1988) that the Announcement of the National 
Executive Council No. 337 dated 13 December 1972 is a special law and exempt from 
the provisions of the Thai Nationality Act B.E. 2508 (1965).
994
 The defendant’s 
nationality was revoked under the National Executive Council No. 337.  
 
In Supreme Court Decision No. 953/2508 (1965), the court ruled that the Thailand 
Buddhist Order Act of 1954 is a special law and prevails over the CCC. Therefore, the 
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provisions regarding possession of property as specified in Sections 1367,
995
 1369,
996
 
and 1377,
997
 are overridden by provisions under the Buddhist Order Act of 1954, 
according to section 41-44 of which, the property of a Buddhist organisation is 
prohibited for possession and transfer, unless it is allowed exclusively by a Buddhist 
organisation. 
 
Social Security Act B.E. 2533 (1990) was ruled in Supreme Court Decision No. 
2040/2539 (1996) to be a special law entitling employees to invalidity benefits 
according to a cause unrelated to work.
998
 As a result, provisions of the CCC, which is a 
general law, were not applicable in this case. Supreme Court Decision Nos.3923/2539 
(1996) and 881/2517 (1974) ruled that the Bankruptcy Act of 1940 (the current version 
is 2004) is a special law which overrides the CCC. The Supreme Court also ruled that 
the Interest for Loan of Financial Institution Act of 1980 Sections 4 and 6 override the 
CCC Section 654.
999
 In the loan contract between the commercial bank and the 
borrower, the overdue interest rate of 18.5% (which exceeds 15% as limited under the 
CCC Section 654) is enforceable.
1000
 
 
With respect to penal laws as special laws, the Supreme Court
1001
 considered Section 27 
of the Customs Act of 1926 which states that a person who avoids paying customs duty 
tax shall be fined four times the price of goods, and for each separate offence. In 
addition, the court considered Section 120 of this Act which states that: 
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The provisions of this Act shall prevail in all matters concerned with 
customs duty, where they are inconsistent with the provisions of other 
Acts or Notifications in forced, and Acts or Notifications which will 
come into force at a future date shall not be deemed as repealing, 
restricting, altering, or withdrawing the powers under this Act unless 
such new Act or Notification expressly states such an intention. 
 
The court ruled in this case that the Customs Act of 1926 is a special law and prevails 
over general laws. Hence, it did not apply Section 31 of the Criminal Code of 1956,
1002
 
which specifies that the court shall impose a fine on every individual offender. This 
provision conflicted with Section 27 of the Customs Act of 1926, which in this case is a 
special law; therefore, Section 31 of the Criminal Code of 1956 was overridden by the 
Customs Act of 1926.
1003
 This case could be applied to the Revenue Code, which, as 
explained in Chapter 3, contains criminal penalties such as fines and jail sentences.
1004
 
Since penalties for the contravention of laws can affect a person’s liberty, the Revenue 
Code is to be seen as a special law, prevailing over general laws such as the CCC. 
7.3.3 Lex posterior derogat priori 
The lex posterior principle, or ‘application of the last in time rule’,1005 means that ‘the 
rule enacted at a later point in time overrides the earlier one’.1006 In international law, 
this rule does not work well where sources other than treaties are concerned, and even 
among certain treaties the lex posterior doctrine assumes that the two conflicting norms 
emanate from the same law-maker, so that a later ruling of that law-maker should 
prevail over an earlier one.
1007
 International law is a forum in which differing and 
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sometimes conflicting law making-processes coexist.
1008
 These can include rulings 
based on both explicit or implicit consent and a range of internationally-based agents 
(these include diplomatic protocols and customs regulations).
1009
 Other law-making 
processes arise from the conduct of the state at the highest level, such as international 
treaties.
1010
 
 
Relying in this context on a later expression overruling an earlier one, when the forms, 
characteristics and even authors of the expression are so divergent, is problematic.
1011
 
The application of the principle of lex posterior to international law creates major 
problems.
1012
 Treaties, for example, can revise laws, most notably human rights law and 
trade laws, by adding further details or confirming prior norms.
1013
 When dealing with 
two separate but overlapping systems – national and international law – it can be 
extremely difficult to ascertain which norm was created later, making lex posterior a 
less effective principle of norm conflict resolution.
1014
  
 
The lex posterior doctrine usually relates to conflicts created inadvertently by the law-
maker, since it can be supposed that a law-maker will not deliberately or knowingly 
pass laws that contradict others.
1015
 If a contradictory law is passed, it would ideally 
explicitly repeal the earlier law that it contradicts.
1016
 It is not, however, always possible 
to achieve this, as the huge number of rules in any legal system, coupled with the fact 
that new laws are passed on a considerable scale, means that it is difficult to conduct a 
                                                          
1008
 Pauwelyn (n 837) 97. 
1009
 Ibid. 
1010
Ibid. 
1011
 Ibid. 
1012
 Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol and Stephen J. Powell, Just Trade: a new covenant linking trade 
and human rights (NYU Press 2009) 69. 
1013
 Ibid. 
1014
 Ibid. 
1015
 Gerard M. Conway, ‘Conflict of Norms in European Union Law and the Legal Reasoning of the 
European Court of Justice’ (Doctor of Philosophy, Brunel University 2010) 123. 
1016
 Bradley and Ewing (n 932) 59. 
202 
 
comprehensive review of all existing laws when a new law is being enacted.
1017
 
Although non-contradiction could be achieved by giving priority to the earlier law, the 
later law represents the most recent will of the law-maker, and in a democracy 
represents the most recent expression of democratic consent.
1018
  
 
In the United Kingdom, the doctrine of lex posterior is known as ‘the doctrine of 
implied repeal’, meaning that: 
 
Where two Acts conflict with each other, and the conflict cannot be 
resolved in another way, the courts apply the Act which is later in time; 
the earlier Act is taken to have been repealed by implication to the 
extent of the inconsistency.
1019
 
 
Two Acts coming into conflict can give rise to the conclusion that the latter is 
automatically more valid where the issue of conflict is concerned:
1020
 ‘if two Acts are 
inconsistent or repugnant, the later will be read as having impliedly repealed the 
earlier’.1021 However, the court leans against implying such a repeal in that unless the 
two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the 
same time, a repeal will not be implied.
1022
 Because the judiciary generally seeks to 
avoid implicit repeals of any legislation, the law is that later enactments do not 
automatically repeal earlier ones.
1023
 Consequently, the words of the later enactment 
must make it clear, for example this term; ‘by their necessity to import a contradiction’ 
                                                          
1017
 Conway ‘Conflict of Norms in European Union Law and the Legal Reasoning of the European Court 
of Justice’ (n 1015) 123. 
1018
 Ibid. 
1019
 Bradley and Ewing (n 932) 59. 
1020
 Donald James Gifford and John R. Salter, How to Understand an Act of Parliament (Routledge 1996) 
120. 
1021
 Herbert Berry Associates Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1977] 1 WLR 1437, HL at 1443.  
1022
 Herbert Berry Associates Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1977] 1 WLR 1437, HL at 1443. 
1023
 Gifford and Salter (n 1020) 120. 
203 
 
should be specified.
1024
 In the case of litigation, any party contending that there was an 
implicit repeal to a piece of legislation must take on the burden of proof.
1025
 
 
Any conflict between two statutory norms can bring the doctrine of implied repeal into 
play, but only when they ‘stand upon the same subject matter’.1026 Inconsistency 
between two laws gives rise to implied repeal; this is the case no matter what the subject 
of the laws.
1027
 Such inconsistency makes it impossible for both laws to be applied in 
their entirety,
1028
 so according to the principle of parliamentary supremacy, the later law 
must prevail.
1029
 Hence, the principle of implied repeal is being treated as a constituent 
element of at least the traditional view of parliamentary sovereignty.
1030
 
 
The concept of ‘implied repeal’ can be illustrated with reference to the so-called Metric 
Martyrs case, in which a number of British market traders were found to be selling 
goods using imperial rather than metric measurements, contrary to the regulations of the 
European Communities Act 1972 section 2 (ECA). According to this Act, goods were to 
be sold in metric measurements only. The traders invoked the British Weights and 
Measures Act of 1985, which permitted the use of both imperial and metric systems. As 
the later Act, it was claimed that it implicitly repealed any power that the ECA may 
have had to enforce the use of the metric system and impose penalties on those who 
refused to use it.
1031
 Laws LJ, however, viewed that the 1972 Act was a ‘constitutional 
statute’ and not subject to implied repeal.1032 With the above considerations in mind, it 
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may be desirable for the courts to re-examine the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, 
which would make it possible to create statutory provisions which guard against implied 
repeals, making the system easier to understand.
1033
  
 
Two cases, Vauxhall Estates Ltd v Liverpool Corporation
1034
 and Ellen Street Estates 
Ltd v Minister of Health,
1035
 both dealt with similar issues. The 1919 Acquisition of 
Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act ensured that owners of slum housing were 
properly compensated for its demolition. The 1925 and 1930 Housing Acts, however, 
reduced the level of compensation offered. In light of this, property owners sought to 
secure compensation based on the terms of the original Act of 1919 by referring to 
section 7 of the 1919 Act, which stated that: 
 
The provisions of the Act or order by which the land is authorised to be 
acquired […] shall have effect subject to this Act and so far as 
inconsistent with this Act those provisions shall cease to have or shall 
not have effect […] 
 
In both cases, the plaintiffs argued that the above passage was legally binding and 
should prevail over the 1925 and 1930 Acts. For their case to succeed, they needed to 
prove that the 1919 Act constituted the effectively constitutional position, being secured 
and so holding a superior status in law, thus making it binding on future parliaments. In 
both the Vauxhall Estates and Ellen Street Estates cases, the court ruled that the 1925 
Act did implicitly repeal that of 1919, in accordance with the maxim of lex 
posterior.
1036
 
 
It is to be noted that where two conflicting laws actually deal with two distinct subjects, 
it can be argued that their different subject matters actually make it possible for them to 
operate side by side.
1037
 If the earlier statute was more specific than the later, and the 
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later did not give any indication that it was intended to affect the earlier, it can be 
possible to interpret the latter to make it inapplicable to the more specific matter.
1038
 
The principle of lex specialis is invoked in such a case.
1039
 
Thailand also applies the maxim of lex posterior under which the latest law abrogates 
the earlier law which it contradicts. This rule relates to the date the law became effective 
(when it started to be enforced)
1040
 but it cannot be applied to actions undertaken before 
the effective date.
1041
 However, a higher law always overrides a lower law, no matter 
whether it was effective before or after the lower law,
1042
 so the new law is only to be 
applied to specific situations and does not replace the former law, which is a general 
one.
1043
 For instance, the CCC, which was in force in 1925, specifies that ‘interest must 
not exceed 15% per year when a higher rate of interest is fixed by the contract for the 
rate higher than 15%, it shall be reduced to 15% per year.’ According to the Anti-Usury 
Act of 1932, usury is a criminal offence. The Supreme Court ruled that the clause 
regarding interest was unenforceable, as it was forbidden under the Anti-Usury Act of 
1932. However, the loan contract is still valid and the borrower must pay back the loan 
with the interest of 15%, as specified under the CCC, which is a general law.
1044
 
Therefore, the lex specialis principle prevails over the lex posterior principle in this 
case. 
7.4 Which norm conflict resolution principle should be applicable to the present 
case (the conflict of the IPA of 2001 and the RC)? 
In the Minebea case, the principle of the lex superior is regarded as the first resolution 
rule particulary in this conflict analysis. The Revenue Code is a parent legislation which 
delegated to the administrative body the power to collect tax from citizens. Subordinate 
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legislation, according to the Revenue Code, includes Royal Decrees, Ministerial 
Regulations, Notifications of the Director-General and Notifications on Income Tax. In 
the Minebea case, the secondary law is the Revenue Departmental Notification dated 5 
February 1987, which provides broad guidelines by which BOI-promoted companies 
can calculate their net profits/losses for CIT purposes.  
In practice, important issues of law, including penalties, are specified by the Act of 
Parliament (as explained in Chapter 2 and with respect to tax in Chapter 3), while 
additional but minor details are specified under secondary law by an administrative 
body. However, with reference to the Minebea case, although profit/loss calculation is 
specified by a Revenue Department Notification, the IPA 2001, which is a primary law, 
takes precedence.  
The status of secondary law made by an administrative body, in Thailand can be 
compared with that of the United Kingdom, where HMRC is able to use its discretion to 
make statutory concessions where it deems necessary. Its power to do so, however, was 
limited in 2005, when the courts delivered the Wilkinson judgement.
1045
 In that case, a 
widower claimed that he was entitled to the same tax allowance granted to widowed 
women. Lord Hoffmann rejected the case on the grounds that, although HMRC could 
make extra statutory concessions, ‘construing the power so widely as to enable the 
commissioners to concede, by extra-statutory concession, an allowance which 
Parliament could have granted but did not grant, and on grounds not of pragmatism in 
the collection of tax but of general equity between men and women’ was beyond their 
powers.
1046
  
Such an interpretation should likewise apply in the Minebea case. The applicable 
Revenue Departmental Notification dated 5 February 1987 does not convey the 
objective of granting tax incentives, as specified under Section 31 of the IPA 2001, 
which is itself an Act of Parliament. In fact, the case of Minebea concerns a calculation 
of the net profit/loss of two BOI-promoted companies. Clause 4.1 of Revenue 
Department Notification dated 5 February 1987
1047
 does not specify that their losses 
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must be offset among BOI-promoted companies, which is not the case where there are 
BOI-promoted projects and non-BOI-promoted projects in which according to clause 
4.2 of this notification, only net loss from all projects would be allowed to be offset 
against net profit from non-BOI- promoted projects. Therefore, clause 4.2 of the 1987 
notification cannot be applied to the Minebea case. 
Considering the Board of Taxation Ruling No. 38/2552 issued on 13
 
February 2009, as 
already mentioned in the previous chapters with reference to the hierarchy of tax laws 
and the status of the Board of Taxation Rulings, Board of Taxation rulings are binding 
only on the revenue officers, and not on other government agencies and taxpayers. 
Consequently, the legal effect of this Board of Taxation Ruling is that revenue officers, 
including the assessment officer and competent officials, are bound to follow it.
1048
 In 
the Minebea case, the revenue officials have to follow the Board of Taxation Ruling No. 
38/2552 (2009).  
Of the IPA 2001 and the Revenue Code, then, which occupies the higher position? 
Parliamentary Acts and Codes are at the same level in the hierarchy of laws. As a result, 
the IPA 2001 is of a status equal to the Revenue Code under the lex superior rule. The 
next rule to be taken into account is lex specialis in order to consider which norm is 
more special and should override the general one. Although the Revenue Code is 
considered a specific law (dealing with tax) in comparison to other, more general, 
commercial laws, the IPA 2001 clearly stipulates special provisions for tax incentives.   
The Investment Promotion Act has been in use since 1977 and since 2001 in its current 
form. As outlined in Chapter 4, the aim of this Act is to grant incentives to invest in 
export industries, protect domestic industries, expand infrastructure and eliminate 
obstacles to investment. These aims reflect the main objective of Thailand to promote 
investment. All three versions of the IPA (1977, 1991 and 2001) are considered 
investment law, promoting foreign and domestic investment by granting equal levels of 
incentives. The BOI was set up specifically to promote investment and is itself a special 
government agency with the power to grant fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to investors 
who are qualified for specific projects. Contrary to the mission of the BOI, the Revenue 
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Department’s mission is to increase the budget by increasing tax collection,1049 because 
tax revenue is essential to a country’s development. The government controls the level 
of national income through the management of government spending and revenue. 
Government expenditure can generate income for the population by paying government 
officers’ salaries, which in turn, will be spent on goods and services and could stimulate 
the wider economy.
1050
 
Under Section 31 of the IPA 2001, the BOI has authority to grant a BOI-promoted 
person exemption from corporate income tax; more specifically, the BOI has discretion 
not to grant a tax exemption to promoted activities which are deemed unsuitable for 
such incentives.
1051
 In addition, Section 31 prescribes special tax treatments for the 
BOI-promoted companies, and the objective of this provision is to give tax incentives to 
specific companies that are qualified to receive investment promotion. The provision 
regarding tax calculation under Section 65 of the Revenue Code is for companies 
operating general businesses, which do not qualify for BOI-promotion. This also 
suggests that the IPA 2001’s provision, specifying ‘the rights and benefits that the BOI-
promoted companies are entitled to are valid until the certificate of BOI promotion is 
withdrawn’, is unclear. As explained earlier in this chapter, revenue law, including the 
Revenue Code, is considered a special law regarding taxation, but only where it is 
compared to the CCC. In cases where there are clearly defined provisions under the 
Revenue Code, the provisions of the CCC are not applied.  
For this reason, together with an analysis of the Minebea case, pinpointing a specific 
case on losses carried forward, the IPA 2001 should be considered a specific law. This 
opinion is supported by the BOI, the Council of State (No. 158.2552 (2009) and up to 
the present time Central Tax Court Decision No. 190/2553, which was rendered on 13 
October 2010. The IPA also most closely reflects the intention of the legislative body 
when drafting original investment promotion laws and subsequent amended versions to 
support investment. As outlined in Chapter 3, the Thai tax court considers the intent of 
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the law a rule in statutory interpretation. To comply with the rule of separation of 
powers, the power of legislation belongs to the National Assembly. The objective of the 
IPA 2001 must therefore be considered in an interpretation of law. All of these reasons 
support the argument that the IPA 2001 is a special law and so should prevail over the 
Revenue Code, which in this case is a general law. 
The principle of lex posterior does not apply to this conflict, since its root is the 
inconsistency between the two different laws, and so it does not regard the date the law 
became effective. Consequently, the lex posterior rule is overridden by the lex specialis 
rule in the case of conflict between the Revenue Code and the IPA 2001. 
7.5 What are the consequences of applying the principle of lex specialis?   
This research agrees with the Central Tax Court in applying the lex specialis doctrine in 
the Minebea case. Although the IPA 2001 is a special law overriding the general 
provisions specified in the Revenue Code, its provisions do not explain practices 
regarding tax returns and the calculation of profit/loss. The Revenue Department itself 
accepted that the IPA 2001 is a specific law which the Revenue Code may not 
contradict.
1052
 However, the Revenue Department claimed that the issue under 
consideration is not the use of BOI tax holiday privileges but their calculation method 
according to the Revenue Code and under the jurisdiction of the Revenue Department. 
The Revenue Department can currently follow the Revenue Departmental Notification 
dated 5 February 1987 and treat a BOI company with multiple BOI projects as one tax 
unit; thus, profits/losses from all projects must be calculated altogether, because 
legislation on the matter, section 31 of the IPA 2001, is unclear.  
 
Although the Central Tax Court adopted the lex specialis maxim and ruled that the IPA 
2001 overrides the Revenue Code, the problem of unclear or ambiguous provisions in 
the IPA 2001 remains. The court in this case considered the objectives of the IPA 2001 
to help with the interpretation process, and drew parallels with the use of Section 11 of 
the Thai Civil and Commercial Code to interpret an ambiguous provision in favour of 
the taxpayer. There are two possible outcomes of the Supreme Court’s eventual decision 
on the Minebea case. On the one hand, if a final court judgement ruled in favour of the 
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Revenue Department, the assessment officer or the competent official has the power to 
enforce the unfavourable part of the judgement retrospectively, but only on the person 
who is a party to the case (Minebea). The revenue official will have to rely on Section 
13(7) paragraph 3 of the Revenue Code, which provides that ‘the rulings given by the 
Board of Taxation shall be final’. In this case, there is an eligible and applicable law. On 
the other hand, if the final judgment changes the opinion of the Board of Taxation or 
upholds the Central Tax Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court’s judgment shall bind 
only the parties in the specific case, not other taxpayers who have already been 
penalised by the tax officers.
1053 Regardless of whether the Supreme Court upholds the 
Central Tax Court’s decision or it may not; there still remains the problem with 
ambiguity in provisions of the IPA 2001. 
7.6 Theoretical Approach to the Problem 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, it is important to examine whether the norm is 
unclear or not before applying norm conflict resolution principles. This section will 
demonstrate the importance of certainty in law, and will examine in particular 
provisions under the IPA 2001 and whether or not they are unclear. 
It is important to understand the rationale of legal clarity. First, the liberty and property 
rights of citizens should be protected, and the extent and limitation of such rights must 
be in accordance with the provisions of the law.
1054
 Under Thailand’s constitution, 
citizens have a duty to obey the law, provided that it is clearly specified.
1055
 From the 
problem analysis in Chapter 6, it can be seen that the IPA 2001 creates conflicts and 
contradictions. Although it specifies conditions and procedures for the BOI-promoted 
companies that qualify for tax incentives, it leaves the authority regarding tax 
calculations and assessment with the Revenue Department, which utilises the Revenue 
Code and other subordinate laws. The Minebea case clearly showed the problem 
inherent in this tax incentive system.  
This jurisdictional conflict of tax incentives between the IPA 2001 and the Revenue 
Code, particularly the provision regarding net profit/loss calculation, is ambiguous. Tax 
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legislation should be certain,
1056
 so it is crucial that the method for calculating any 
benefit should be clearly outlined in legislation or regulation should be explained 
simply and should be as transparent as possible.
1057
 It should also include the person, a 
particular transaction and the amount of money which is subject to tax. The clear 
intention is that taxpayers should be able to anticipate the consequences of their 
ordinary personal and business affairs,
1058
 as well as be entitled to plan their conduct in 
accordance with a given tax structure, and that their legitimate expectations arising from 
a given tax structure must be respected. In order for taxpayers to plan their financial 
activities properly, the tax system must provide them with maximum certainty regarding 
the tax that they will be required to pay.
1059
  
 
Where FDI is concerned, it is unlikely that any large company would make major 
investments without first formulating a detailed business plan and a cost/benefit 
analysis.
1060
 Certainty is also beneficial to the country because it makes it possible for 
the tax authority to predict roughly the amount of tax that can be collected to add up to 
revenue, thus enabling the government to adjust the national budget accordingly. 
However, in this case, the BOI-promoted companies cannot anticipate the amount of tax 
which they are obliged to pay. A good tax policy does not only ensure that tax is 
collected. It must achieve ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’ for taxpayers’ compliance.1061 
Therefore, the current tax incentive system can be unfavourable to the revenue authority 
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as it is unable to estimate exactly how much tax can be collected, and it is unfair to 
BOI-promoted companies because they are unable to estimate how much tax they need 
to pay. Certainly, this creates a negative environment for investment. As viewed by 
Mallampally and Sauvant:  
 
Equally important, with FDI policy frameworks becoming more 
similar, countries interested in encouraging investment inflows are 
focusing on measures that facilitate business. These include investment 
promotion, investment incentives, and after-investment services, 
improvements in amenities, and measures that reduce the ‘‘hassle’’ 
costs of doing business.
1062
 
 
Governments may, and do, attempt to guide public habits and behaviour through the use 
of taxation, for example tax incentives to attract investment in specific areas or specially 
needed sectors. In the case of Thailand, a number of incentives are offered through the 
BOI. Governments including the Thai government should not, however, overlook the 
basic principle of taxation.
1063
   
According to Wagner, ‘no single principle of taxation can ever be decisive in itself; the 
various principles are all relevant to any one problem of taxation’.1064 In relation to tax 
incentives, though, it is important to remember that their purpose is to attract domestic 
and foreign investors into particular activities or areas. A tax incentive system should 
not be uncertain, since the investment that the government encourages is in the greater 
national interest (as described in Chapter 4 section 4.4). An explanation of the causes of 
legal uncertainty is essential and has been critically analysed in the previous chapter. 
Knowing these points, law-makers can prevent uncertainty and conflict in legislation 
through amendment or the passing of new legislation –  in Wagner’s words, finding ‘the 
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reasons why the law is uncertain will also help us better understand the theory of norms 
and its failings.’1065  
Generally, there are two types of legal uncertainty: subjective and objective. ‘Subjective 
uncertainty’ refers to individual assessments of the given situation; in short, there is 
uncertainty as to what actually constitutes the law.
1066
 ‘Objective uncertainty’ is a 
concrete situation that can be observed by all concerned, in which statutory regulations 
for certain sets of facts are either non-existent or do not form a reliable basis for 
decisions. Wagner has stated that ‘legal uncertainty always occurs when individual 
factors are uncertain of the effects of provisions of the dominant legal system on the 
results of their actions’.1067 In a broader sense, the term covers both ‘subjective’ and 
‘objective’ legal uncertainty.  
To give several scenarios, ‘objective legal uncertainty’ could apply to a situation in 
which there are no statutory rules and regulations to deal with it – because it has never 
before been encountered, perhaps. The second type of objective uncertainty occurs 
where regulations are unstable over and beyond consumption or investment periods.
1068
 
This can be due to the fact that amendments to statutes are frequent and unforeseeable, 
so that even experts are not clear about the current legal position and the continuance of 
subjective claims. The last situation of legal uncertainty is the denial of justice, which is 
understood to be the obstruction or prevention of the enforcement of legal rights by 
state authorities or employees.
1069
  
In practice, however, certainty is not always possible, since taxpayers may not always 
know in advance the effect of those rules, which depends on the facts and circumstances 
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in a particular case.
1070
 At the same time, tax authorities are not obliged to provide 
taxpayers with certainty in relation to the application of anti-abuse provisions aimed at 
those who seek to circumvent the intent of the legislation.
1071
 The researcher therefore 
recommends that tax avoidance strategies, particularly with regard to multinational 
companies’ transactions, need to be investigated further.1072 The current problem is that 
it is uncertain whether the Revenue Department or the BOI should have jurisdiction 
over tax incentives. Although it can be assumed that all of these agencies and 
departments are acting in the national interest, they have different priorities and their 
particular responsibilities are not always clearly delineated.
1073
 
 
Is this legal uncertainty over tax incentives in Thailand due to the fact that they fall 
under the control of a non-tax authority? Or is it because the IPA 2001 should clearly 
specify provisions regarding tax incentives? The problem arises from the fact that the 
BOI gives the impression of being a tax authority under the IPA 2001, whereas the real 
authority lies with the Revenue Department. In the Minebea case, the BOI took the 
issue to the Council of State, which is in charge of drafting legislation and offering 
expert opinions regarding provisions in legislation. At the same time, revenue officers 
took action against the BOI-promoted company, which then had to proceed with 
lawsuits against the Revenue Department. There are other BOI-promoted companies 
which are in the same situation as Minebea and are being assessed by the Revenue 
Department for tax that should have been waived, at least according to the IPA 2001.
1074
 
The uncertainty arising from this case was confirmed by Assavapokee, a leading tax 
advisor to a number of companies, who stated that this problem ‘has an impact on and 
                                                          
1070
 Carlo Romano, Advance tax rulings and principles of law: towards a European tax rulings system? 
(International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 2002) 217. 
 
1071
 OECD Note: Tax guidance series (n 1058) 4. 
1072
 In the case of the United Kingdom, HMRC’s Anti-Avoidance Group (AAG) was set up for the 
development, maintenance and delivery of the department’s anti-avoidance strategy, see Mary Hyland 
and Lisa-Jane Harper, Tolley’s Corporation Tax 2010-2011 (LexisNexis 2010) 40. 
1073
 Easson (n 8) 160. 
1074Prachachat News Ooline ‘Council of State ruled on a disagreement between the BOI and the Revenue 
Department’, Year 33, No.4206, 3 May 2010. 
<http://www.prachachat.net/view_news.php?newsid=02inv01030553&sectionid=0203&day=2010-05-
03> accessed 10 November 2011. 
215 
 
jeopardises the BOI promotion scheme and the efforts of the Thai government to 
promote Thailand as a great place to invest’.1075 He suggests that BOI-promoted 
companies could be subject to unanticipated assessments by the revenue officer. He also 
comments: 
 
So what exactly does the ‘‘BOI’’ means for foreign investors? One thing 
we certainly don’t want to hear is that it no longer means the ‘‘Board of 
Investment’’, and now stands for ‘‘Beware of Inland Revenue 
Services’’.1076 
 
Section 31 of the IPA 2001 is considered an ambiguous provision because its terms are 
too broad and fail to cover specific points. It contains words or terms which cover 
several possibilities, and it is left to the users of the law to judge what situations are 
covered by such the words or terms. Even if the law had been drafted in detail, with the 
lawmakers trying to cover every possible contingency, some situations could arise 
which are not specifically covered. The question, then, is whether the court should 
interpret the legislation so as to include the situation which was omitted, or whether 
they should limit the law to the precise meaning specified by the legislative body. The 
court then has to use one or more of the statutory interpretation rules, as laid out in 
Chapter 3. There is, of course, potential for words or phrases in the law to cause 
uncertainty.  
It is specified in the 2007 Constitution of Thailand that the National Assembly, the 
Council of Ministers, the courts and state agencies are to perform duties of office by the 
rule of law.
1077
 Everyone within the jurisdiction, Thai nationals and foreigners alike, can 
have confidence that their activities will be judged in accordance with established rules 
and principles of law. Thus, their personal liberty and the liberty to conduct business 
affairs are subject to restraint, only by virtue of legal powers clearly vested in persons 
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acting with the authority of the state under the constitution or under legislation as 
interpreted by the judges in courts.
1078
  
 
Complex and incomprehensible tax laws have become an increasing feature of modern 
taxation systems, to the detriment of both taxpayers’ and tax administrators.1079 In 
Thailand, Ministerial Notifications have been proven to create inconsistency because 
they are issued by an administrative body, not the legislative body. As such, legislation 
issued by an administrative body, instead of elected representatives, can violate the 
principle of ‘no taxation without representation’.1080 Rulings have, in time, turned into 
what they should not have been, i.e. an additional source of legislation, so potential 
solutions should therefore be examined. An efficient legislation-drafting process is 
essentially crucial, since it can decide whether the enforcement of the law is in line with 
an objective of such law. A careful drafting process can prevent conflicts of jurisdiction 
and avoid the procedure in selecting norm conflict resolution. 
 
Two factors are of key importance in determining the certainty of a law – the clarity of 
its wording and understanding, and the confidence that it will be interpreted and applied 
consistently. A system which adheres to these principles and treats people equally under 
these measures is more likely to be viewed by taxpayers as fair.
1081
 If they are to 
influence investor decisions, tax incentives need to be predictable. The qualifying 
conditions for tax incentives should be set out clearly and in detail in the legislation so 
that potential investors may determine whether or not they will qualify for the incentive, 
or what they have to do in order to qualify.
1082
 It is important here to look back at the 
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formulation of policy on incentives including tax incentives.
1083
 Were all of the agencies 
concerned involved in its formulation? Most importantly, were the potential costs of 
incentives (in terms of administrative burden and loss of public revenue) weighed up 
against the anticipated benefits? Not only must tax administration collect tax as stated 
by law, but it must also consider the cost of public service, as well as compliance and 
administration.
1084
 Because Thailand abides by a civil law system, relying primarily on 
the wording of legislation to make citizens’ rights and obligations clear, a high level of 
clarity and certainty is needed in its tax law.
1085
 
7.7 Should the BOI or the RD have authority over tax incentives? Which law 
should be applicable to disputes on tax incentives? 
As we have seen from the previous section, investors will normally apply for tax 
privileges early in the investment process. For obvious reasons, new investors can be 
reluctant to start operations or make significant business commitments without being 
sure of their tax status. Incentive legislation is found in both foreign investment laws 
and tax laws. The granting of incentives, both fiscal and non-fiscal, can be set out in the 
general foreign investment legislation.
1086
 However, as this chapter has illustrated in 
detail, this can cause significant problems because tax provisions in investment law may 
be drafted with little regard for their relation to general tax law, as has been the case in 
Thailand. The relationship between tax holidays, especially the loss carry forward rule, 
and general tax law was not considered in enough detail during the legislative draft 
process.  
Because of the risk of conflicts of legislation, and the danger of overlapping incentives 
whereby investors can unfairly reap the benefits twice, it is advisable that all tax 
measures are contained in tax legislation only. It is crucial to establish which body has 
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the authority to decide whether an investment qualifies for tax privileges, at what level 
the decision is taken and the level of discretion that such the body can exercise. The 
case analysis in Chapter 6 revealed the need for ‘certainty’ in the tax incentive system. 
Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that a single body should have authority over 
tax incentives. Easson recommends that the body in charge should itself have the 
authority to grant privileges, as opposed to just helping investors to apply for them.
1087
  
This research argues that the tax authority should, rather than only granting privileges 
(as does the BOI currently), also cover the control and management of such privileges. 
The real problem is that the Revenue Department is currently the only real authority to 
control taxation, including incentives. Under the current legislation, and in accordance 
with the norm conflict resolution principles discussed in the earlier part of this chapter, 
the IPA 2001 should be applicable to disputes on tax incentives for BOI-promoted 
companies because it is a specific law and prevails over the Revenue Code, which is a 
general set of laws regarding tax. In addition, in order to improve clarity and certainty in 
taxation, taxpayers should be responsible only for what the legislation clearly specifies, 
and only at the time when their transaction occurs. Because tax law is a public law with 
criminal penalties, ambiguities should always be interpreted in favour of the taxpayer, 
to avoid cases of mistakenly fining or jailing innocent people.  
Under the current legislation, the researcher agrees with the Central Tax Court that the 
IPA 2001 is a specific law and that the BOI should have authority over tax incentives.  
The current different objectives of the BOI and the Revenue Department, coupled with 
their overlapping responsibilities, are the main causes of the problem, and so it is clear 
that the system needs reform.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter focused on significant types of norm conflict resolution doctrines, namely 
lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior which are regularly used in both 
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international law and domestic law systems. In Thailand, these three rules are also 
applied by the courts where there is conflict between two laws that apply to the same 
subject at the same time. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the main issue in the Minebea 
case is whether the Revenue Code or the IPA 2001 should be applicable in the issue of 
tax incentives for BOI-promoted businesses. The Central Tax Court applied the lex 
specialis maxim and ruled that the IPA 2001 should be applied as a specific law, 
overriding the Revenue Code. The court also adopted the rule on statutory interpretation 
in that, where the jurisdiction over tax is unclear, the court should interpret the law to be 
in favour of taxpayers. It is, however, important to note that Thai courts, using a civil 
law system, need to follow the exact wording of legislation. This stands in contrast to 
the British common law system under which the final interpretation by the court can 
create legal precedent.  
This chapter concluded that the IPA 2001 should be applicable to the Minebea case and 
other problematic provisions under the IPA 2001, provided that there is no reform or 
legal amendment. According to the analysis presented in this chapter, section 31 of the 
IPA 2001 is unclear on the method of profit/loss calculation when a tax exemption is to 
be calculated. The Minebea case emphasised the fact that provisions regarding tax 
incentives for BOI-promoted companies under the IPA 2001 are unclear and cause 
difficulties for both investors and government authorities. A reform of the tax incentive 
system to clarify meaning and tax calculation under the provisions of the IPA 2001 may 
therefore ease the conflict. Alternatively, the Revenue Code could provide a solution to 
the problem by specifying tax incentives for BOI-promoted businesses itself. The next 
chapter will make suggestions for the reform of legislation and administration regarding 
tax incentives. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
8 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined in detail the workings of Thailand’s legal system in order to 
provide a full context for the legislative problems discussed. It has also provided a full 
framework – drawing on the experience of other states’ legislatures – within which the 
problem of conflicting laws can be analysed. The conclusions that may be drawn from 
the studies in this thesis are first summarised, and then followed by a brief final 
comment. The second part of this chapter deals with recommendations. 
 
The Thai legal system and its characteristics were explained in Chapter 2. Its mixed 
character as a civil law system with common law traits is essential to understanding the 
problems outlined in this thesis and the typical approaches and procedures that the Thai 
courts might take to address them. The fact that decisions made by the courts do not set 
a legally binding precedent, as under common law (the most famous example of which 
is the British legal system), but can still influence judges’ decisions, is characteristic of 
this mixed system. Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, in which the king acts as head 
of state within the parameters of the constitution. Its formal, written constitution is the 
supreme law. The Tax Court is one of the specialised courts through which an appeal 
can be taken directly to the Supreme Court. Thus, the court procedure is accelerated, 
since the case does not have to be heard by the Appeal Court. The hierarchy of laws in 
Thailand places primary legislation and secondary legislation beneath the constitution, 
in that order, while the constitution itself, as mentioned above, is the supreme law, with 
any legislation contradicting it automatically judged null and void. This thesis has 
discussed the exact hierarchy of laws and its implications in some detail.   
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As Chapter 3 reveals, taxes are crucial to Thailand’s economy, a they are the main 
source of revenue for financing public sector spending, including economic growth 
support, resource management, the maintenance of economic stability and income 
allocation. This chapter examined the sources and the scope of Thai revenue law, along 
with its administration. More specifically, it addressed the hierarchy of tax legislation, 
which is a substantial topic of discussion regarding the relationship between norm 
conflict resolution principles and tax law. Chapter 3 went on to specify the duties of the 
Revenue Department, namely to collect all taxes efficiently to administrate the tax 
system and that it is part of the Ministry of Finance, which in turn has responsibilities 
over all public finance, taxation, treasury and other revenue-generating enterprises. This 
chapter also laid out specific statutory interpretation rules adopted by the Thai courts.  
 
Thailand is one of Asia’s most popular investment destinations. Gains from FDI have 
aided the country’s recovery from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and FDI is seen by 
the Thai government as a viable means of achieving sustainable development. When 
practiced responsibly and efficiently it can be a productive means of educating and 
training the workforce in developing industrial techniques, and can guarantee minimal 
environmental impact. Post-1997, the Thai government became aware of the pressing 
need to attract capital into the country, fresh investment was essential in order for the 
nation’s economy to grow and prosper. FDI continues to be an important means of 
income generation in Thailand and, as this thesis argues, should be developed and 
encouraged. However, due to domestic political unrest, the Map Ta Phut case and the 
global economic crisis, the confidence and interest of both foreign and domestic 
investors has decreased, leading them to delay and even abandon potential investments. 
A solution to this decline and a resolution to the problem would encourage investment 
by guaranteeing specific and predictable incentives.  
 
The BOI was established to provide investment incentives to foreign or local investors 
that invest in promoted or priority activities; the BOI stipulates and revises investment 
promotion schemes in accordance with the objectives of the government at the time, and 
it is a government agency under the auspices of the Ministry of Industry. The BOI 
introduced investment promotional schemes, including tax and non-tax oriented 
incentives in order to eliminate avoidable burdens that could deter investors, such as 
bureaucracy and high tax costs at start-up. Chapter 4 explained that the BOI’s role is as 
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a ‘one-stop’ governmental body, dealing with and supporting all aspects of investment, 
both foreign and domestic. The history, importance and responsibilities of the BOI raise 
a critical question, in that why should it, as opposed to the Revenue Department, have 
jurisdiction over tax incentives? As discussed in Chapter 3, the most important role of 
the Revenue Department is to enhance revenue collection and improve expenditure 
management. This objective differs from that of the BOI, which aims to promote 
investment by offering tax exemptions or reductions. 
 
The objectives of the Revenue Department and the BOI are therefore clearly different. 
The conflict problem is generated by the two government agencies undertaking their 
roles with little collaboration, i.e. the Revenue Department collects taxes from promoted 
companies, whilst the BOI grants promoted companies tax exemptions in order to 
generate further investment in Thailand. However, a solution cannot be found easily, as 
there are a number of factors, such as economic situation, political instability, 
requirements for specific types of investments and influence from investors, which lead 
taxpayers to prefer the BOI as a one-stop service agency. From the perspective of 
investors, it is quicker and more convenient to contact one agency to deal with the 
setting up of businesses, work permits, land ownership and incentives – both tax and 
non-tax related. From the government’s perspective, the fact that the BOI is responsible 
for investment promotion alone means that it understands the current requirements of 
the Thai economy and which types of activities and areas should be promoted.   
 
The varying types of tax incentives offered by the Thai Revenue Department and the 
BOI were discussed in Chapter 5. More specifically, the tax incentives provided for 
BOI-promoted businesses were examined in relation to their importance and impact on 
business sectors or activities. This chapter provided the background to subsequent 
discussions on the conflict of jurisdiction over tax incentives. As the thesis emphasises 
and as Luja suggests, fiscal incentives should be considered preferable to other means of 
subsidy for a variety of reasons,
1088
 including confidentiality, sensitivity, visibility, 
politics, and tax expenditure, if used as a policy instrument. According to Luja, as long 
as the cost of tax expenditure is apparent, a reduction in tax could indeed be a viable 
option for grants, if considered appropriate. Politicians should be cautious that in opting 
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for fiscal subsidies the tax system is not overly complicated for the taxpayers.
1089
 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that tax incentives may not work and may potentially 
cause revenue loss. With this in mind, the issues discussed in this chapter are intended 
to further enhance the debate on the amendment of tax incentive provisions. Although 
tax incentives influence the decisions of foreign investors to invest in a country, it is 
vital that other non-taxation factors in the investment climate should not be overlooked. 
This thesis suggested that tax incentives are to be used primarily as a signposting 
device, especially for required activities and in targeted areas.  
 
Law and economics play equal parts in the debate on tax incentives. Economic 
principles largely dictate the system when it comes to revenue enhancing and each tax 
incentive should be carefully considered to ascertain if it is fit for purpose. There are 
potential pitfalls that need to be noted, though. Size must be budgeted for and tax 
incentives reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that government funding and resources 
are being used efficiently and consistently. Furthermore, it is essential to consider 
whether tax incentive provisions should still be included in the IPA 2001. If this is the 
case, it is crucial to analyse whether or not the IPA 2001 should be amended in order to 
address the problem of unclear provisions.   
 
Chapter 6 outlined problems caused by the Revenue Department and the BOI’s 
overlapping power over tax incentives. This was borne out by a number of rulings 
asking the Revenue Department for advice on the unclear provisions of the IPA 2001 
regarding tax incentives for BOI-promoted businesses. Problems regarding profit and 
loss calculations for BOI-promoted companies were particularly noteworthy, with the 
Minebea case a prime example. A number of BOI-promoted companies were in similar 
situations. The Revenue Department and the BOI hold different opinions and practices 
where tax incentives are concerned, which has brought about uncertain and extended 
administrative procedures as opposed to efficiently administered foreign investment, 
which is necessary for the continued growth of Thailand’s economy. Over the course of 
this thesis, the major problem of ambiguous jurisdiction was addressed in the hope that 
a potentially significant disincentive to FDI within Thailand can be eliminated.  
 
                                                          
1089
 Ibid. 
224 
 
The specific issue discussed in Chapter 6 arose after inconsistent interpretations, by the 
Revenue Department and the BOI, regarding the calculation of net losses from 
companies operating more than one promoted project. The question was as follows: 
When the net loss from promoted business is considered, should it mean either each 
promoted project individually or all promoted projects of that company combined?  In 
the Minebea case, the Revenue Department did not accept the BOI’s calculation; 
instead, they adopted their own calculation of loss and profit under the ‘single entity’ 
concept. Consequently, companies have been taxed at much higher rates. Even though 
the Council of State issued its opinion, agreeing with the BOI, tax officers are still 
continuing this practice (according to the Board of Taxation No: 38/2552) until the 
courts give a final order. As a consequence, it is imperative that the Thai government 
finds a solution to this problem and establishes one consistent administration for tax 
incentives. The amendment of legislation and the incorporation of tax incentives to the 
Revenue Code could be a solution to the problem. 
 
Lastly, Chapter 7 dealt with the means through which conflicts in law can be solved. 
The principles of norm conflict resolutions were explored in this chapter. In Thailand, 
three specific principles are used by the courts where there is conflict between two laws 
applying to the same subject at any one time. This research explained the characters and 
rationales of the three principles, namely the principles of lex superior, lex priori, and 
lex specialis. In the Minebea case, the Central Tax Court ruled in favour of Minebea by 
applying existing legislation according to the ‘separations of powers’ rule, under which 
the court cannot make law. Here, the court used the maxim of lex specialis and further 
ruled that the IPA 2001 is a specific law which overrides the Revenue Code (the general 
law). As such, it showed compliance with the principle of certainty when the fact is that 
the jurisdiction over tax is not precise or clear.  
 
Thai courts, in line with their civil law system, are required to follow the exact wording 
of legislation. As there is no specific wording in the IPA 2001 specifying the means of 
calculating profit and loss, a reform of the tax incentive system to clarify the meaning of 
words and specify tax calculations under the provisions of the IPA 2001 would 
hopefully ease the conflict. There is also the possibility that incorporating provisions for 
tax incentives into the Revenue Code could be a solution to the problem. Chapter 6 
examined this idea in detail, including its consequences and aspects that should be 
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considered for reform. The Minebea case demonstrated that provisions regarding tax 
incentives for promoted companies under the IPA 2001 are unclear. This case shows 
that the dispersal of power over tax incentives across two regulatory authorities, the 
Revenue Department and the BOI, creates uncertainty and can lead to lengthy legal 
procedures, which can prove costly to both the government and investors. What is clear 
is that the administration of taxation should be clear and manageable.  
 
It is also imperative that taxpayers have a thorough grasp and understanding of how the 
system works. This is essential for many reasons, not least because it reduces the 
likelihood of accidental tax evasion, whereby people have not understood their 
obligations. Financial planning can also be facilitated, allowing people to budget for 
their tax liabilities in advance to avoid unexpected financial difficulty. This thesis has 
attempted to highlight the conflict of jurisdiction over tax incentives and the problems 
that it creates. The system is in need of reform. 
 
Recommendations 
The first recommendation is to examine the possibility of combining the two separate 
authorities that have jurisdiction over tax issues. The United Kingdom is an example of 
a country which merged its different tax departments into one. There was a merger of 
the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise Departments, hence forming HM 
Revenue & Customs (HMRC), on the 18 April 2005.
1090
 By using technologies such as 
the computerisation of records and self-assessment, the policies and procedures of tax 
administration can be simplified. Such tools make a separate tax department 
unnecessary and reduce the costs and bureaucracy associated with the separation of tax 
administration into different departments. This thesis does not, however, recommend 
the combination of the Revenue Department, the Custom Department and the Excise 
Department, which currently share responsibility for tax administration as a whole. It 
suggests, rather, that the use of a primarily non-tax authority (the BOI) to oversee tax 
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matters causes problems. Historically, the BOI was set up as a single body responsible 
for all investment-related matters and to grant tax incentives to investors. However, 
currently this scenario is no longer preferable due to problems with overlapping 
jurisdiction and unclear provisions of law, together with continual changes in business 
operations and tax planning. Therefore, this thesis recommends considering whether the 
inclusion of tax provisions in otherwise non-tax legislation, such as the IPA 2001, 
should be terminated. This will be dealt with in section 8.3 onwards. 
 
One possible solution is aimed at finding policies that entail the co-operation and co-
ordinated action of the BOI and the Revenue Department, with the intention of avoiding 
duplication, confusion and oversight. This solution may be a problematic one to 
implement, since some roles and objectives of the two authorities contradict one 
another. One example is that the current objective of the BOI, is to promote investment 
by giving tax exemptions, whereas the aim of the Revenue Department is to maximise 
tax collections. 
 
The current tax incentive provisions under the IPA 2001, as this thesis has made clear, 
are difficult to understand clearly, and are equally as tricky to implement uniformly. In 
this case, it is unclear as to whether the responsible authority is the BOI or the Revenue 
Department. As such, the existing system is open to a high level of tax planning, 
making complex forms of tax evasion possible and causing an increase in tax collection 
costs for the state and in compliance costs for taxpayers. Taking these insights into 
account, the most viable solution in Thailand’s case is to amend the current legislation, 
for which two options can be considered. 
 
The first option is the amendment of the Revenue Code, Section 65, which should 
specify that ‘companies which are promoted by the Board of Investment shall be subject 
to the calculation of net profit or net loss under this provision’. Instead, it should be 
amended to specifically include the terms of such calculations. Hopefully, therefore, this 
should make it clear that the Revenue Department is the body responsible for all tax 
matters, including tax incentives for BOI-promoted companies. The second option is to 
amend the IPA 2001 by clarifying its problematic terms, particularly where tax 
calculation, especially profit/loss calculation, is concerned. A clause, similar to section 
120 of the Customs Act of 1926 (see below) could be added:  
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The provisions of this Act shall prevail in all matters concerned with 
investment promotion, including fiscal and non-fiscal incentives 
granted by the Board of Investment. Where the provisions of this Act 
are inconsistent with the provisions of other Acts or Notifications, such 
Acts or Notifications which will come into force at a future date shall 
not be deemed as repealing, restricting, altering, or withdrawing the 
powers under this Act unless such new Acts or Notifications expressly 
state such an intention. 
 
Under current legislation, one point needs to be considered for the IPA to have its 
jurisdiction over tax incentives. Section 13 (7) of the IPA 2001 states ‘[…] the office 
shall have the power and duty to perform other duties in the furtherance of the 
objectives of the Act.’ Furthermore, as we have seen in Chapter 4 of this thesis, one of 
the objectives of this Act is to grant incentives, including tax incentives, as a means to 
promote investment. This provision can therefore be considered as giving authority to 
the BOI to clarify any matter, including tax incentives stipulated under the Act, and to 
seek legal opinion from the Council of State. 
 
The two options stated above, in solving the problem of conflict between the IPA 2001 
and the Revenue Code might actually create other problems because the BOI has 
different objectives to the Revenue Department and is not responsible for collecting the 
country’s tax revenue. Rules concerning the calculation, interpretation and application 
of the law could, under the jurisdiction of the BOI, be biased in favour of investors. It is 
also important to understand that the BOI has no power to enforce the law, and in the 
case of disputes, higher authorities might have to be consulted. The inclusion of tax 
provisions in non-tax legislation, as evident in the case of the IPA 2001, is problematic. 
Neither does the BOI have tax officials who can efficiently advise or assist investors on 
tax matters.  
 
Under Thailand’s current system, the BOI’s role is to promote investment, both 
domestic and foreign, in the Thai economy, including through the use of tax incentives, 
because Thailand is an economically developing country under difficult political 
circumstances and still requires foreign investment. Consideration must, however, be 
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given to the nature of the promoted companies and the conditions they must meet to be 
entitled to such incentives, as well as what constitutes the most advantageous use of the 
investment.
1091
 Any enacted reform should develop clearly defined policies and 
establish efficient regulatory measures. In this context, it is therefore submitted that the 
Revenue Department should have sole jurisdiction over tax incentives. Reform of 
revenue administration will be considered in light of this recommendation.  
 
A number of commentators offer succinct analyses of the precise reasons why a country 
must ensure that its tax administration is as efficient as possible. The first point is that 
the actual amount of tax revenue that flows into public funds depends almost entirely on 
the efficiency of the body dealing with tax administration.
1092
 A weakness in this area 
leads to a loss in public funds from tax evasion.
1093
 Secondly, it is clear that the 
investment climate is directly affected by the standard of tax administration because 
potential investors are deterred not only by high levels of taxation,
1094
 but also by an 
administration that appears unpredictable or predatory, as well as complicated or overly 
bureaucratic.
1095
 Thirdly, poor administration, leading to inefficient calculation or 
collection of taxes, actually puts law-abiding firms, who make a concerted effort to 
administrate their own tax well, at a disadvantage.
1096
 This lessens the incentives for 
firms to be vigilant about their own tax payments. Finally, global business environments 
are moving and changing rapidly, with globalisation presenting an array of 
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opportunities for companies to practice tax manipulation and avoidance.
1097
 Hence, the 
following aspects must be taken into consideration to decide the best and most suitable 
solution to this current problem. 
 
8.2 Tax Incentive Reform  
This thesis has examined the problems of conflict and lack of clarity in tax incentive 
jurisdiction between the Revenue Department and the BOI. Such overlaps and conflicts 
should, if possible, be completely eliminated. It is therefore recommended that tax 
incentive provisions be incorporated in the Revenue Code under the jurisdiction of the 
Revenue Department, as this would avoid the difficulties that have been highlighted in 
this thesis. Most importantly, this would add to the efficiency of Thailand’s tax system. 
It is recommended that Thai policymakers, in pursuing the suggested reforms, should 
address the following important questions. 
8.2.1 Granting of tax incentives by the Revenue Department   
It has been shown that tax incentives are a significant factor taken into consideration by 
foreign investors. In addition, FDI is important for Thailand’s sustainable economic 
development. However, there are also difficulties associated with the use of tax 
incentives, as they require a special set of interpretative tools because they have unique 
features such as ‘high level[s] of detail’ and a ‘self-contained nature’.1098 It is important 
to have a competent body which can monitor and evaluate the practical effect of tax 
incentives on the overall economy of the country. It is possible, at least in theory, to 
restrict tax incentives to incremental investment by countries already operating in 
Thailand, rather than to grant them primarily to FDI investments that might set up in the 
country regardless.
1099
 However, it is difficult to determine which of the prospective 
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investors would come to Thailand only if granted incentives, and which would be 
attracted by other factors, such as a skilled workforce or low costs. Further complicating 
the matter is the fact that, if pressed, all prospective investors are likely to agree that tax 
privileges are essential to their investment decision.
1100
 
 
An interesting and useful suggestion is made by Wells and Allen, who suggest that the 
cost of incentives be charged to the budget of the department granting them.
1101
 In this 
way, the authority which is responsible for tax incentives is likely to be more cautious 
in risk and cost assessment. This thesis also recommends that the tax authority – which, 
under the terms set out in this thesis, should be taken to mean the Revenue Department 
– could grant tax incentives in accordance with the criteria set forth for granting tax 
incentives. It is suggested that the criteria for granting tax incentives should be 
expressed in the Revenue Code or by Royal Decree. Each application should be 
assessed on its own merit, and care should be taken that the system is kept quick and 
efficient.
1102
 In addition, there should be a provision to specify explicitly the guaranteed 
period, such as ‘This condition will be valid until [whatever date].’ Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, the potentially adverse effects of using tax incentives, 
including the creation of exploitable loopholes in the tax system, are evident.
1103
 To 
prevent this, the Revenue Department should take responsibility for the administration 
of tax incentives because with its competent tax officials, it is capable of anticipating 
possible tax abuses and taking appropriate and prompt action when needed. 
 
This thesis proposes that the better solution to prevent the conflict between the IPA 
2001 and the Revenue Code on the issue of tax incentives is to incorporate the 
provisions regarding tax incentives in the Revenue Code. This is due to the following 
reasons.  
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Firstly, the Revenue Department is a tax authority and has competent tax officials who 
can employ techniques against tax abuses
1104
 with more knowledge and experience than 
officials from the Ministry of Industry and the BOI. As Chalk noted in relation to 
investment in the Philippines, ‘companies in receipt of the various incentives often do 
not comply with the BOI’s regulations to supply information and financial statements 
and the BOI appears to have little resources to monitor and control the abuse of 
incentives’.1105  
Secondly, all the principles and practices regarding taxation, including tax 
administration, assessment and legal actions conducted by officials, should be specified 
under the Revenue Code, which is primary legislation, and not in secondary legislation, 
because secondary legislation, by an executive body, concerning matters which can 
affect the statuses and rights of the citizens might not be properly examined. This issue 
can be supported by the opinion of Lord Hoffmann in the Wilkinson case, as discussed 
in section 7.4 in Chapter 7. According to current practice, the Revenue Department can 
issue notifications to supplement the Revenue Code, which is the primary legislation. 
The Revenue Department’s role should primarily be tax administration and collection 
rather than the interpretation of tax legislation, which should be the responsibility of the 
courts. Likewise, the Revenue Code should be written as clearly as possible and can be 
supplemented by Revenue Department Notifications or other secondary legislation, but 
only where matters need to be clarified further, and such matters must not impose more 
burdens on taxpayers. As suggested by Chalk, all tax law should be made by statute to 
ensure that all such legislation is properly scrutinised.
1106
  
This researcher accepts the argument that secondary legislation has a place in the 
formulation of policy, provided that it is limited to the clarification of minor or one-off 
issues, and in cases in which a statute would be difficult to formulate.
1107
 This research 
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has proven that the IPA 2001’s provisions on tax incentives create an unacceptable level 
of uncertainty, which could result in protracted and costly resolution processes. Its 
recommendation, therefore, is that these particular provisions should be specified by the 
Revenue Code, or at least by Royal Decree. The current practice, whereby the method 
of tax calculations is specified by a Departmental Notification, should be ceased 
forthwith.  
Thirdly, stipulating tax incentive provisions under the Revenue Code should enhance 
transparency and efficiency in tax administration. There are increasing numbers of 
certificates of promotion being issued, showing that there are more BOI-promoted 
projects being approved.
1108
 Tax incentive administration, therefore, should be 
enhanced, and conducted by a tax specialised agency. In addition, the administrative 
expenses of tax collecting should not be excessive. The current system, having two 
authorities, is more costly than having the Revenue Department handle all tax matters. 
The collection of revenue should be relatively easy, without causing a disproportionate 
burden to the tax administration or high compliance costs to the taxpayer. In the highly 
competitive arena of the world economy, Thailand’s investment climate could be 
improved radically by the implementation of a new investment policy paradigm, thus 
attracting more foreign capital. The system of tax incentives must be made clearer, as 
well as more consistent and predictable,
1109
 which could be achieved under a new 
scheme centred on administration by the Revenue Department.  
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 For numbers of BOI promotion certificate issued in 2009-2011 (January – September), see Promotion 
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8.2.2 Important points to be considered for incorporating tax incentive 
provisions under the Revenue Code 
First and foremost, it is recommended that tax reform regarding incentives for BOI-
promoted companies should be made at an appropriate time. Considering the global 
economic crisis, Thailand’s political instability and the latest severe bout of flooding, 
the Thai government must be very careful when considering the most suitable time for 
reform. Particularly, unpredictable or sudden changes in tax measures can be harmful to 
investors,
1110
 so sufficient prior notice of changes in tax incentives and amendments to 
their provisions should be given to both foreign and domestic investors, which will 
provide a greater degree of certainty. One suggestion is to have a ‘road map’, which sets 
out how the Thai government intends to approach its reform of the tax incentive system 
over the next five years. This practice is currently being conducted by the United 
Kingdom Treasury Department.
1111
 
 
The change of tax incentive administration is proposed to be announced one year before 
the effective date, and should be considered together with the plan to reduce the national 
corporate tax rate. The Thai Cabinet approved on 11 October 2011 a plan to reduce the 
national corporate tax rate from the standard rate of 30% to 23% for the year ending 31 
December 2012, and on 1 January 2013, it will be reduced to 20%.
1112
 The purpose of 
this plan is to promote Thailand’s competitiveness in the global market, and to prepare 
for its membership to the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which was initiated by 
ASEAN leaders with the vision to ‘transform ASEAN into a single market and 
production base that is highly competitive and fully integrated into the global 
community by 2015’.1113 This economic integration is aiming for ‘the elimination of 
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tariffs, free movement of professionals, freer movement of capital and a streamlined 
customs clearance procedure’.1114 Thus, the plan to change tax incentive administration 
and the incorporation of tax incentive provisions under the Revenue Code should be 
carried out shortly after, or together with, the plan to reduce the corporate tax rate for 
the purpose of revenue adjustment and overall national tax reform. 
 
Second, there should be an assessment of whether the administration of current tax 
incentives by the Revenue Department is workable. Tax incentives which are currently 
governed by the Revenue Department are those for regional operating headquarters 
(ROHs), as explained in Chapter 5. The calculation of corporate income tax (CIT) under 
this ROH scheme has to follow Sections 65 and 65 (2) of the Revenue Code, which 
specifies the determination of profit and loss whereby each business must calculate 
profit and loss separately from another business (if there are ROH businesses and non-
ROH businesses). With respect to expenses, they must be apportioned based on the 
proportion of income derived from the ROH business and the non-ROH business.
1115
 
The same practice is adopted for loss calculation, where the deduction of losses incurred 
from the ROH business in any accounting year is restricted to ROH profits (not 
combined with non-ROH profits) of subsequent accounting years.
1116
 This ROH scheme 
shows that tax incentives which aim to encourage foreign companies to set up regional 
headquarters in Thailand could be overseen by the Revenue Department. In this way, 
tax practice and authority are clearly specified. With this in mind, it can be argued that 
bringing the ROH scheme under the auspices of the Revenue Department could help it 
to be better monitored and made more user-friendly. Additionally, it could be used 
alongside the double tax agreements that are currently implemented by the Revenue 
Department.   
 
Regarding the ROH scheme, approved by the Revenue Department. There are, however, 
issues relating to the ROH scheme which the Thai government should take into account. 
ROH legislation has proved disappointing to many foreign investors, who may initially 
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have considered Thailand an appealing investment destination.
1117
 Hong Kong and 
Singapore, for example, now seem more appealing destinations in the region.
1118
 Critics 
of the ROH argue that the scheme’s lack of provision for foreign currency bank 
accounts, and the relatively small number of work permits available to foreign staff, 
makes it unviable in its current form.
1119
 In addition, tax incentives under the control of 
an authority such as the Thai Revenue Department, known for unpopular tax collecting 
policies, may not seem appealing to investors. 
 
Another tax incentive scheme which is currently under the control of the Revenue 
Department is tax incentives for R&D projects. As Chapter 5 outlined, 100% CIT 
exemption for companies’ R&D projects is provided under the conditions set out by the 
Revenue Department.
1120
 The benefit of this R&D scheme is an increase in expenditure 
on R&D by international groups. Further research into the possible benefits of such a 
scheme should be undertaken.  
 
The third issue to consider is the fact that the change of tax incentive jurisdiction to the 
Revenue Department might raise concerns around tax compliance. The Revenue 
Department should adopt a measure to balance between respecting the rights, privacy 
and commercial confidentiality of investors on the one hand, and efficient 
administration and the prevention of non-tax compliance on the other. Neither should 
this process lose sight of the fact that BOI-promoted companies still need to benefit 
from tax incentives, without feeling unreasonably persecuted by the authority. 
 
Lastly, the process of tax incentive incorporation to the Revenue Code must address the 
relationship between policy and drafting, anticipating application and interpretation, 
drafting for a judicial audience and the relationship between statutes, regulations and 
other secondary legislation.
1121
 It is desirable that the relationship between the Revenue 
                                                          
1117
 Seri Manop & Doyle (n 629). 
1118
 Ibid 
1119
 Ibid. 
1120
 Royal Decree B.E. 2539 (1996) No. 297. 
1121
 For more detail regarding technique of drafting tax laws, see Victor Thuronyi (ed), ‘Tax Law Design 
and Drafting’, (1996) International Monetary Fund, Chapter 3. 
236 
 
Code and secondary laws be clear to taxpayers. An explicit provision which specifies 
them should therefore be introduced.  
 
Provisions regarding tax incentives for BOI-promoted companies under 
the Revenue Code Section […] prevail over the inconsistent provisions 
of Royal Decrees, Ministerial Regulations, Ministerial Instructions and 
Ministerial Notifications. 
 
Furthermore, whenever a tax policymaker foresees or encounters undefined or unclear 
terms or methods of tax calculations, these incidences should be taken into account 
when drafting or amending tax laws.
1122
 More specifically, provisions regarding tax 
incentives under the Revenue Code should clearly define unclear terms and methods of 
tax calculation, as evident from the discussion in Chapter 6, in order to avoid 
uncertainty in interpretation. Other types of secondary laws are for tax officials to 
comply with in operating tax provisions under the Revenue Code. Secondary laws can 
also deal with types, criteria and conditions of businesses and the amounts of taxes 
which are constantly evolving. However, secondary legislation should not result in more 
burdens on taxpayers. 
8.2.3 Tax incentives and the possibility of corruption 
The main purposes of taxation are to acquire sources of revenue, to support economic 
growth, to manage resources and to maintain economic stability. However, the Thai 
government has also used its taxation system for other purposes, such as to promote 
investment. Under the current situation, decisions of the BOI are difficult to predict, 
owing to the lack of clarity in the legislation. The result is that potential investors may 
incur a substantial outlay of time and money before learning the terms on which the 
investment may proceed. A system whereby the BOI has discretion over tax incentives 
can be an invitation to corruption, since investors do not wish to waste money on tax 
litigation and may be more tempted to bribe officers instead. Two possible reasons for 
ceasing corruption among BOI officials are that (1) it is easier to hide corruption by 
claiming that they lack expertise and (2) the BOI can be biased to give as many tax 
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incentives as possible, without sufficient risk assessment, in order to convince investors 
to invest in Thailand. After tax incentive provisions are incorporated into the Revenue 
Code, there should be raised awareness among tax officials, who can be accused of any 
bribery. This thesis suggests that the process of granting tax incentives should be 
changed from discretionary to automatic, so tax incentives should be automatically 
granted to investors where all the prescribed criteria and conditions are met. Another 
suggestion for the problem of corruption is that, since tax incentives are granted by 
revenue officials, these officials’ forms of motivation should be altered. In order to 
reduce corruption, honesty should be rewarded through promotions and higher pay, as 
well as corruption punished through financial penalties and possible dismissal.
1123
  
8.2.4 The consequences of tax incentive reform for investors 
The reform of tax incentive administration and legislation, as this thesis has proposed, 
would ideally enhance overall certainty in the amount of tax due to be paid by investors, 
whose concerns may arise as they will  have to contact the Revenue Department 
directly, whereas in the current practice, the BOI facilitates and provides assistance for 
essential matters, including tax queries. However, as analysed in this thesis, BOI-
promoted companies currently have to spend money and time in seeking advice from 
both authorities, regarding tax issues. The new proposal can eliminate the cost and time 
that these BOI-promoted companies spend, and make it possible to estimate tax cost of 
operating a business. Hopefully therefore, there should be fewer trials because tax 
legislation and authority will be clearly specified. This, ideally, would improve 
investors’ opinions of the tax system and lead to higher voluntary compliance. 
8.2.5 The new role of the BOI 
According to the thesis’s analysis, the current practice, whereby the BOI is responsible 
for granting tax incentives under the IPA 2001, could lead to an unacceptable level of 
unpredictability and inconsistency in the tax system. In the rapidly changing world of 
the 21
st
 century, Thailand faces the challenge of remaining attractive to foreign 
investors. It is therefore imperative that the BOI must change with the times in order to 
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maintain and enhance Thailand’s appeal. The main objective of the BOI’s proposed new 
initiatives is for it to become less a regulator and more a facilitator of investment. Its 
role should not be ambiguous, nor should it prolong business operations. As indicated in 
this thesis, the current situation concerning consulting the BOI regarding investment 
issues, especially tax incentive matters can create more confusion for investors. As 
such, it is submitted that the BOI’s main role should be that of an investment facilitator. 
The current practice of ‘One Start One Stop’ (OSOS), is an investment centre 
established by the BOI to offer a wide range of investment-related services. 
Representatives from the Ministry of Finance, including the Revenue Department, 
Customs Department and Excise Department, are also based there. The recommendation 
is to define clearly the roles of the BOI and other related governmental agencies. 
8.2.6 The changing contents of tax policy 
Tax policies change with each successive government, bringing new challenges each 
time. Often, incoming governments do not pay sufficient attention to the existence of 
problems in the system, preferring to deal with more pressing issues. Therefore, tax 
legislation of the previous government can cause problems and obstacles in the current 
application of law. Consequently, government tax policy needs to evolve, as one policy 
might be practical at one particular time but create problems later. 
 
The formulation of tax policy will never give a simple solution to a country’s economic 
needs; it involves the balancing of a variety of often conflicting objectives. 
Furthermore, there is no catch-all solution that suits all countries; therefore, tax reform 
must be adjusted to local requirements, cultural prerogatives, legal traditions, available 
workers and local resources. A state – Thailand in this instance – may wish to attract 
foreign investment, but will simultaneously wish to maximise its tax revenue from such 
investment. This is the very reason for seeking to attract such investment initially. A 
balance must be struck between maximising potential tax revenue and making the 
country an attractive destination for FDI. Tax incentives to promote investment may 
also create distortions in the balance of industries that choose to locate in Thailand, and 
may also create instability within the tax system. They can give rise to complex 
problems surrounding classification and interpretation, and in the worst-case scenario 
can be exploited through tax evasion.  
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With these considerations in mind, how can the Thai tax authorities minimise revenue 
loss through tax incentives? Should they consider restricting the use of incentives in 
order to prevent such loss? Altung et al conducted an empirical study, which concluded 
that the greater the investment stimulus, the more the investor perceives it as temporary. 
As such, large investment stimuli could have the effect of destabilising investment,
1124
  
so policy-makers must strike a balance here between high levels of stimulus and the 
encouragement of stable, sustainable investment.
1125
 In Thailand’s case, further research 
into whether short-term, immediate or long-term investment would generate more 
foreign capital is required. One suggestion is that the cost-effectiveness of tax incentives 
could be improved by careful targeting and design.
1126
 However, tax incentives do not 
constitute the only investment promotion strategy open to the Thai government, so 
various other promotion programmes and circumstances should also be adopted. Any 
future research on this subject should study whether Thailand should still use tax 
incentives as a means to encourage investment, taking into account the conflict 
discussed in this thesis and the literature on the potential drawbacks of tax incentives.  
8.2.7 Incentives on custom duty 
The BOI offers import duty exemptions, which are not the focus of this thesis, on the 
import of machinery and raw materials. However, given the recommendation that the 
revenue authority should have authority over tax incentives, and that tax incentive 
provisions should include these import duty exemptions, they should also be specified 
under revenue law. In Thailand, the Customs Act of 1926 is regarded as revenue law. 
Therefore, provisions regarding exemptions and reduction from customs duty should be 
removed from the IPA 2001 and specified instead under the Customs Act of 1926 for 
the same reasons as recommended in the case of corporate income tax. 
8.2.8 Cooperation and Joint Committee 
In order to eliminate possible bias on tax incentive management after tax incentive 
provisions are incorporated under the Revenue Code, and which are then administered 
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by the Revenue Department, a joint committee of the BOI and the Revenue Department 
is recommended for establishment. The fundamental roles of this joint committee would 
be to act as a dedicated agency and to establish a framework for co-operation between 
the BOI and the Revenue Department in the field of taxation, particularly tax incentives 
provided for BOI-promoted companies.  
This committee will set out the role of each authority and explain how they work 
together towards the common objective of overall national revenue. The actions and 
responsibilities of each body should be well-defined, which could avoid duplication as 
each authority must have a clearly defined role to avoid overlaps of responsibility. To 
strengthen the links and to support co-operation between the two authorities, there 
should be regular information exchange through a series of on-going, regular monthly 
meetings. A special meeting could be held to discuss specific cases of significance such 
as special requirements of investment, tax planning techniques for BOI-promoted 
companies, or any problems identified. This committee should have a significant role in 
the amendment of the IPA and Revenue Code provisions on tax incentives. It is 
proposed that members of the committee are led by the prime minister, ensuring clear 
political support, and include equal numbers of representatives from the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Industry. This committee should have a full-time staff to 
guarantee efficient operation. It will be the principal forum for agreeing policy and, 
where appropriate, coordinating or agreeing action between two authorities. The joint 
committee should guarantee direct input into the process of the designing and 
implementing of investment promotion policy for both the BOI and the Revenue 
Department.
1127
 
The roles of the committee should include: first, the co-operation of the BOI and the 
Revenue Department on shared plans and projects on important matters, the 
consideration of problems concerning the practicalities of tax incentives, and means of 
solving them quickly and with minimal impact on investors, discussion of the ongoing 
role of investment in supporting the development of the Thai economy, the organisation 
of  administrative work assigned to related agencies and bodies, the appointment 
subcommittees and focus groups to particular assignments, and lastly, the two bodies’ 
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working together with the common goal of Thailand’s sustainable economic 
development in mind.  
In addition, it is suggested that there should be a mechanism to establish involvement 
from the private sector, i.e. foreign and domestic investors should be able to make 
proposals or recommendations regarding tax and investment promotion policies.
1128
 
8.2.9 Enhancement of FPO performance 
As described in Chapter 3 section 3.4.1, the Fiscal Policy Office (FPO), under the 
Ministry of Finance is in charge of analysing and advising on the economic and fiscal 
policies of the country. Economic and fiscal systems do not rely only on taxation but 
also other factors such as investment, social management and foreign capital inflows. In 
order to strengthen fiscal sustainability, economic and financial systems and social and 
environmental development, the FPO should act as a planner and a controller by taking 
into account other factors that contribute to Thailand’s economic sustainability. The tax 
incentive system for investment promotion is to be included, and there should be 
efficient and competent personnel who are specialised in foreign investment, investment 
promotion and investment incentives working alongside economists and public finance, 
as well as tax experts in making fiscal policy. Subsequently, operating sectors such as 
the Revenue Department and other governmental agencies can follow the guidelines and 
policies set up by the FPO in the same direction. The FPO must ensure a sound and 
comprehensive evaluation of tax incentive measures, possibly through a cost-benefit 
analysis.  
8.2.10 The new role of the Revenue Department 
After the incorporation of tax incentives in the Revenue Code, the Revenue 
Department’s role should move away from that of a mere tax collector,1129 so it needs to 
take into account other governmental policies that aim to achieve the same goal, and 
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should in no way obstruct economic growth.
1130
 Thailand should consider the practices 
of other competitive countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia and 
India and choose the most suitable and practicable measures and policies to be adopted. 
As this thesis argued, tax incentives under the jurisdiction of the revenue body can 
guarantee certainty in tax compliance. The new role of the Revenue Department should 
be to assess current tax measures, judge whether they meet their targets and improve tax 
incentive measures to be in line with the objectives of the country. An example of 
helping to enhance an investment environment is evident through the Canadian Customs 
and Revenue Agency’s strategies to promote voluntary compliance by both domestic 
and foreign businesses.
1131
 By establishing OSOS, an investment centre with staff from 
the Revenue Department, a sound investment environment can be promoted. 
8.2.11 The role of the Council of State  
An interesting point regarding the status of the opinions of the Council of State emerges 
from the Minebea case. In general, all government agencies must refer to the Office of 
the Council of State in order to seek opinion on legal queries. This practice is in 
accordance with the Cabinet Resolution No. Nor
1132
 11310/2482 on 2 March 1939. As 
explained in Chapter 2, the opinions of the Council of State have no legally binding 
effect on individuals but can influence government agencies in the enforcement or 
interpretation of rules and regulations. It is evident from the Minebea case that the 
system of seeking an opinion from the Council of State actually prolongs the overall 
conflict resolution and results in a more complicated legal procedure. Furthermore, the 
opinion is not binding and can hamper effective legal administration. The researcher 
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therefore wishes to emphasise that this system should be reconsidered and, if possible 
stopped because the court should play the full role in deciding legal matters. Other 
functions of the Council of State, such as drafting laws and regulations, submitting 
opinions to the Cabinet for new legislation or legal amendment should be retained. 
8.2.12 Tax incentive reconsideration 
No matter how carefully targeted they are, tax incentives are likely to have some 
revenue cost, which has to be paid for through a reduction in the services provided by 
the host government, by an increase in other taxes or by increased spending introduced 
by new investors. If the Thai government reduces expenditure on education, health or 
infrastructure, the result may be to make the country less attractive to other potential 
investors. Then again, if it increases taxes on wages and consumption to compensate for 
the corporate income tax revenue lost because of increased incentives, labour and living 
costs are likely to rise, once more with a possible detrimental effect on other 
investments, especially domestic investment. Some investors may be attracted by tax 
incentives, while others may be deterred by their potentially negative consequences. 
There are also likely to be other costs such as efficiency costs caused by the distortions 
that incentives produce, social costs (in the form of corruption and rent-seeking) and 
administrative costs.
1133
 Some of those costs certainly are very difficult to measure or to 
predict.
1134
 As we have learned from the literature referred to earlier in this thesis, and 
as argued by Athukorala, tax incentives ‘do not generally work unless they are 
appropriately combined with other initiatives to improve the general investment 
climate’.1135 A healthy investment environment would take into consideration such 
factors as political stability and the macroeconomic context, as well as the issues 
discussed in this thesis. The object here is not to examine the propriety of tax incentives 
in general, but to provide solutions to the problems inherent in the current Thai 
incentive system. 
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The Minebea case and the problems analysed in this thesis should be the catalyst for a 
reconsideration of the tax incentive system, and possibly an amendment of the IPA 
2001, bringing it up to date with the current economic and investment situation. The 
proposed solution is to incorporate all the tax incentive provisions under the Revenue 
Code, and for these to be under the sole jurisdiction of the Revenue Department. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Bank of Thailand 
   Net Flow of Foreign Direct Investment Classified by Sector  
(Unit : Millions of Baht) 
   Last Updated : 31 Aug 2011 14:30 
   Retrieved date : 29 Oct 2011 01:15 
       2010  2009  2008  
1 Industry 101,059.88 133,246.52 196,743.19 
2    Food & sugar 13,840.23 5,824.28 5,069.87 
3    Textiles 1,527.38 1,733.10 748.66 
4    Metal & non metallic 1,650.43 1,148.42 1,635.95 
5    Electrical appliances 15,670.28 3,136.54 43,680.88 
6    Machinery & transport equipment 15,320.64 82,945.90 38,253.14 
7    Chemicals 13,631.68 9,794.17 14,518.23 
8    Petroleum products 6,630.61 6,718.78 -14,878.66 
9    Construction materials 318.55 359.24 130.45 
10    Others 32,470.03 21,586.06 107,584.62 
11 Financial institutions -5,044.05 -36,534.14 9,193.18 
12 Trade 18,065.07 11,201.66 1,156.56 
13 Construction -7,302.20 754.90 -1,054.96 
14 Mining & quarrying 10,878.55 18,896.01 -96.71 
15 Agriculture 186.55 253.56 317.61 
16 Services 7,002.00 -7,372.16 14,052.29 
17 Investment 162.42 31.65 222.79 
18 Real estate 19,625.76 24,973.93 33,956.71 
19 Others 13,451.27 8,562.52 -6,160.75 
20 Total 158,085.27 154,014.47 248,329.93 
     Source: 
   Bank of Thailand 
   Remark: 
   1. The figures cover investment in non - bank sector only. 
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2. Direct Investment = Equity Investment plus loans from related companies. 
Since 2001, 'Reinvested earnings' has been incorporated into direct investment as 
well. 
3. From April 2004 onwards inputs for private financial flow data are obtained 
through data sets electronically. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Bank of Thailand 
   : Net Flow of Foreign Direct Investment Classified by Country  
(Unit : Millions of Baht) 
   Last Updated : 31 Aug 2011 14:30 
  Retrieved date : 29 Oct 2011 01:20 
      2010  2009  2008  
1 Japan 34,078.70 93,130.46 66,860.86 
2 United States of America 15,997.27 -11,761.11 -7,358.06 
3 EU (15) 4/ 46,631.43 33,634.79 9,415.81 
4 EU 5/ 47,193.18 33,873.76 8,261.33 
5     Austria -122.42 324.37 675.26 
6     Belgium 4,628.45 300.42 655.74 
7     Germany -340.99 3,340.52 -10,139.65 
8     Denmark 4,063.38 3,306.18 3,859.79 
9     Spain 2,142.39 4,382.41 2,203.18 
10     Finland 86.53 208.61 98.50 
11     France 5,814.66 5,567.76 -372.16 
12     United Kingdom 3,703.80 -567.76 1,955.61 
13     Greece 5.52 16.00 44.72 
14     Ireland -819.53 -1,133.73 806.99 
15     Italy 624.28 307.56 -99.32 
16     Luxembourg 3,430.17 3,141.24 985.80 
17     Netherlands 21,726.25 13,080.47 8,507.85 
18     Portugal 10.32 3.99 11.01 
19     Sweden 1,678.58 1,356.70 222.46 
20     Cyprus 162.82 58.35 -1,622.50 
21     Czech Republic 19.05 8.23 51.55 
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22     Estonia 23.51 17.59 67.20 
23     Hungary 42.52 32.46 26.85 
24     Latvia 97.65 68.59 162.30 
25     Lithuania 11.28 26.80 40.83 
26     Malta 145.96 -45.24 9.90 
27     Slovakia 20.75 22.51 23.22 
28     Poland 16.75 13.05 18.48 
29     Slovenia 7.73 35.23 21.62 
30     Bulgaria 0.04 -0.19 0.99 
31     Romania 13.63 1.58 45.04 
32 ASEAN (5) 6/ 12,019.28 22,666.95 8,035.80 
33 ASEAN 7/ 12,411.14 22,947.70 6,168.96 
34     Brunei Darussalam 7.71 -371.75 76.90 
35     Indonesia -116.85 -172.80 8.04 
36     Malaysia 3,440.57 2,864.71 1,719.38 
37     Philippines 1,233.43 606.13 617.70 
38     Singapore 7,454.41 19,740.67 5,613.75 
39     Cambodia 194.89 203.52 27.41 
40     Laos 179.70 11.81 -2,488.23 
41     Myanmar 6.79 19.31 561.09 
42     Vietnam 10.47 46.09 32.88 
43 Hong Kong 13,975.06 4,271.78 30,548.63 
44 Taiwan 799.68 1,568.64 -506.15 
45 Korea, South 4,416.82 3,615.99 2,725.68 
46 China 2,623.45 746.29 195.82 
47 Canada 698.11 468.25 880.42 
48 Australia 1,947.42 2,304.43 2,728.55 
49 Switzerland 108.69 2,514.53 14,985.65 
50 Others 23,835.70 333.71 122,838.20 
51 Total 158,085.27 154,014.47 248,329.93 
     Source: 
   Bank of Thailand 
   Remark: 
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1.The figures cover investment in non - bank sector only. 
2. Direct Investment = Equity Investment plus loans from related companies. 
Since 2001, 'Reinvested earnings' has been incorporated into direct investment as 
well. 
3. From April 2004 onwards inputs for private financial flow data are obtained 
through data sets electronically. 
4. Prior to May 2004, EU comprises 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland,  
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. 
5. Since May 2004, EU comprises 25 countries, including also Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Poland and 
Slovenia. 
Since Jan 2007, EU comprises 27 countries, including also Bulgaria and Romania. 
6. Prior to 1999, ASEAN comprises 5 countries: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. 
7. Since 1999, ASEAN comprises 9 countries, including also Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam. 
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Appendix 3 
 
(UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION) 
Based on Board of Investment Announcement  
No. 10 / 2552 
Types, Sizes and Conditions of Activities Eligible for Promotion 
The Board of Investment deems it appropriate to adjust criteria for activities eligible for 
promotion in order to respond to the current economic and investment situation. By 
virtue of Section 16 paragraph 2 of the Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1997), the 
Board of Investment hereby announces that:  
1. Announcement of the Board of Investment No. 2/2543 dated 1 August 2000 
regarding types, sizes and conditions of activities eligible for promotion shall be 
revoked.  
2. Activities on the list attached to this announcement are eligible for investment 
promotion.  
3. A minimum level of investment capital (excluding cost of land and working capital) 
of one million baht shall be required for all types of activities eligible for promotion.  
4. Promoted projects must comply with the conditions specified for each type of 
activity.  
5. The rights and benefits provided for promoted projects shall be in accordance with 
Board of Investment Announcement No. 1/2543 regarding policies and criteria for 
investment promotion, except that which is specified in the list of activities attached to 
this announcement.  
6. Projects designated as priority activities shall be entitled to the following privileges: 
6.1 Exemption of import duty on machinery, regardless of zone  
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6.2 Eight-year corporate income tax exemption, regardless of zone  
6.3 Other rights and benefits shall be granted according to BOI Announcement 
No.1/2543 dated 1 August 2000.  
7. Activities classified as being of special importance and benefits to the country shall 
be granted the following tax incentives:  
7.1 Exemption of import duties on machinery, regardless of zone  
7.2 Eight-year corporate income tax exemption, regardless of zone, NOT subject to the 
corporate income tax exemption cap  
7.3 Other rights and benefits shall be granted according to BOI Announcement 
No.1/2543 dated 1 August 2000.  
8. Activities in electronics and electrical appliance industry shall be granted the rights 
and benefits according to BOI Announcement No. 4/2549 dated 20 March 2006 
regarding investment promotion policy for electronics and electrical appliances 
industry.  
9. The Board may announce the suspension of any activity on the investment promotion 
list attached to this announcement when it considers that promotion is no longer 
necessary. The Board may also add new activities to the list if it considers that such 
activities should be promoted.  
10. This announcement shall be applicable to applications submitted from 14 September 
2009 onwards.  
11. For projects in any activity that have already submitted the application for 
promotion or have been promoted prior to 14 September 2009, if such projects have not 
yet used their tax privileges prior to 14 September 2009, they can apply to be 
administered under the new investment promotion list and follow the new conditions 
specified therein. Letter of intention must be submitted to the Office of the Board of 
Investment within 30 December 2009.  
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12. All BOI announcements that refer to the Announcement of the Board of Investment 
No. 2/2543 dated August 1, 2000 regarding types, sizes and conditions of activities 
eligible for promotion shall be referred to this announcement instead.  
Announced on 15 October 2009.  
List of Activities Eligible for Promotion (Information as of February 2011) 
Section 1: Agriculture and Agricultural Products  
Section 2: Mining, Ceramics and Basic Metals  
Section 3: Light Industry 
Section 4: Metal Products, Machinery and Transport Equipment 
Section 5: Electronic Industry and Electric Appliances 
Section 6: Chemicals, Paper and Plastics 
Section 7: Services and Public Utilities 
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Appendix 4 
 
Revenue Code Section 65 States: 
Taxable income under this Part is net profit which is calculated by deducting income 
from business or income arising from business carried on in an accounting period with 
expenses in accordance with conditions prescribed in Sections 65 (2) and 65 (3). An 
accounting period shall be twelve months except in the following cases where it may be 
less than twelve months: 
1. A newly incorporated company or juristic partnership may elect to use the 
period from its incorporation date to any one date as the first accounting period. 
2. A company or juristic partnership may file a request to the Director-General to 
change the last day of an accounting period. In such a case, the Director-General shall 
have the power to grant approval as he deems appropriate. Such an order shall be 
notified to the company or juristic partnership who files the request within a reasonable 
period of time and in the case where the Director-General grants the permission, the 
company or juristic partnership shall comply to the accounting period as prescribed by 
the Director-General. 
The calculation of income and expenses in paragraph 1 shall use an accrual basis. 
Income arising in an accounting period, even though it is not yet received in such 
accounting period, shall be included as income for that accounting period. All expenses 
relating to such income, even though they are not yet paid, shall be included as expenses 
for such accounting period. 
In a necessary case, a taxpayer may file a request to the Director-General to 
change the accrual basis and accounting method for the calculation of income and 
expenses under paragraph 2. And when approved by the Director-General, he shall 
comply with the accounting period as prescribed by the Director-General.
 
 
Source: The Thai Revenue Department, the Thai Revenue Code  
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Appendix 5 
 
Revenue Code Section 65 (2) States: 
 The calculation of net profit and net loss under this Part shall follow the following 
conditions: 
(1) Items specified in Section 65 (3) shall not be deductible as expense. 
(2) Depreciation and depletion of assets shall be deductible under the rules, 
procedures, conditions and rates specified by a Royal Decree. 
The depreciation and depletion of assets shall be deductible in proportion to the 
period from the acquisition of such assets. 
(3) Value of assets other than (6) shall use the normal purchase price of such asset 
and in the case of appreciation in the value of the asset; such appreciation shall not be 
included in the calculation of net profit or net loss. If any item of assets is entitled to 
depreciation or depletion, depreciation and depletion shall be deductible in the 
calculation of net profit or net loss in accordance with the rules, procedures, conditions 
and previous rates applicable before the appreciation in the value of assets by deducting 
and only the remaining period and remaining cost of capital of the assets shall be 
deducted.  
(4) In the case of transfer of assets, provision of service or lending of money 
without remuneration, fee or interest; or with remuneration, fee or interest that is lower 
than the market price without reasonable cause, an assessment official shall have the 
power to assess such remuneration, fee or interest in accordance with the market price 
on the date of transfer, provision or lending. 
(5) Money, asset or liability having value or price in foreign currency on the last 
day of an accounting period, shall be converted into value or price in Thai currency as 
follows: 
(a) in the case of a company or juristic partnership other than (b), the value or 
price of money or assets shall be converted to Thai currency using the average buying 
rate of commercial banks that is calculated by the Bank of Thailand. The value or price 
of liability shall be converted to Thai currency using the average selling rate of 
commercial banks that is calculated by the Bank of Thailand. 
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(b) In case of a commercial bank, or other financial institution as prescribed by 
the Minister, the value or price of money, assets or liability shall be converted to Thai 
currency using the average buying and selling rates of commercial banks that are 
calculated by the Bank of Thailand. 
Money, assets or liability having value or price in foreign currency that is received 
or paid during an accounting period shall be converted into value or price in Thai 
currency using the market price on the day of such receipt or payment. 
(6) Value of stock on the last day of an accounting period shall be calculated in 
accordance with the cost or market price, whichever is lower, and such value shall be 
deemed to be the value of stock carried forward into the new accounting period. 
Once the calculation of cost in Paragraph 1 is calculated in accordance with an 
accounting rule, such rule shall continue to be used in the future unless the Director 
General grants approval to change the rule. 
(7) In calculating the cost of goods imported from abroad, the assessment official 
shall have the power to assess by comparing with the cost of the same type and kind of 
goods imported into other countries. 
(8) If the cost of goods is in foreign currency, it shall be converted into Thai 
currency using the market exchange rate on the day of the acquisition of the goods 
unless such foreign currency is convertible under official rate, then it shall be converted 
into Thai currency using that official rate.  
(9) Writing off bad debts from debtor’s account shall be done only if it follows 
rules, procedures and conditions prescribed by a Ministerial Regulation, however, if 
debt payment is received in any accounting period, it shall be included as income for 
that accounting period. 
If any bad debt that is included as income is paid afterwards, it shall no longer be 
included as income again. 
(10) For a limited company incorporated under Thai laws, dividends received 
from a company incorporated under Thai laws, mutual fund or financial institution 
incorporated under the specific Thai laws for the purpose of lending to promote 
agriculture, commerce or industry and share of profits derived from a joint venture shall 
be included as income, but only half of the amount received. However, the following 
limited companies incorporated under Thai laws shall not include as income the 
dividends received from a company incorporated under Thai laws, mutual fund or 
financial institution incorporated under the specific Thai laws for the purpose of lending 
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to promote agriculture, commerce or industry and share of profits from a joint venture 
as income; 
 (a) listed company 
(b) limited company other than (a) which hold shares in a limited company 
paying dividends at least 25% of voting shares and the limited company paying the 
dividends does not hold shares in the limited company receiving the dividends, whether 
directly or indirectly. 
Paragraph 1 shall not apply in a case where a limited company or a listed 
company deriving income which is the said dividend or share of profits by holding 
shares or investment units which incur the dividends or share of profits less than 3 
months as from the date of acquisition of the shares or the investment units to the date 
in which such income arises, or by transferring shares or investment units 3 months 
from the date in which such income arises. 
Dividends from the investment of provident funds under Section 65 (3) (2) shall 
not be deemed to be dividends or share of profits under Paragraph 2. 
 (11) Interest on loan which is subject to withholding tax under the law governing 
Petroleum Income Tax shall be included in the calculation of income, but only the 
amount remaining after the tax is withheld under the above law. 
(12) Dividends or share of profits which is subject to withholding tax under the 
law governing Petroleum Income Tax, shall be included in the calculation of income, 
but only the amount remaining after the tax is withheld under the above law, and if the 
recipient is a listed company or is a company incorporated under Thai laws and not 
falling under Section 75, the provisions in (10) shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 (13) A foundation or association which carries on business that produces revenue 
shall not include registration fees or maintenance fees from members, or cash or assets 
received as donations or gifts, whichever the case may be, in the calculation of his 
income.  
(14) An output tax received or receivable by a company or juristic partnership 
which is a VAT registrant, and the value added tax which is not a tax under Section 
82/16 and refunded under Chapter 4 shall not be included as income. 
 
Source: The Thai Revenue Department, the Thai Revenue Code  
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Appendix 6 
Revenue Code Section 65 (3) states: The following items shall not be allowed as 
expenses in the calculation of net profits: 
(1) Reserves except: 
(a) Insurance premium reserves for life insurance set aside before calculation 
of profit, but only the amount not exceeding 65% of the amount of insurance premiums 
received in an accounting period after deducting premiums for re-insurance. 
In a case where money is paid out on an amount insured on any life insurance 
policy whether in full or in part, only the paid amount which does not exceed the 
reserves under Paragraph 1 for such policy shall not be allowed as expense. 
In a case where any life insurance policy contract is terminated, the amount of 
remaining reserve under Paragraph 1 for such policy shall be calculated in the 
calculation of income in the accounting period in which the contract is terminated.  
(b) Insurance premium reserves for any other insurance set aside before the 
calculation of profit, but only the amount not exceeding 40% of the amount of insurance 
premiums received in an accounting period after deducting premiums for re-insurance 
and this amount of reserves set aside shall be income in the calculation of net profit for 
tax purposes in the following accounting period. 
(c) A reserve set aside for bad debts or suspected bad debts from liability 
arising from the provision of credit which a commercial bank, finance company, 
securities company or credit foncier company sets aside under the laws governing 
commercial banks or laws governing the finance business, securities business and credit 
foncier business, as the case may be; but only the amount set aside which increases 
from such type of reserve appearing in the balance sheet of the previous accounting 
period.  
For the increased reserve set aside under paragraph 1 and treated as expense for 
the purpose of calculating net profit or net loss in any accounting period, if afterwards, 
there is a reduction of such reserve; such reduced reserve which was already used as 
expense shall be included as income in the accounting period in which the reserve is 
reduced. 
(2) Fund except provident fund under the rules, procedures and conditions 
prescribed by a Ministerial regulations. 
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(3) Expense for personal, gift, or charitable purpose except expense for public 
charity, or for public benefit as the Director-General prescribes with the approval of the 
Minister, shall be deductible in an amount not exceeding 2% of net profit. Expense for 
education or sports as the Director-General prescribes with the approval of the Minister 
shall also be deductible in an amount not exceeding 2% of net profit. 
 (4) Entertainment or service fees that are not in accordance with the rules 
prescribed by a Ministerial Regulation. 
 (5) Capital expense or expense for the addition, change, expansion or 
improvement of an asset but not for repair in order to maintain its present condition. 
(6) Fine and/or surcharge, criminal fine, income tax of a company or juristic 
partnership. 
 (6 (2) Value added tax paid or payable and input tax of a company or juristic 
partnership which is a VAT registrant except value added tax and input tax of a 
registrant paid under Section 82/16, input tax not deductible in the calculation of value 
added tax under Section 82/5(4) or other input tax as prescribed by a Royal Decree.  
 (7) The withdrawal of money without remuneration of a partner in a juristic 
partnership 
(8) The part of salary of a shareholder or partner which is paid in excess of 
appropriate amount. 
(9) Expense which is not actually incurred or expense which should have been 
paid in another accounting period except in the case where it cannot be entered in any 
accounting period, then it may be entered in the following accounting period. 
(10) Remuneration for assets which a company or juristic partnership owns and 
uses. 
(11) Interest paid to equity, reserves or funds of the company or juristic 
partnership itself.  
(12) Damages claimable from an insurance or other protection contracts or loss 
from previous accounting periods except net loss carried forward for five years up to the 
present accounting period.  
 (13) Expense which is not for the purpose of making profits or for the business. 
(14) Expense which is not for the purpose of business in Thailand. 
 (15) Cost of purchase of asset and expense related to the purchase or sale of asset, 
but only the amount in excess of normal cost and expense without reasonable cause. 
(16) Value of lost or depleted natural resources due to the carrying on of business. 
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(17) Value of assets apart from devalued assets subject to Section 65 (2) 
(18) Expense which a payer cannot identify the recipient. 
(19) Any expense payable from profits received after the end of an accounting 
period. 
(20) Expense similar to those specified in (1) to (19) as will be prescribed by a 
Royal Decree. 
 
Source: The Thai Revenue Department, the Thai Revenue Code  
260 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Authored books and academic articles: 
Akhavi, S. Methods of resolving conflicts between treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2003). 
Alder, J. Constitutional and Administrative Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
Alexander, L. Legal Rules and Legal Reasoning (Ashgate/Dartmouth 2000). 
Allan, T.R.S Constitutional Justice (Oxford University Press 2001). 
Altug, S. ‘Tax and Irreversible Investment’, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic 
Analysis Working Paper Series CDMA04/04, (14 November 2004). 
Alvarez, H.R. V., Kanniainen, V. and Södersten, J.‘Tax Policy Uncertainty and 
Corporate Investment: A theory of Tax-Induced Investment Spurts’, Journal of Public 
Economics, 69 (1), 1998. 
Andreoni, J. Erard, B and Feldstein, J. (1998) ‘Tax Compliance’ Journal of Economic 
Literature 36, No. 2. 
Apple, J.G. and Deyling, R.P. A Primer on the Civil-Law System (The Federal Judicial 
Center at the request of the International Judicial Relations Committee of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States) 
<http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf> accessed 
10 November 2011. 
Arkin, H.L. ‘International Ad Hoc Arbitration: A Practical Alternative’, International 
Business Law 15 (5) (1987). 
<www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/.../rules_appointing_english.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Assavapokee, C. ‘New Taxation Ruling Could Hurt Companies That Receive BOI 
Investment Privileges’ Thai-American Business, Vol. 4, 24 (2009) 
<www.amchamthailand.com/asp/view_doc.asp?DocCID=2455> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Asher, M.G. ‘Design of Tax Systems and Corruption’ Paper for Conference on 
‘Fighting Corruption: Common Challenges and Shared Experiences’, organized by the 
Konard Adenauer Stiftung, and the Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore, 
10-11 May 2001 <http://www.cpdsindia.org/designoftaxsystemsandcorruption.htm> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Athukorala, P. ‘FDI in Crisis and Recovery: Lessons from the 1997-98 Asian Crisis’ 
(2003) Australian Economic History Review, 43(2). 
261 
 
Athukorala, P. ‘Trends and Patterns of Foreign Direct Investments in Asia: An 
Interpretative Survey’  Draft paper for presentation to the conference on ‘The Future of 
Economic Integration in Asia’ co-organised by the faculty of Economics, Thammasat 
University and Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 20-21 November 2008. 
Atkinson, R.D., ‘Expanding the R&E tax credit to drive innovation, competitiveness 
and prosperity’, Journal of Technology Transfer 32, (2007) 
<http://www.itif.org/files/AtkinsonRETaxCreditJTT.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Auerbach , A.J. and Hassett, K., ‘Taxation and foreign direct investment in the United 
States: a reconsideration of the evidence’, in: Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard 
and Joel Slemrod (eds.), Studies in International Taxation (University of Chicago Press, 
1993).  
Baker, P. ‘Some Aspects of United Kingdom Double Taxation Relief’ Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 52 (1998).   
Barak, A., Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005). 
Barber, N.W. ‘The afterlife of Parliamentary sovereignty’ Oxford University Press and 
New York University School of Law I.CON Vol. 9, No. 1 (2011). 
Barber, N.W. & Young, A.L. 'The Rise of Prospective Henry VIII Clauses and their 
Implications for Sovereignty' Public Law 115 (2003). 
Barbier, E.  Natural resources and economic development (Cambridge University Press 
2005). 
Barnett, H. Constitutional & Administrative (7
th
 edition, Routledge-Cavendish 2009). 
Basu, S. Global perspectives on e-commerce taxation law (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd 
2007). 
Baumol, W.J., & Blinder, A.S. Microeconomics: Principles and Policy (Cengage 
Learning 2007). 
Baumüller, H. ‘Sustainable Development Impacts of Investment Incentives in Southeast 
Asia’ (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2009) 
<www.iisd.org/tkn/pdf/competing_business_southeast_asia.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Beech, H. ‘Land of Fading Smile’, Time  Bangkok (18 January 2007) 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580046,00.html> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Benson, P. The theory of contract law: new essays (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
Benson, J. and Zhu, Y. Unemployment in Asia (Routledge 2005). 
Bergsman, J., ‘Advice on Taxation and Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment’ 
(FIAS paper 1999). 
Bindreiter, U. Why grundnorm?: a treatise on the implications of Kelsen's doctrine 
(Springer 2002). 
262 
 
Bird, M. R. ‘Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform’ (2004) Asia-Pacific Tax 
Bulletin March 2004. 
Bird M. R. and Zolt, M. E. ‘Introduction to Tax Policy Design and Development’ Paper 
Prepared for Practical Issues on Tax Policy in Developing Countries, World Bank 28 
April-1 May 2003. 
Bird, M. R. Tax Incentives for Investment: The State of the Art, Canadian Tax Paper No. 
64 (Canadian Tax Foundation Publications Department 1980). 
Bitzenis, A., Tsitouras, A. and Vlachos, V. ‘Decisive FDI obstacles as an explanatory 
reason for limited FDI inflows in an EMU member state: The case of Greece’ Journal of 
Socio-Economics, Vol. 38, Issue 4, August 2009. 
Bhagwati, J. ‘Why Multinationals Help Reduce Poverty?’ (2006) World Economy 29 
(11). 
Blomstrom, M. ‘The Economics of International Investment Incentives’ (2002) NBER 
and CEPR, OECD 176 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/1/2487874.pdf > accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Blomström, M., Kokko, A., & Zejan, M. Foreign direct investment: firm and host 
country strategies (Palgrave Macmillan 2000). 
Bloom, N. and Griffith, R. ‘The internationalisation of R&D’ Fiscal Studies, Vol. 22, 
No.3, (2001) <http://www.ifs.org.uk/fs/articles/0045a.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Boer, A., van Engers, T., & Winkels, R. ‘Traceability and Change in Legal 
Requirements Engineering’ in Casanovas, P., Pagallo, U., Sartor, G., & Ajani, G. (eds), 
An Approach to the Complexity of Legal Systems International Workshops AICOL-
I/IVR-XXIV September 2009 and AICOL-II/JURIX (December 2009). 
Bokor-Szegő, H. Questions of international law: Hungarian perspectives (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1986). 
Bradley, A.W. & Ewing, K.D. Constitutional and Administrative Law, Vol. 1 (Pearson 
Education, 2007). 
Brimble, P. ‘Foreign Direct Investment: Performance and Attraction: The Case of 
Thailand’ (The Brooker Group PLC 2002)  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2002/fdi/eng/pdf/brimble.pdf> accessed 
10 November 2011. 
Brimble, P., Sherman, J. Sibuntuang, A. and Rachatatanun, W., ‘The Broader Impacts 
of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Development in Thailand: Corporate 
Responses’ Paper Prepared for the High-Level Roundtable on Foreign Direct 
Investment and its Impact on Poverty Alleviation, Singapore, December 14-15, 1998, 
revised April 1999. 
Browning, L. Campbell, J. and Chamberlain, E. Revenue Law Principles and Practice 
(22
nd
 edition, Lexis Nexis 2004). 
263 
 
Burgess, R. and Stern, N. ‘Taxation and Development’ (1993) Journal of Economic 
Literature vol. XXXI June 1993. 
Burns, L. and Krever, R. ‘Taxation of Income from Business and Investment, Tax Law 
Design and Drafting’ Vol.2, (International Monetary Fund 1998). 
Campbell, D. (ed), International Agency and Distribution Law (Yorkhill Law 
Publishing 2007). 
Carroll, A. Constitutional and Administrative Law, (6
th
 edition, Pearson Education 
Limited 2011). 
Chalk, N.A. ‘Tax Incentives in the Philippines: A Regional Perspective’ (2001) IMF 
Working Paper WP/01/181. 
Chaloemtiarana, T. Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Social Science 
Association of Thailand, 1979).  
Cheong Chan, W. Support for Victims of Crime in Asia (Taylor & Francis 2007). 
Chowdhury, A. Handbook on the Northeast and Southeast Asian economies (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2007). 
Cho, S. ‘Review Title: WTO’s Identity Crisis’, Global Law Books 
<www.globallawbooks.org.> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Clark, S.W. ‘Tax Policy for Investment’ eJournal of Tax Research, Atax, The 
University of New South Wales Vol.5 No. 2, (2007).  
Clark, S.W. ‘The Design and Assessment of Corporate Tax Incentives for Foreign 
Direct Investment’ Global Forum on International Investment Attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment for Development, Shanghai, (5-6 December 2002) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/58/2764532.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Conforti, B. International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems, (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1993). 
Conway, G.M.  ‘Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning 
of the ECJ’ (2010) German Law Journal Vol. 11, No. 09. 
Conway, G.M. Conflict of Norms in European Union Law and the Legal Reasoning of 
the European Court of Justice (Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Brunel University, 2010).  
Czaplinski, W. & Danilenkow, G.M. ‘Conflict of norms in international law’, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 21 (1990).  
Dagenais, M., Mohnen, P. and Therrien, P., ‘Do Canadian firms respond to fiscal 
incentives to research and development?’ CIRANO Working Papers, 97s-34, 1997.                                                                            
<http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/97s-34.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Daintith, T. (ed) ‘Law as a Policy Instrument: Comparative Perspectives’ in Daintith, T. 
(ed) Law as an Instrument of Economic Policy: Comparative and Critical Approaches, 
(Walter de Gruyter 1988) 30-55.  
264 
 
Darling, F.C., ‘The Evolution of Law in Thailand’, The Review of Politics 32.2, 1970.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406516> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Dautrey, J., ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Thailand’s Color-Coded Politics: The Thai 
Paradox-Will it Endure?’ <gsbejournal.au.edu/4V/Journals/1.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Decharuk, K., Leelapornchai, P. & Udomkerdmongkol, M., ‘Thailand Investment in the 
Post-Crisis Era: Issues and Challenges’, Bank of Thailand Discussion Paper (April 
2009). <www.bot.or.th/English/EconomicConditions/.../dp042009_eng.pdf> accessed 
10 November 2011. 
Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (first 
published1885), (10
th
 edition, Macmillan 1959). 
Disney, R. ‘The impact of tax and welfare policies on employment and unemployment 
in OECD countries’ (2000) IMF Working Paper WP/00/164. 
Dollar, D., Hallward-Driemeier, M., Iarossi, G. and Chakraborty, M., “Short-term and 
Long-term Competitiveness Issues in Thai Industry”, in Witte, J. and Koeberle, S (eds.) 
Competitiveness and Sustainable Economic Recovery in Thailand, (The World Bank 
1998). 
Dunning, J.H. ‘The Determinant of International Production’ (1973) Oxford Economic 
Paper, Vol. 25, No.3. 
Dunning, J.H. ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Globalisation Induced 
Changes and the Role of FDI Policies’, (2002) Paper presented at the Annual Bank 
conference on Development Economics in Europe, Oslo, 25-26 June. 
Dijck, P., Linnemann, H., & Verbruggen, H. Export oriented industrialisation in 
developing countries (NUS Press 1987). 
Easson, A. Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, (Kluwer Law International 
2004). 
Edmiston, K. ‘Tax Uncertainty and Investment: A Cross-Country Empirical 
Examination’, Economic Inquiry Vol. 42, No. 3, July 2004. 
Edmiston, K., Mudd, S., & Valev, N. ‘Tax Structures and FDI: The Deterrent Effects of 
Complexity and Uncertainty’, Fiscal Studies Vol. 24, No. 3 (2003). 
Eisenstein, L. ‘Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration’ (1945) Harvard 
Law Review. 
Eiter, T., Faber, W., & Trusznski, M. ‘Logic programming and nonmonotonic 
reasoning’, 6th International Conference, LPNMR 2001, Vienna, Austria, Vol. 6 (17-19 
September 2001). 
Emiliou, N. The Principle of Proportionality in European Law, A Comparative Study, 
(Kluwer Law International, 1996). 
Falk, R.A. & Mendlovitz, S.H. International Law Vol. 2 (Transaction Publishers, 1966). 
265 
 
Fan, E.X. ‘Technological Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment – A Survey’ ERD 
Asian Development Bank December Working Paper Series no. 33, 2002 
<www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working_Papers/wp033.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Fawcett, J.E.S. ‘The Issue of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ in Barber, J.P. & Reed, B. 
European Community: Vision and Reality (Taylor & Francis, 1973). 
 
Fitzgerald, E. ‘Redistribution through Ireland’s Welfare and Tax Systems’ in Cantillon, 
S., Corrigan, C., Kirby, P., & O’Flynn, J. (eds), Rich and Poor Perspectives on Tackling 
Inequality in Ireland (Combat Poverty Agency, 2001). 
Fitzmaurice, G. The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (Oxford 
University Press 1950).     
Frost, S. ‘Protecting the Baht - Capital reserve requirements in Thailand’ Bangkok 
International Associates, (January 2007) 
<www.bia.co.th/.../Capital%20Requirements%20Art%20080107.doc> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Funston, J. Divided over Thaksin: Thailand coup and problematic transition, (Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies 2009). 
Gammie, M. ‘The Ruding Committee report: An initial response’ (Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 1992) <http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm30.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Gentry, B.S. (ed.) Private capital flows and the environment: lessons from Latin 
America, (Edward Elgar Publishing 1998). 
Gibbs, J.P. ‘Norms: The Problem of Definition and Classification’, American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 5 (March 1965). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2774978> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Gifford, D.J. & Salter,J.R. How to Understand an Act of Parliament (Routledge 1996). 
Gill, J.B.S. ‘The Nuts and Bolts of Revenue Administration Reform’, Lead Public 
Sector Management Specialist Europe and Central Asia Region (2003) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTPA/Resources/NutsBolts.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Glassman, J. ‘Economic Crisis in Asia: The Case of Thailand’, Economic Geography’ 
Vol. 77, No.2 (2011). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594061> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Gorter, J. and de Ruud, A.de M., ‘Capital income taxation in Europe: trends and trade-
offs’, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague (2001).  
<http://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/capital-income-taxation-
europe-trends-and-trade-offs.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
266 
 
Goyal, R. & Chai, J. Tax Concessions and Foreign Direct Investment in the Eastern 
Caribbean (International Monetary Fund 2008). 
Gropp, P. and Kostial, K. ‘FDI and Corporate Tax Revenue: Tax Harmonisation or 
Competition?’ International Monetary Fund, Finance & Development, Vol 38, No. 2, 
June 2001 <http://www.imf.org/esternal/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/gropp.htm> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Groppi, T., Piergigli, V. & Rinella, A. (eds), Asian constitutionalism in transition. A 
comparative perspective (Giuffre Editore 2008). 
 
Gugl, E. and  Zodrow, G.R.‘International Tax Competition and Tax Incentives in 
Developing Countries’ International Studies Program Public Finance Conference: The 
Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
<aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/0440_Guglzodrow.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Gyimah-Brempong, K. and Traynor, T. ‘Political Instability, Investment and Economic 
Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of African Economies, Vol. 8(1). 
Halkyard, A. and Lingh, R. ‘China’s Tax Incentive Regimes for Foreign Direct 
Investment: an Eassonian Analysis’, 2 February 2008 [draft]. 
Hall, B.H. ‘The effectiveness of research and experimental tax credits: Critical literature 
review and research design’, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1995). 
<http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH95%20OTArtax.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Hall, B.H. & van Reenen, J.M.  ‘How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A review 
of the evidence’ Research Policy 29 (2000). 
Hamson, C. J. Executive discretion and judicial control: an aspect of the French 
Conseil d'État (Stevens 1954). 
Hansen, H & Rand, J., ‘On the Causal Links between FDI and Growth in Developing 
Countries’, University of Copenhagen Discussion Paper, (December 2004). 
Handley, P.M, The King Never Smiles (Yale University Press, 2006). 
Hartman, R. ‘The Effects of Price and Cost Uncertainty on Investment’, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 5 (2), 1972. 
Harris, P. ‘An Historic View of the Principle and Options for Double Tax Relief’, 
British Tax Review (1999). 
Hassett, K. and Metcalf, G. ‘Investment with Uncertain Tax Policy: Does Random Tax 
Policy Discourage Investment’ The Economic Journal, 109 (457) July 1999. 
Heady, C. ‘Taxation Policy in Low-Income Countries’ United Nation University 
Discussion Paper No. 2001/81 September 2001. 
Hernández-Truyol, B.E. & Powell, S.J, Just Trade: a new covenant linking trade and 
human rights, (NYU Press 2009). 
267 
 
Henneman, J.B. Studies in the history of Parliaments, (Comparative Legislative 
Research Centre University of Iowa 1982). 
Hess, R., ‘Constraints on Foreign Direct Investment in Africa’, in Jenkins, C., Leape, J., 
& Thomas, L., Gaining from Trade in Southern Africa: Complementary Policies to 
Underpin the SADC Free Trade Area (St Martin’s Press 2000). 
Hines, J.R. Jr., ‘Lessons from behavioral responses to international taxation’, National 
Tax Journal 54, 1999.  
Hoffmann, T., & Siebers, L. (eds), World Englishes--problems, properties and 
prospects: selected papers from the 13
th
 IAWE conference, (John Benjamins Publishing 
Company 2007). 
Hogue, C. (ed), Thailand’s Economic Recovery, (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
2006) 
Holland, D. & Owens, J. ‘Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: The Experiences of 
the Economies in Transition’ in Bléjer, M.I. & Ter-Minassian, T. (eds) Fiscal policy 
and economic reform: essays in honour of Vito Tanzi (Routledge 1997). 
Holland, D.H. and Vann, R.J. ‘Income Tax Incentives for Investment’ 1998), in 
Thuronyi, V. (ed), Tax Law Design and Drafting (Volume 2, International Monetary 
Fund). <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/1998/tlaw/eng/ch23.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Holland, J. and Webb, J. Learning Legal Rules A Students’ Guide to Legal Method and 
Reasoning (6
th
 edition, Oxford University Press 2006).  
Holmes, K. International tax policy and double tax treaties: an introduction to 
principles and application (IBFD, 2007). 
Howard, D.A.E., ‘Reflection on the Rule of Law: America’s 400th Anniversary at 
Jamestown’ University of Richmond Law Review 9 (2007).  
Hyland, M. and Harper, L-J., Tolley’s Corporation Tax 2010-2011 (LexisNexis 2010).  
Hyman, D.N. Public Finance, A Contemporary Application of Theory to Policy (9
th
 
edition, Thomson South-Western, 1995).  
Itō, T. & Krueger, A.O. The political economy of tax reform (University of Chicago 
Press, 1992). 
James, S. and Nobes, C. The Economics of Taxation Principles, Policy and Practice 
(10
th
 edition, Fiscal Publications 2010/2011). 
Jenks, W. C., ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, British Yearbook of International 
Law, (1953). 
Jha, R. Modern Public Economics (2
nd
 edition, Routledge 2010). 
Johnston, D.M., & Ferguson, G.A. Asia-Pacific Legal Development (UBC Press 1998). 
Jones, J.F.A. et al, ‘Credit and exemption under tax treaties in cases of differing income 
characterisation’ (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 1996). 
268 
 
Jones, G. The evolution of international business: an introduction (Routledge 1996). 
Jones, P. & Berrington, H. Party, Parliament and Personality: essays presented to High 
Berrington, (Routledge 1995). 
Kammerhofer, J., Uncertainty in International Law: a Kelsenian perspective, 
(Routledge 2011). 
Kantabutra, S., ‘Development of the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy in the Thai 
Business Sector: Evidence, Future Research & Policy Implications’ (2006). 
<http://www.sufficiencyeconomy.org/old/en/files/26.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Kaosa-ad, K. ‘Economic Development and Institutional Failures in Thailand’ (1998), 
Thailand Development Research Institute Quarterly Review Vol.13, No. 1, (March 
1998). <http://www.info.tdri.or.th/library/quarterly/text/m98_1.htm> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Kaplow, L. ‘Taxation’, NBER Working Paper No. 12061 February 2006 in Polinsky, A. 
Mitchell and Steven Shavell (eds.) Handbook of Law and Economics Vol. 1 
(Amsterdam :Elsevier 2007). 
Kasipillai, J., ‘Malaysia: Linking FDI with Investment Incentives?’ (2001) Asia-Pacific 
Tax Bulletin Vol. 7, No.2. 
Kelsen, H. General Theory of Law and the State (Lawbook Exchange Ltd 2007). 
Kern, S. ‘Competition for Foreign Investment in Developing Countries-the Role and 
Impact of Investment Incentives’ (2005), Universitat zu Koln, Wirtschaftspolitisches 
Seminar. 
Kittayarak, K., ‘The Constitution of Thailand 1997 and its Implication on Criminal 
Justice Reform’ (2001) <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch06.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Klabbers, J., Peters, A. & Ulfstein, G. The constitutionalization of international law 
(Oxford University Press 2009). 
Klein, J.R. ‘The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for 
Participatory Democracy’ (1998) The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series 8 (March 
1998) <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Paper_on_the_1997_constitution_2.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Klemm, A. Causes, Benefits, and Risks of Business Tax Incentives (International 
Monetary Fund 2009). 
Knauer, A. Impact of International Taxation on FDI Location Choice, Seminar Paper 
(GRIN Verlag 2008) 
Kokko, A. ‘Globalisation and Foreign Direct Investment Incentives’, (2002) Paper 
presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe, Oslo, 
25-26 June. 
269 
 
Kosin, O. Thailand’s New Law to Promote Industrial Development, (Bangkok 1962).  
Koskenniemi, M. ‘The ILC Report, Study on the Function and Scope of the lex specialis 
rule and the Question of Self-Contained Regimes’, International Law Commission 
(LVI) SG/FIL/CR (7 May 2004). 
Kusonsinwut, S. A comparative study of confession law: The lesson for Thailand 
regarding the exclusionary rule and confession admissibility standard (ProQuest 2008). 
Krueathep, W., ‘Fiscal Strategies of Thai Local Government during the Decentralisation 
Movement: A Preliminary Exploration of Characteristics and Causes’ Institute for Local 
Government Initiatives ILGI Working Paper 01/2549 (2006). 
Lall, S. & Urata, S. (eds) Competitiveness, FDI and technological activity in East Asia 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2003). 
Lang, M., Herdin, J. & Hofbauer, I.,WTO and Direct Taxation, (Kluwer, 2005). 
Larkins, E.R., Double Tax Relief for Foreign Income: A Comparative Study of 
Advanced Economies’, (ATAX Discussion Paper Series No. 4, 2001, ISSN 1444-4283). 
Lasok, D. and. Stone, P., Conflict of Laws in the European Community, (Professional 
Books Limited 1987). 
Lauridsen, L.S., ‘The Financial Crisis in Thailand: Causes, Conduct and 
Consequences?’ World Development Vol. 26, No.8 (Roskilde University 1998). 
Lerman, A.H., ‘Withholding of Taxes’ in Cordes, J.J., Ebel, R.D., & Gavelle, J. (eds), 
Encyclopedia of taxation and tax policy (2
nd
 edition, The Urban Institute, 2005). 
Leonard, J.H. Pollution and the struggle for the world product (Cambridge University 
Press 1998). 
Lester, A. A British Bill of Rights (Institute for Public Policy Research 1990). 
Leung, S., Bingham, B.F.W., & Davies, M. (eds), Globalization and development in the 
Mekong economies (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010). 
Lewis, G. Virtual Thailand: the media and cultural politics in Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore, (Taylor & Francis 2006). 
Leyland, P. ‘The emergence of administrative justice in Thailand under the 1997 
Constitution’ in Ginsburg, T. & Chen, H. Administrative law and governance in Asia: 
comparative perspectives, (Taylor & Francis 2008).  
Lim, D. Explaining Economic Growth: a new analytical framework (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 1996). 
Lindroos, A. ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine 
of Lex Specialis’, Nordic Journal of International Law 74: HeinOnline, Koninklijke 
Brill NV.27 (2005). 
Lipsey, R.‘The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in International Capital Flows’ in 
Feldstein, M. (ed), International Capital Flows (University of Chicago Press 2000) . 
270 
 
Livingston, M. ‘Practical Reason, ‘Purposivism,’ and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes’ 
Tax Law Review Vol. 51 (1995-1996). 
Loos, T.L. Subject Siam: family, law, and colonial modernity in Thailand (Cornell 
University Press, 2006). 
Loughlin, M. The idea of public law (Oxford University Press 2003). 
Luja, R.H.C. Assessment and Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC and the WTO: A 
View on State Aids, Trade Subsidies and Direct Taxation (Intersentia 2003). 
Lyman, A. ‘Income Tax in Thailand: A Comparison’, American Bar Association 
Journal, Vol. 40 (1954). 
Lyman, D. ‘An Insight into the Functioning of the Thai Legal System’, Thai-American 
Business Magazine (Jan-Feb 1975).  
Macdonald, G. and Martin, D. ‘Tax and Accounting, A Response to the 2003 
Consultation Document on Corporation Tax Reform’ Tax Law Review Committee, The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies TLRC Discussion Paper No. 4, 3.1-3.2. (February 2004) 
<http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/dp4.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Mallampally, P. & Sauvant, K.P. ‘Foreign direct investment in developing countries’ 
Finance and Development, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1999). 
Mancill, D. ‘Foreign Business Act - Current Status and Risks’ Thai Law and Policy, (29 
November 2010) <https://thailawandpolicy.wordpress.com/2010/11/29/foreign-
business-act-current-status/> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Mankiw, N.G. Principles of Economics (6
th
 edition, Cengage Learning 2011). 
 
Mansfield, E. and Romero, A. ‘Technology transfer to overseas subsidiaries by US-
based firms’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 95, No.4. (1980).  
Marquis, L. International uniform commercial law: towards a progressive 
consciousness  (Ashgate Publishing 2005). 
Mateus, M. A, and  Moreira, T. Competition law and economics: advances in 
competition policy enforcement in the EU and North America (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2010). 
McClean, D. Morris: The Conflict of Laws, (4
th
 edition, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 1993). 
McEldowney, J.F. Public Law (3
rd
 edition, Sweet & Maxwell Limited 2001). 
McWhinney, E. Judicial Review (4
th
 edition, University of Toronto Press 1969). 
McWhinney, E., Yee, S., & Morin, J-Y. Multiculturalism and international law: essays 
in honour of Edward McWhinney (Brill 2009). 
Milanovic, M. ‘A norm conflict perspective on the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and human rights law’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2009), 
Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited. 
271 
 
Moens, M-F. and Spyns, P. Legal Knowledge and Information Systems: JURIX 2005: 
the 18
th
 Annual Conference, (IOS Press 2005). 
Mommsen, T., Krueger, P. and Watson, A. (eds), The Digest of Justinian vol. IV 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 1985). 
de Mooij, R.A. and Ederveen, S., ‘Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A synthesis 
of Empirical Research’ (2001) CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
1 <http://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/taxation-and-foreign-
direct-investment-synthesis-empirical-research.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Moosa, I.A. Foreign direct investment: theory, evidence, and practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002).  
Mulkay, B. & Mairesse, J. ‘The Effect of the R&D Tax Credit in France’ EEA-ESEM 
Conference, Stockholm, Sweden (2003) < http://www.eea-esem.com/papers/eea-
esem/2003/2250/RD%20Tax%20Credit%20in%20France.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Metcalf, G.E. ‘Using Tax Expenditures to Achieve Energy Policy Goals’ National 
Bureau of Economic Research, United States NBER Working Paper 13753 (January 
2008) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13753> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Mintz, J.M. & Leechor, C. ‘Taxing foreign income in capital-importing countries: 
Thailand's perspective’, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series 499,4 
(1990). 
Mintz, J.M. & Tsiopoulos, T. Corporate income taxation and foreign direct investment 
in Central and Eastern Europe (World Bank Publications 1992). 
Mo, P.L.L. Tax avoidance and anti-avoidance measures in major developing economies 
(Greenwood Publishing Group 2003). 
Moore, R.F. Stare decisis: some trends in British and American application of the 
doctrine (Simmons-Boardman 1958). 
Moran, T.H., Graham, E.M. & Blomström, M. Does foreign direct investment promote 
development? (The Institute for International Economics 2005). 
Morisset, J. ‘Tax Incentives, Public Policy for the Private Sector’, The World Bank 
Group Private Sector and Infrastructure Network, (February 2003) 
<http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PublicPolicyJournal/253Moris-020603.pdf > 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Morisset, J. and Pirnia, N. ‘How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Review’ Policy Research Working Paper 2509 (2001) <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/01/20/000094946_0101
0905342188/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf > accessed 10 November 2011. 
Musgrave, P.B., Public Finance in Theory and Practice (5
th
 edition, McGraw-Hill 
International 1989). 
Mytelka, L.K. Globalisation, Investment and Sustainable Human Development A 
Learning and Innovative Approach, (UNCTAD 1999). 
272 
 
Nakayama, K. ‘Tax Policy: Designing and Drafting a Domestic Law to Implement a 
Tax Treaty’, International Monetary Fund Fiscal Affairs Department, Technical Notes 
and Manuals, March 2011 
Neher, C.D. Modern Thai politics: from village to nation (Transaction Publisher, 1979). 
Nelson, M. Thaksin Overthrown: The ‘Well-intentioned’ Coup of September 19, 2006, 
eastasia.at Vol. 6, No. 1, (1 June 2007) <http://www.eastasia.at/vol6_1/article01.htm> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Nov, A. ‘Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment: The Drawbacks, Tax Notes 
International Magazine, 263, (18 April 2005). 
Nunnenkamp, P. ‘Too Much, Too Little, or Too Volatile? International Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries in the 1990s’, Kiel Working Papers 1036, Kiel Institute of World 
Economics (2001). <http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/2571/1/kap1036.pdf > 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Oman, C.P. Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition 
among Governments to Attract FDI, (OECD Publishing 2000). 
Onyeiwu, S. and Shrestha, H. ‘Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment in the 
MENA Region’ Economic Research Forum 12th Annual Conference, Cairo, (19-21 
December 2005). 
<http://www.erf.org.eg/cms.php?id=download_document&file_id=501> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
O’Shea, T., Anantavipat, P. & Veraphong, P., ‘Thailand Enacts Tax Incentives for 
Regional Operating Headquarters’ Worldwide Tax Daily, Tax Analysts , (3 December 
2010). <www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/staff/oshea/52179.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Ott, K. ‘Tax Administration Reform in Transition: The Case of Croatia’ Institute of 
Public Finance Occasional Paper No. 5 (1998). 
Patterson, N.K. Foreign Direct Investment: Trends, Data Availability, Concepts, and 
Recording Practices (International Monetary Fund 2004). 
Paulson, S.L. ‘Kelsen’s Legal Theory: the Final Round’ Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies Vol. 12, (HeinOnline 1992) 
Paulson, S.L. ‘On the Status of the lex posterior Derogating Rule’ in Tur, R. and 
Twining, W. (ed), Essays on Kelsen (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986). 
Pauwelyn, J. Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to 
Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2004).  
Paitoonpong, S. and Abe, S. ‘The Thai Economy: A Picture from the Past’ Thailand 
Development Research Institute Quarterly Review (2004).  
Pearson, C.S. Multinational corporations, the environment and the third world, (Duke 
University Press 1987).  
273 
 
Pepys, M.N. ‘Corruption within the judiciary: causes and remedies’ in Transparency 
International Global Corruption Report 2007 (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
Peerenboom, R. (ed.) Asian Discourses of rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of 
Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and The U.S (Routledge 2004). 
 
Petersmann, E-U., ‘WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 1995-2005: Lessons from the 
Past and Future Challenges’, in Taniguchi, Y., Yanovich, A., and Bohanes, J., (editors), 
The WTO in the Twenty-First Century: Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and 
Regionalism in Asia (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
 
Pissarides, C.A. The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages: the 
role of unemployment benefits and tax structure (Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics and Political Science 1997). 
Poolen, T. ‘Dutch Tax Administration: Improvement in Tax Practice’ Journal of 
International Taxation, Vol 18, Issue 2, February 2007. 
Pornsakol, P.C., ‘The evolution of the rule of law in Thailand: The Thai constitutions’, 
University of New South Wales Law Research Service 45 (2008) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2008/45.html> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Profeta, P., & Scabrosetti, S. The political economy of taxation: lessons from developing 
countries (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010). 
Pufendorf, S. Droit de la Nation et des Gens, book V, chapters XII-XXIII (quoted in de 
Vattel, Droit des Gens, 511. 
Repetto, R.C. & Gillis, M. Public policies and the misuse of forest resources 
(Cambridge University Press 1988). 
Richter, K. ‘Thailand’s Growth Path: From Recovery to Prosperity’, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3912, (May 2006), 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917483> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Robbers, G. Encyclopedia of world constitutions (Infobase Publishing 2007). 
Rochananonda, C ‘Tax Incentives and FDI in Thailand’ Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry 
of Finance in Thailand (2006), <http://www.econ.hit-
u.ac.jp/~ap3/apppfdi6/paper/THAILAND.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Romano, C. Advance tax rulings and principles of law: towards a European tax rulings 
system? (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 2002). 
Romer,C and Romer, D. ‘The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates based 
on a New Measure of Fiscal Chocks’ University of California Berkeley March 2007, 36 
<http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~cromer/RomerDraft307.pdf> accessed 21 November 2011. 
Ross, A. On Law and Justice (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd 2004). 
Sadat-Akhavi, A. Methods of resolving conflicts between treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2003). 
274 
 
Sandler, D. Tax treaties and controlled foreign company legislation: pushing the 
boundaries (Kluwer Law International 1998). 
Sanger, C. ‘Corporate Tax Road Map’ (2011) British Tax Review 1. 
Santipitaksakul, S. The Effect of Liberalisation of Foreign Direct Investment on the 
Economic Development of Thailand: An Empirical and Political Economy Approach 
(Doctor of Philosophy, University of Westminster, 2010). 
Schilling, T. Rang und Geltung von Normen in gestuften Rechtsordnungen (Nomos, 
Berlin 1994). 
Schneider, S. National objectives and project appraisal in developing countries (OECD 
Publishing 1975). 
Shah, A. ‘Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation’ (2006) World Bank Working 
Paper Series, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=896144. 
Shekel, M. The Timing of Income Recognition in Tax Law and the Time Value of Money 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2009).  
Shell, R. and  Jones, R. Legal uncertainty and business risk (Reginald H. Jones Centre, 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 1988). 
Shelton, D., ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2 (April 2006). 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3651149.> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Shytov, N.A. Conscience and love in making judicial decisions (Springer 2001) 
Sik, K. S. and Pinto, M.C. W. Asian Yearbook of International Law vol 4 1994 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996). 
Singh, D. Southeast Asian affairs 2003 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2003). 
Singh, D. &Than, T. M.M. Southeast Asian Affairs 2008 (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies 2008). 
Slemrod, J. and Yitzhaki, S. ‘Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration’ (2002) 
NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 7473 <http:www.nber.org/papers/w7473> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Smith, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (1776). 
Smith, W. Dictionary of Greek and Roman antiquities, Volume 1 (Walton and Maberly 
1859). 
Sosa, S. Tax Incentives and Investment in the Eastern Caribbean (International 
Monetary Fund 2006) 
Sosukpaibul, S. The relationship among foreign direct investment flows, government 
policy and investment strategy: the case of Thailand (Doctor of Philosophy, Waseda 
University 2007) 
275 
 
Sornarajah, M. The International Law on Foreign Investment (2
nd
 edition, Cambridge 
University Press 2004). 
Spevik, T., ‘BOI taxpayers may have a reason to celebrate’, The Nation (Bangkok, 18 
November 2010) <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/BOI-taxpayers-may-have-
a-reason-to-celebrate--30142476.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Srilertchaipanich, S., ‘The Board of Investment’s Application of Legal Measures for 
Investment Promotion under Government’s Economic Policy’ (Master of Laws 
Dissertation, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand 1995).  
Stengs, I., Worshipping the great moderniser: King Chulalongkorn, patron saint of the 
Thai middle class (NUS Press 2009). 
Stevens, I. Constitutional & Administrative Law, (3
rd
 edition, Pearson Professional 
Limited 1996). 
Stockmann, F. ‘Should the Exemption Method have Priority over the Credit Method in 
International Tax Law?’ (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, June 1995). 
Surhone, L.M., Timpledon, M.T. & Marseken, S.F. No Taxation Without 
Representation, (Betascript Publishers 2010). 
Sun, X., ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development What Do the States 
Need To Do?’ Prepared by the Foreign Investment Advisory Service for the Capacity 
Development Workshops and Global Forum on Reinventing Government on 
Globalization, Role of the State and Enabling Environment. Sponsored by the United 
Nations Marrakech, Morocco (2002). 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan006348.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Surrey, S.S. ‘Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 
4 (1970). 
Sussangkarm, C., ‘Thailand’s Debt Crisis and Economic Outlook’ (Thailand 
Development Research Institute 1998) 
<http://www.tdri.or.th/reports/publiched/m42.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Suwannathat-Pian, K. Kings, country and constitutions (Routledge 2003). 
Svensson, J. ‘Investment, property rights and political instability: Theory and evidence’, 
European Economic Review, Vol 42. 
Tancharoenphol, S. ‘Country Report on Thailand’ (2007) 
<http://www.cacci.org.tw/Journal/2007%20Vol%202/THAI%20ECONOMIC%20PER
FORMANCE%20IN%20Q3.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Tangwongyodying, O. and Aphornratana, J., Quick Thai Tax Guide, 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002). 
Tasarika, E.. ‘A Recapitulation of Asian Financial Crisis and Institutional Factors’ 
(2004) Thammasat Economic Journal, Vol.22, No.1 
276 
 
<http:econ.tu.ac.th/journal/Material/Previous/Y22n1p138.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Taylor, M.P. & Sarno, L. ‘Capital flows to developing countries: Long and short-term 
determinants’ (World Bank Economic Review 11, 1999). 
Telò, M. International relations: a European perspective (Ashgate Publishing Ltd 
2009) 
Teoh, Z.W., Sathirathai, S., Lam, D., Chung, H. L. and Chareonwongsak, K., ‘Thailand 
Automotive Cluster, Microeconomics of Competitiveness, Final Paper (2007). 
<http://www.isc.hbs.edu/pdf/Student_Projects/Thailand_AutomotiveCluster_2007.pdf > 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Tetley, W., ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified)’ Unif.L. Rev. (N.S.) 591-691 (Part I) (1999) 
<http://www.mcgill.ca/files/maritimelaw/mixedjur.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Thanyakhan, S. The Determinants of FDI and FPI in Thailand: A gravity Model 
Analysis (Doctor of Philosophy, Lincoln University 2008). 
Thomsen, S. ‘Investment Incentives and FDI in Selected ASEAN Countries’ in 
International Investment Perspectives (OECD 2004). 
Thomsen, S. ‘South-East Asia: The Role of Foreign Direct Investment Policies in 
Development’ Working Papers on International Investment. OECD, Paris, (1999) 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/5/24/1897793.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Thuronyi, V. (ed), ‘Tax Law Design and Drafting’, (1996) International Monetary 
Fund. 
Thuronyi, V. (ed) ‘Taxation of Income from Business and Investment’ 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/1998/tlaw/eng/ch16.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Toby, R.A. The Theory and Practice of Income Tax, (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 1978). 
Tomkins, A. & Millar, J. ‘Clause 18 of the Bill: Parliamentary Sovereignty and EU 
Law’ in Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: European Scrutiny Committee, 
The EU Bill and Parliamentary Sovereignty, 10
th
 Report of Session 2010-11 Vol. 2, 
(The Stationery Office 2011).  
Tonkin, H. State Control Over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed 
Conflict  (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
Tosompark, C.T. and Daly, K. ‘The Determinants of FDI Inflows – Recent Evidence 
from Thailand’ (June 25, 2010) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630642> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Trevino, L.J., Daniels, J.D. & Arbelaez, H. ‘Market reform and foreign direct 
investment in Latin America: Evidence from an error correction model’ International 
Trade Journal, 16.4 (2002). 
Tribe, L.H. American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press 1978). 
277 
 
Tseng, W-S., Matthews, D.B. &  Elwyn, T.S. Cultural competence in forensic mental 
health: a guide for psychiatrists, psychologists, and attorneys (Psychology Press 2004). 
Urapeepatanapong, K. and Prasongprasit, R. ‘Relationship between Accounting and 
Taxation Principles’ Thailand', Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, May/June 2002. 
Usher, D. ‘The Economics of Tax Incentives to Encourage Investment in Less 
Developed Countries’, Journal of Development Economics 4. 
Van Damme, I. Treaty interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford University 
Press 2009). 
Veitch, S., Christodoulidis, E. and Farmer, L., Jurisprudence Themes and Concepts 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007). 
Ventry, D. ‘Cooperative Tax Regulation’ Connecticut Law Review, Vol 41, No. 2, 
December 2008. 
Veugelers, R. ‘Locational determinants and rankings of host countries: An empirical 
assessment,’ Kyklos 44, (1991). 
Vranes, E., ‘The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and Legal Theory’, 
The European Journal of International Law Vol. 17, No. 2, (2006). 
Wagner, A. ‘The Basic Principles of Taxation’ (1890), in Musgrave, R.A. and Peacock, 
A.T. (eds), Classics in the theory of public finance (Macmillan & Co.1958). 
Wagner, H. ‘Costs of Legal Uncertainty: Is Harmonization of Law a Good Solution?’ 
Modern Law for Global Commerce: Congress to celebrate the fortieth annual session of 
UNCITRAL, (Vienna, 9-12 July 2007) 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/WagnerH.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Wanapha, S. ‘The Shifting Paradigm of FDI Policy and Promotion in Thailand, Global 
Forum on International Investment: Attracting Foreign Direct Investment for 
Development’, OECD, Shanghai, (5-6 December 2002) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/63/2764564.pdf > accessed 10 November 2011. 
Warr, P.G. & Nidhiprabha, B. Thailand's macroeconomic miracle: stable adjustment 
and sustained growth (World Bank Publications 1996). 
Watanabe, S. ‘FDI and Taxation in Asia - from a Japanese Point of View’ (2006), paper 
presented at International symposium on FDI and Corporate Taxation: Experience of 
Asian Countries and Issues in the Global Economy, hosted by Centre of 
Excellence/Research on Economic Systems, Public Economic Program and ASIAN 
Public Policy Program, School of International and Public Policy, Hitotsubashi 
university < http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~ap3/apppfdi6/papers.html> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Watanagase, T. ‘The Prospects of the Thai Economy and Monetary Policy’, Dinner 
Talk at Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, (16
 
March 2007) 
<http://www.bot.or.th/Bothomepage/General/PressReleasesAndSpeeches/Speeches/engl
ish_version/Governor &Deputy Governor/16Mar2007_ThaiEconomy.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
278 
 
Wattanawisitporn, R. Foreign direct investment in Thailand: with special reference on 
European foreign direct investment in the Thai manufacturing sector (Cuvillier Verlag 
2005). 
Wells, L.T. Using tax incentives to compete for foreign investment: are they worth the 
costs? (World Bank Publications 2001) 
Wells, L.T. & Wint, A.G., ‘Marketing a Country: Promotion as a Tool for Attracting 
Foreign Investment Revised Edition’ FIAS Occasional Paper (2000) <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/05/25/000094
946_00051005302185/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Wells, L.T. & Allen, N.J. ‘Tax Holidays to Attract Foreign Direct Investment: Lessons 
from two Royal Decrees No. 405s 3 <http://www.rd.go.th/publish/9415.0.html> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Wenzel, M. and Taylor, N. ‘Toward Evidence-Based Tax Administration’ Australian 
Journal of Social Issues 1 August 2003. 
Wheeler, D. ‘Racing to the, bottom? Foreign investment and air pollution in developing 
countries’ (The World Bank, 2001) <http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2524.html> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Wheeler, D. & Mody, A. ‘International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of US 
Firms’ Journal of International Economics 33 (1992). 
White, J. and Koeberle, S. Building Thailand’s Competitiveness: The Road to Economic 
Recovery (World Bank 1998). 
White, L.W. & Hussey, W.D. Government in Great Britain, the Empire, and the 
Commonwealth, (CUP Archive 1961)  
Williams, A. UK Government & Politics (Heinemann 1998). 
Williams, B.A.O ‘The Inaugural Address: Consistency and Realism’ Aristotelian 
Society Vol. 40 (1966), reprinted in Williams, B. Problems of the Self (Cambridge 
University Press 1973). 
Williams, D.F. ‘Developing the Concept of Tax Governance’, A discussion paper of 
KPMG’s Tax Business School, 24 (2007). 
Witchayanon, P. Thailand's financial system: structure and liberalization (Thailand 
Development Research Institute, 1994). 
Wolfram, K., ‘Treaties, conflict between’, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law Vol. 4 (2000). 
Wolfrum R. & Matz, N. Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer, 2003). 
Wood, M.W. & Pronto, A.A. The International Law Commission 1999-2009: vol IV: 
Treaties, Final Draft Articles and Other Materials, Vol. 4 (Oxford University Press 
2011). 
279 
 
Woolsey, T.D. Introduction of the study of international law: designed as an aid in 
teaching, and in historical studies (C. Scribner 1864). 
Worthington, S.,Dashwood, A. & Ward, A. The Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies, Vol. 2 (Hart Publishing 2000). 
Yussof, I. and Ismail, R., ‘Human Resource Competitiveness and Inflow of Foreign 
Direct Investment to the ASEAN Region’ Asia-Pacific Development Journal, Vol.9, 
No.1, 94, (2002). <http://www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/journal_9_1/ishak.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Zee, H. H., Stotsky, J.G. & Ley, E. ‘Tax Incentives for Business Investment: a Primer 
for Policy Makers in Developing Countries’ (IMF Working Paper 2002). 
 
Authors not specified 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘An ASEAN Economic Community by 2015’ 
Fact Sheet 2008/AEC/001-2, 20 August 2008 
<www.asean.org/Fact%20Sheet/AEC/2007-AEC-001-2.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Australian Bureau of Industry Economics cited in Hall, B.E. & van Reenen, J.M. ‘How 
effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A review of the evidence’ Research Policy 29 
(2000). 
CCH Hong Kong Limited, Tax compliance in Greater China: China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan (2
nd
 edition, CCH Hong Kong Limited 2008). 
Coopers & Lybrand, Economic Benefits of the R&D Tax Credit (January1998).  
Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Report of the Committee of 
Independent Experts on Company Taxation, (Ruding Report), (Brussels, March 1992).   
Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court and the Institution of 
Developing Economies ‘The Judicial System in Thailand: An Outlook for a New 
Century’ (Japan External Trade Organisation 2001). 
Division for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM), 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), ‘The Kingdom of Thailand Public 
Administration Country Profile’, United Nations, 5 (2004) 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023244.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Explanatory Notes - The Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/11/pdfs/ukpgaen_20050011_en.pdf> 
accessed 18 November 2011. 
 
Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Treasury Committee, Principles of Tax 
Policy: Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence (The 
Stationary Office 2011). 
280 
 
House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Corporation Tax in Northern 
Ireland 1
st
 report of session 2010-2012, Vol.2 (The Stationery Office 2010). 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Principles of Tax Policy’ Eight Report of 
Session 2010-11, HC753, 15 March 2011 (The Stationary Office Limited 2011) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtreasy/753/753.pdf> 
accessed 21 November 2011. 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘The Merger of Customs & Excise and the 
Inland Revenue’, Ninth Report of Session 2003-04, HC556 (The Stationary Office 
Limited 2004) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmtreasy/556/556.pdf> 
accessed 18 November 2011. 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Bulletin for international fiscal 
documentation IBFD Vol. 50 (L.J. Venn, 1996). 
International Legal Counsellors Thailand Limited (Russin & Vecchi,), Thailand 
Business Legal Handbook Prepared for the Board of Investment Royal Thai 
Government (Millennium Edition 2000).  
Information and Communication Technology Centre, ‘Ministry of Finance Thailand 
Government Revenue’ (February 2011) <http://dwfoc.mof.go.th/menu2.htm> accessed 
10 November 2011. 
Library of Congress, ‘Thailand country profile’, Federal Research Division (July 2007). 
Mckinsey & Company, ‘Mckinsey & Co Report: Thailand’17-19 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/thailand/thiland.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Ministry of Education of Thailand, ‘Towards a Learning Society in Thailand: An 
Introduction to Education in Thailand’ 
<http://www.bic.moe.go.th/fileadmin/BIC_Document/book/intro-ed08.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, ‘Business Handbook: Section 5 - Starting a 
business in Thailand’ 28 <http://www.mfa.go.th/internet/document/h_sec5fin.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, ‘Business Handbook: Section 4 Export 
Opportunities: Thailand in the global economy’14 
<http://www.mfa.go.th/internet/document/h_sec4fin.pdf > accessed 10 November 2011. 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, ‘World Investment and Political Risk 09’, 
World Bank Group 29 <www.miga.org/documents/flagship09ebook_chap2.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
News from the Ministry of Finance (unofficial translation by the Board of Investment of 
Thailand), No. 86/2544 (11 December 2001) 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/download/law_regulations/60/roh.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
281 
 
Nordic Journal of International Law Vol. 74 (Nyt Nordisk forlag 2005). 
Office of the Council of State, Thailand, ‘Factbook: Council of State (Kritsadika)’, 
(2008) 
<http://www.lawreform.go.th/lawreform/index.php?option=com_content&task=downlo
admedia&file=c468_3.pdf&filetemp=copy%20of%20ocs%20factbook%20as%20of%2
0october%202008.pdf&lang=th&id=468 > accessed 10 November 2011. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Asia and the global crisis: 
the industrial dimension (OECD Publishing 1999). 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘OECD Benchmark 
Definition of Foreign Direct Investment’ 4th edition, the Investment Committee's 
Working Group on International Investment Statistics, Paris (2008). 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/50/40193734.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Checklist for Foreign 
Direct Investment Incentive Policies’ (2003)                                              
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/21/2506900.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Committee of Fiscal 
Affairs Forum on Strategic Management, ‘Principles of Good Tax Administration-
Practice Note’, (25th June 1999) amended 2nd May 2001, Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration, OECD, Tax guidance series, GAP001. 
<http:www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/39/1907918.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Tax Effects on Foreign 
Direct Investment-Recent Evidence and Policy Analysis’ (2008) OECD Tax Policy 
Studies No. 17. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Committee of Fiscal 
Affairs Forum on Tax Administration, ‘Tax guidance series, Taxpayers’ Rights and 
Obligations-Practice Note’ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/52/17851176.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Commentary on the Model 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital’ < 
http://www.oecd.org/document/37/0,3746,en_2649_33747_1913957_1_1_1_1,00.html> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Corporate tax incentives 
for foreign direct investment (OECD Publishing 2001). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Fundamental reform of 
corporate income tax (OECD Publishing 2007). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Policy Framework for 
Investment: A Review of Good Practices (OECD Publishing, 2006) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Principle of Good Tax 
Administration-Practice Note’ Tax guidance series General Administrative Principles-
GAP001, issued 25 June 1999, amended 2 May 2001. 
282 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Tax Effects on Foreign 
Direct Investment’, Recent Evidence and Policy Analysis No. 17, 2007. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Tax Incentives for 
Investment-A Global Perspective:  experiences in MENA and non-MENA countries’ 
(MENA-OECD Investment Programme June 2007). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Tax Policy Reform and 
Economic Growth No. 20 (OECD Publishing 2010). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Taxpayers' rights and 
obligations: a survey of the legal situation in OECD countries  (OECD 1990). 
Oxford Business Group, The Report: Thailand (2011). 
Seri Manop & Doyle ‘ Regional Operating Headquarters’ GTCC Magazine No. 1/2003 
<http://www.serimanop.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=127:re
gional-operating-headquarters&catid=40:artcles&Itemid=92> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
The Bank of Thailand, ‘Exchange Rate’ as of 4 November 
<http://www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/FinancialMarkets/ExchangeRate/_layouts/Appl
ication/ExchangeRate/ExchangeRate.aspx> accessed 4 November 2011. 
The Bank of Thailand, ‘Foreign Exchange Reserves’  
<http://www.bot.or.th/ENGLISH/FINANCIALMARKETS/RESERVEMANAGEMEN
T/Pages/BOT%20Foreign%20Reserves.aspx> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Bank of Thailand, ‘The Reserve Requirement on Short-Term Capital Inflows’ BOT 
News No. 51/2006’       
<http://www.bot.or.th/Thai/PressAndSpeeches/Press/News2549/n5149e.pdf> accessed 
10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, Announcements No.1/2550 Subject: Measure to 
Promote Research and Development Collaboration between the Industrial Sector and 
Academic Institutions, (9th April 2007), 
<http://www.thinkasiainvestthailand.com/download/A%20Guide%20to%20the%20Boa
rd%20of%20Investment.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, Announcements No. 3/2549 Subject: Additional 
Rights and Privileges for Investment to Develop Skill, Technology & Innovation-STI 
(20
th
 March 2006).                                               
<http://www.thinkasiainvestthailand.com/download/A%20Guide%20to%20the%20Boa
rd%20of%20Investment.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, Announcements No. 3/2550 Subject: 
Environmental Problem-Solving Measures (14 September 2007) 
<http://www.thinkasiainvestthailand.com/download/A%20Guide%20to%20the%20Boa
rd%20of%20Investment.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, Announcement No. 10 / 2552 (2009) Types, 
Sizes and Conditions of Activities Eligible for Promotion 
283 
 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/about/eligible_activities.asp> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand: BOI Investor Confidence Report (2010), Centre 
for International Research and Information, (15 January 
2011)<http://thaifinancialpost.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Thailand_BOI_2010_ForeignInvestorConfidenceReport.pdf > 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Foreign Investment Projects Approved by BOI 
Classified by Sector’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/download/other_statistics/1098/FDI10.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Foreign Investment from Major Countries’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/download/statistics_foreign_investment/249/FINV113.p
df> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Investment Promotion Act, 2001’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/download/boi_forms/proact_eng.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Press Release No. 92/2010 (O 49)’ on 27th May 
2010. 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/download/hot_topic/409/BOI_message_May_2010.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Projects in Zone 3 in Thailand Board of 
Investment, BOI Privileges by Location’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/about/boi_privileges_by_location.asp> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Thai ICT Industry’, Thailand Investment Review 
Vol. 20, No. 4, April 2010. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Thailand Investment Review’ 17.2 (2007), 
<http://www.boi.go.th:8080/issue_content.php?issueid=25;page=0> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, ‘The Role and Strategies of the Tax 
Administration in Developing Countries: Methods to Promote Voluntary Compliance’ 
Inter-American Centre of Tax Administration, Third Regional Training Workshop On 
International Taxation 3 December 2002. 
The Customs Department of Thailand, ‘Investment Privileges from IEAT’ 
<http://www.customsclinic.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=399
&Itemid=367&lang=en> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
‘Doing Business 2011, Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs’ The World Bank, A co-
publication of The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, (2010). 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annu
al-Reports/English/DB11-FullReport.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
284 
 
The Revenue Department of Thailand, ‘The Revenue Code Study and Development 
Project Translation’ 
<http://www.rd.go.th/fileadmin/download/PramualProj/cont01.html> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The World Bank, ‘About Us’ 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:500044
10~piPK:36602~theSitePK:29708,00.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Lao People’s Democratic Republic: 
Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (International Monetary Fund 2008). 
The World Bank, ‘Global Slump and Political Uncertainty to Continue to Weigh on the 
Thai Economy in 2009’ (10 December 2008) Bangkok 
<http://www.worldbank.or.th/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIF
ICEXT/THAILANDEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22006157~menuPK:333302~pagePK:2865
066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:333296,00.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The World Bank: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit East Asia 
and Pacific Region, ‘Thailand Investment Climate, Firm Competitiveness and Growth 
Report’ No. 36267-TH (2006) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/08/11
/000160016_20060811101441/Rendered/INDEX/362670TH.txt> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The World Bank, ‘Thailand Investment Climate Assessment Update, Report No. 44248-
TH’, (June 2008), 10 
<http://www.worldbank.or.th/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIF
ICEXT/THAILANDEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22272367~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854
~theSitePK:333296,00.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The World Bank, ‘Thailand Investment Climate, Firm Competitiveness and Growth, 
Report No.36267-TH’, (2006) 10. 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/Final_ThaiICA.doc> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
The World Bank, ‘New World Bank Report Says Thai Economy to Slow in 2007, Grow 
Moderately in 2008, Development in Partnership’ (December 2007) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/newsletter_december2
007_eng0.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Treasury Press Notice (United Kingdom), 13 May 2004 <www.hm-treasury.gov.uk> 
accessed 18 November 2011. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Definitions of FDI’ 
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3147&lang=1> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Geneva ‘Taxation 
and Technology Transfer: Key Issues’ Executive Summary, UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/2005/9 
(2005). <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20059summ_en.pdf> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
285 
 
United Nations, ‘Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment A Global Survey, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’ ASIT Advisory Studies No.16 
(2000). <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipcmisc3_en.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
USA International Business Publications, Thailand Research & Development Policy 
Handbook (International Business Publications 2007). 
United States General Accounting Office, International Taxation: Problems Persist In 
Determining Tax Effects Of Intercompany Transfer Prices (DIANE Publishing 1992). 
 
Sources in Thai 
Amoravej, P. Investment Promotion (Parliament Publication, Thailand, No. 48, 2000). 
Bangkok Bank, Thailand’s key economic indicators: Exchange Rates, (BBL Economic 
Research Department Monthly Report, 1 December 1997). 
Cabinet of Thailand, Cabinet Resolution ‘Tax measures to promote competitiveness of 
Thailand on the global market’ 11 October 2011 
<http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/cc_main21.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance of Thailand 
<http://www.fpo.go.th/FPO/index2.php?mod=Content&file=contentview&contentID=C
NT0002939&categoryID=CAT0000146> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Jumpa, M. Principle of Law, (Chulalongkorn Press 2004). 
Parliament of Thailand <http://www.parliament.go.th/files/library/b05.htm> accessed 
10 November 2011. 
Sanguthai, Y. Principle of Law (Prakraipruk 2005). 
Pinijkul, S. Financial Law and Taxation, (Winyuchon Publishing 1999). 
Boondech, P., Vanikkul, K. & Yampol, S. Judicial System in Thailand, (Ministry of 
Justice).  
Prokati, K., ‘General Rule of Application and Interpretation of law’ Journal of 100 
years in memorial of Jitti Thingsapat (2011) 
<http://www.keepandshare.com/doc/656202/?da=y> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Rabibhadanasak Judicial Research Institute 
<http://www.coj.go.th/rabi/userfiles/file/Rabi_history.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Report of Committees of the Law Commission on Investment Promotion Act 1977, 
(Library of the National Assembly, Thailand). 
Rojanavanij, P., Sansai, C., & Thongprakam, S. Taxation (Sayamcharoenpanich Ltd 
2006). 
286 
 
Ruksasut, T. ‘Hierarchy of Law’ in Jumpa, M. Legal Foundation, (10th edition, 
Chulalongkorn Publishing 2010). 
Siriwan, Y. Tax Accounting (Champa Printing 2009). 
Suwanaporn, C., ‘Thai Economy to improve in the second half of the year: Government 
stimulus measures to help the economy’ (Fiscal Policy Office 2007) 
<http://www.fpo.go.th/content.php?Action=view&section=3100000000&id=19167> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Sanongchart, S., ‘Proceeding of the Seminar on Tax Court’, organised by the Women 
Lawyer’s Association of Thailand and SVITA Training Centre, SVITA Foundation, 
Thailand (8 March 1986) .  
The Supreme Court of Thailand, ‘Responsibilities of the Supreme Court of Thailand’ 
<http://www.supremecourt.or.th/webportal/supremecourt/content.php?content=compon
ent/content/view.php&id=61> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Trachutam, C., A Guide to Tax Law (7
th
 edition, the Thai Bar 2010). 
Uwanno, B., Public Law Volume III (Nititham 1995). 
 
Websites  
Amnesty International, ‘Thailand must repeal or reform emergency legislation 
immediately’ (UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, 30 September 2010) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c2252,4565c25f1d,4ca98980a,0.html> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘Highlight on Thailand’s Homepage’ 
<http://www.asean.org/12390.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘Member Countries’ 
<http://www.aseansec.org/74.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘The ASEAN Free Trade Area’ 
<http://www.aseansec.org/12021.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Bjorkman, H. ‘Honouring the World’s ‘Development King’, sufficiencyeconomy.org 
<http://www.sufficiencyeconomy.org/old/en/files/27.pdf > accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Biography: ‘King Chulalongkorn of Siam’  
<http://www.braundeutschland.de/chula/chula-en.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Canada Revenue Agency, ‘Audits and Investigations’ 
<http://www.craarc.gc.ca/gncy/lrt/dt-eng.html> accessed 19 November 2011. 
Euromonitor International, ‘Political instability in Thailand affects ASEAN countries’ 
(6 July 2010) <http://blog.euromonitor.com/2010/07/political-instability-in-thailand-
affects-asean-countries.html> accessed 10 November 2011.  
287 
 
Fiscal Policy Office, Thailand 
<http://www.fpo.go.th/FPO/index2.php?mod=Category&file=categoryview&categoryI
D=CAT0000708> accessed 10 November 2011. 
HM Treasury, ‘Part 1: The Corporate Tax Road Map’ <www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/corporate_tax_reform.htm> accessed 21 November 2011. 
International Court of Justice, ‘The Court’ <http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&PHPSESSID=49722f09cf19cc92e78bb2241c7dfdc1> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Law Alliance, ‘Thai Regional Operating Headquarters: A better alternative to oversee 
business interests in Asia’ <http://www.lawalliance.co.th/update01.htm> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Law Library – American Law and Legal Information, Free Legal Encyclopedia, ‘pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt’< http://law.jrank.org/pages/21415/pacta-tertiis-nec-
nocent-nec-prosunt.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Library of the European Court of Human Rights, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/library/colentravauxprep.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
NMB Minebea Thailand, ‘History’ <http://www.minebea.co.th/history.html> accessed 
10 November 2011.  
NMB Minebea Thailand, ‘Profile of Minebea’ <http://www.minebea.co.th/profile.html> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, homepage 
<http://www.oecd.org> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, ‘Annex 3 – Glossary’ 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_2649_33753_37685737_1_1_1_1,00.ht
ml> accessed 24
 
September 2011Online Oxford Dictionary 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/contra+proferentem> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Online Oxford Dictionary, <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ejusdem+generis> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Promotion Certificate Issued, Board of Investment Thailand 
<http://www.boi.go.th/upload/content/1109_cer_en_96591.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Purnell, N. ‘Thailand: Bangkok Dangerous’, Newly.com, (3 May 2010) 
<http://newley.com/archive_thailand_bangkok_dangerous/> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Thai Company Law: Foreign Business Act Amendments, 
<http://www.thailandlawonline.com/article-blog/company-law-foreign-business-act-
amendments.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
288 
 
Thailand Economic Monitor, April 2007, World Bank Office-Bangkok, 30 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/Economic-
Monitor/2007april_tem_report.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Thailand Info, ‘Industrial Estates’ <http://thailandall.info/?page_id=78> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
‘Thailand to liberalise Foreign Business Act’, Bangkok International Associates, (2009) 
<www.bia.co.th/.../Foreign%20business%20article%20270209.doc> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Thaiwebsites.com, ‘Political History’ <http://www.thaiwebsites.com/political-
history.asp> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘History of the Board of Investment’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/clean/index.asp?mid=2> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Investment Policies and Criteria’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/about/investment_policies_criteria.asp> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Incentives: BOI Privileges by Location’ 
<http://ns.boi.go.th/english/about/boi_privileges_by_location.asp> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Policies for Investment Promotion’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/english/about/boi_policies.asp> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Board of Investment of Thailand, ‘Why Thailand’ 
<http://www.boi.go.th/thai/why/thailand_advantages.asp> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Customs Department of Thailand, <http://www.customs.go.th/Customs-
Eng/EPZ/EPZ.jsp?menuNme=FreeZone> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Ministry of Finance of Thailand, ‘History of Ministry of 
Finance’<http://www.mof.go.th/mofhistory_e/his_index.htm> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
The Ministry of Finance of Thailand, ‘Organisation Info’ 
<http://www2.mof.go.th/government_agencies.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Prime Minister’s Office of Thailand 
<http://www.opm.go.th/opminter/contentweb/powerContent.asp> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Revenue Department of Thailand, ‘Administration and Organisation Structure of 
the Revenue Department’ <http://www.rd.go.th/publish/6015.0.html> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Revenue Department of Thailand, ‘An Introduction to the Revenue Department of 
Thailand’ <http://www.rd.go.th/publish/6001.0.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Revenue Department of Thailand, ‘Mission of the Revenue Department’ 
<http://www.rd.go.th/publish/29984.0.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
289 
 
The Supreme Court of Thailand, <http://www.supremecourt.or.th/file/dika_eng.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Thai Court of Justice, ‘The Judiciary of Thailand’ Section 1 
<http://www.coj.go.th/eng/thejudiciary.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Thai Revenue Department, ‘Administration and Organisation Structure of the 
Revenue Department’ <http://www.rd.go.th/publish/6015.0.html> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
The Thai Revenue Department ‘Responsibilities’ 
<http://www.rd.go.th/publish/6016.0.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Thai Revenue Department, ‘Specific Business Tax’ 
<http://www.rd.go.th/publish/6042.0.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Thai Revenue Department, ‘Tax Treaties’ 
<http://www.rd.go.th/publish/29164.0.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Thai Revenue Department, ‘Value Added Tax’ 
<http://www.rd.go.th/publish/6043.0.html> accessed 10 November 2011. 
World Trade Organisation, ‘The 128 countries that had signed GATT by 1994’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. 
World Trade Organisation ‘Member Information: Thailand and WTO’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/thailand_e.htm> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
 
News articles 
Bangkok Post: ‘Breaking News, Military set to publish interim constitution’, (12 July 
2007) <http://www.bangkokpost.net/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=113154> 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
Barden, A.J. & Kuramitsu, Y. ‘Thailand's Baht Rebounds as Coup May Break Political 
Deadlock’, Bloomberg (21 September 2006) 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=avixPFpb8eqs&refer=asia
> accessed 10 November 2011. 
BBC News: ‘Thai PM deposed in military coup’, (20 September 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5361512.stm> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Chantanusornsiri, W., ‘Minebea Ruling May Open Door for More Refund Bids’, 
Bangkok Post (26 October 2010) 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/203077/minebea-ruling-may-open-
door-for-more-refund-bids> accessed 10 November 2011. 
290 
 
Fernquest, J., ‘Long political crisis hurts investment’, Bangkok Post, (6 July 2011) 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/245778/long-political-
conflict-hurts-investment> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Human Rights Watch: ‘Thailand: Repeal Emergency Decree’ 
<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/24/thailand-repeal-emergency-decree> accessed 
10 November 2011. 
Marshall, A., (ed.), ‘Factbook-Key political risks to watch in Thailand’, Reuters (1st 
July 2010) <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/07/01/risks-thailand-
idUKRISKTH20100701> accessed 10 November 2011. 
McGeown, K. ‘Thai king remains centre stage’, BBC News (21 September 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5367936.stm> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
Prachachat Online News, ‘Prime minister decides the conflict between the BOI and the 
Revenue Department, requesting an opinion of the Council of State on double tax 
collections’ Year 33, vol. 4159 (19 November 2009). 
<www.prachachat.net/view_news.php?newsid=02p0102191152&sectionid=0201~&day
=2009-11-19> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Ravilious, E. ‘Timeline: From contested elections to military coup’, The Financial 
Times, (19 September 2006). Last updated 20
th
 September 2006, 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68906b70-4806-11db-a42e-
0000779e2340.html?nclick_check=1> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Rujivanarom, T. and Suppakijjanusorn, S., ‘State Council rules in favour of BOI?’, 
Bangkok Post Business (21 April 2009) 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/15378/state-council-rules-in-
favour-of-boi> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Sullivan, B. ‘Thailand Business News, Foreign Investments drop 32% in Thailand’ 
Thailand Business News (21 January 2011) <http://thailand-business-
news.com/investment/28903-foreign-investments-drop-32-in-thailand> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
Unknown ‘Council of State ruled on a disagreement between the BOI and the Revenue 
Department’, Year 33, No.4206, (3 May 2010). 
<http://www.prachachat.net/view_news.php?newsid=02inv01030553&sectionid=0203
&day=2010-05-03 > accessed 10 November 2011. 
Unknown ‘M.R. Pridiyathorn critiques proposed changes to foreign investment policy’, 
Bangkok Post, Bangkok 23 August 2007 
<http://www.readbangkokpost.com/business/foreign_business_act/will_unelected_nla_c
hange_fore.php> accessed 10 November 2011. 
Wiriyapong, N. and Chantanusornsiri,W., ‘Court rules in favour of Minebea’, Bangkok 
Post Business (14
 
October 2010) 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/201265/court-rules-in-favour-of-
minebea> accessed 10 November 2011. 
291 
 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES AND LEGAL DOCUMENTS 
 
Thailand 
Primary Laws 
Act Promulgating the Land Code, B.E. 2497 (1954). 
Administrative Procedure Act B.E. 2539 (1996). 
Agricultural Land Reform Act B.E. 2518 (1975).  
Bankruptcy Act B.E. 2483/1940, amended by Bankruptcy Act (No.7). B.E. 2547 
(2004).  
Civil and Commercial Code B.E. 2466 (1925).  
Civil Procedure Code B.E. 2478 (1935) as amended by the Civil Procedure Code 
(No.22) B.E. 2548 (2005).  
Civil Service Act B.E. 2551B.E. 2551 (2008). 
Civil Service Reform Act B.E. 2476 (1933). 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007). 
Council of State Act B.E. 2522 (1979). 
Criminal Procedure Code B.E.2477 (1934), amended by the Criminal Procedure Code 
(No. 2) B.E. 2548 (2005).   
Customs Act B.E. 2469 (1926) as amended by the Customs Act (No. 17) B.E. 2543 
(2000). 
Customs Tariff Act B.E. 2530 (1987). 
Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure Act B.E. 
2542 (1999). 
Establishment of and Procedure for Tax Courts Act B.E .2528 (1985). 
Excise Tax Act B.E. 2527 (1984), amended by the Excise Tax Act (No.3) B.E. 2543 
(2000). 
Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999).  
Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand Act B.E. 2522 (1979), amended by Industrial 
Estate Authority of Thailand Act (No.4) B.E. 2550 (2007). 
Industrial Promotion Act B.E. 2497 (1954). 
Interest for Loan of Financial Institution Act B.E. 2523 (1980). 
292 
 
Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1977), amended by the Investment Promotion 
Act (No. 2) B.E. 2534/1991, and the Investment Promotion Act (No.3) B.E. 2544 
(2001). 
Mineral Royalty Rates Act B.E. 2509 (1966). 
Organisation of Courts of Justice Act B.E. 2543 (2000). 
Penal Code B.E. 2499 (1956), as amended by the Penal Code (No.17), B.E. 2546 
(2003).  
Petroleum Income Tax Act B.E. 2514 (1971), amended by the Petroleum Income Tax 
Act (No. 6) B.E. 2550 (2007). 
Revenue Code B.E. 2481 (1938). 
Royal Treasury Act B.E. 2418 (1875).  
Securities Exchange of Thailand Act B.E. 2517 (1974). 
Social Security Act B.E. 2533 (1990).  
Statute of the Court of Justice Act B.E. 2543 (2000).  
Tax and Duty Compensation for Export Goods Produced in Thailand Act B.E. 2524 
(1981). 
Thai Nationality Act B.E. 2508 (1965). 
Thailand Buddhist Order Act B.E. 2500 (1954).  
Undertaking of Finance Business, Securities Business and Credit Foncier Business Act 
B.E. 2522 (1979).  
 
Secondary Laws and Legal Documents 
 
Announcement of the National Executive Council, No. 337 (13 December 1972). 
Board of Investment of Thailand, Announcement No.10/2552 (2009). 
Board of Investment of Thailand, Announcement No. 1/2553 (2010). 
Board of Investment of Thailand, Memorandum Nor Ror 1301/2523 (14 March 1991). 
Board of Investment of Thailand, Memorandum Ao r Gor0901/000888 (14 November 
2006).  
Board of Investment of Thailand, Memorandum Aor Gor 0901/Nor Tor/000820 (12 
November 2007). 
Board of Investment of Thailand, Memorandum Aor Gor/Nor Tor/000821 (12 
November 2007).  
293 
 
Board of Taxation, Ruling No. 28/2538 (1995). 
Board of Taxation, Ruling No. 35/2540 (1997).  
Board of Taxation, Ruling No. 37/2551 (2008). 
Board of Taxation, Ruling No. 38/2552 (2009).  
Cabinet Resolution No. Nor 11310/2482 (2 March 1939). 
Departmental Instruction (Revenue Department), No. Paw. 8/2528 (1985). 
Departmental Instruction (Revenue Department), No. Paw 113/2545 (2002). 
Departmental Notification (Revenue Department), 5 February 1987. 
Departmental Notification (Revenue Department), 20
 
April 2009. 
Departmental Regulation (Revenue Department), No. Taw Paw 4/2528 (1985). 
Departmental Regulation (Revenue Department), No. Paw 73/2541 (1998). 
Departmental Regulation (Revenue Department), No. Taw Paw 176/2552 (2009). 
Director-General’s Notification (3 July 2009). 
Director-General’s Notifications on Income Tax No. 190-191 (15 November 2010). 
Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation, 16 July 2005. 
Ministerial Instruction No.130/2546 (21
 
April 2003). 
Ministerial Regulation No.126 B.E. 2509 (1966). 
Ministerial Regulation No. 266 B.E. 2551 (2008).  
Ministerial Regulation 271 B.E. 2552 (2009). 
Ministerial Regulation: Council of State Organisation, Office of the Prime Minister 
2002. 
National Executive Council Announcement 281 (1972).  
National Executive Council Announcement 337 (1972). 
Notification of the Ministry of Interior, March 2007, effective from 29 March 2007 to 
28 March 2008. 
Notification of the Revolutionary Council No. 227. 
Opinion of the Council of State No. 197/2530 (1987). 
Opinion of the Council of State (General Meeting) No. 403/2544 (2001).  
Opinion of the Council of State (General Meeting) No. 209/2551 (2008). 
Opinion of the Council of State Aor Gor 0901/Gor Mor/000026 (19 January 2009). 
294 
 
Opinion of the Council of State No. 158/2552 (2009). 
Revenue Department Notification 5 February B.E. 2535 (1987). 
 
Revenue Department, Ruling No. Gor Kor 0802/13731 (27 July 1993). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0802/12550 (20 July 1994). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0811/16548 (1 December 1998). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0811/Gor.1325 (5 October 2000).  
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0811/7832 (25 December 2000). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/627 (12 July 2004). 
Revenue Department Ruling No: Gor Kor 0706/648 (25 January 2005). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/ (GorMor.03) /408 (17
 
May 2005). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/10550, (19 December 2005). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/10750 (23 December 2005). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/Por./1175 (10
 
February 2006). 
Revenue Department Ruling No: Gor Kor 0706/1357 (17 February 2006). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/1625 (27 February 2006). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/1849 (6 March 2006). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/1918 (7 March 2006). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0706/2622 (28 March 2006). 
Revenue Department Ruling No: Gor Kor 0706/2935 (10 April 2006). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. GorKor 0725/12101 (11 December 2007). 
Revenue Department Ruling No. Gor Kor 0702/9578 (1 December 2010). 
Royal Decree No. 297 B.E. 2539 (1996). 
Royal Decree No.395 B.E.2454 (2002).  
Royal Decree No. 396 B.E.2545 (2002). 
Royal Decree No. 405 B.E. 2545 (2002).  
Royal Decree No. 426 B.E. 2547 (2004). 
Royal Decree No. 467 B.E. 2550 (2007). 
Royal Decree No. 469 B.E. 2551 (2008). 
Royal Decree No. 470 B.E. 2551 (2008). 
295 
 
Royal Decree No. 472 B.E. 2551 (2008). 
Royal Decree No. 473 B.E. 2551 (2008). 
Royal Decree No. 475 B.E. 2551 (2008). 
Royal Decree No. 479 B.E. 2551 (2008). 
Royal Decree No. 480 B.E. 2552 (2009). 
Royal Decree No. 484 B.E. 2552 (2009). 
Royal Decree No. 488 B.E. 2552 (2009). 
Royal Decree No. 507 B.E.2553  (2010). 
Royal Decree No. 516, B.E. 2554 (2011).  
 
United Kingdom 
Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation Act 1919. 
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005. 
Housing Act 1925. 
Housing Act 1930. 
 
International or Other Jurisdictions 
 Agreement between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Kingdom of Belgium for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion.  
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN): Framework  Agreement on the 
ASEAN Investment Area 1998. 
Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2008. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Commentary on the Model 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Article 5. 
World Trade Organisation: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 1993 
